

RAAF College & Academy 1947-86

R.E.Frost



The emblem of the College is an Australian bird, the Swift, and the motto one English word: TRUE. These are enclosed in the standard frame for R.A.A.F. badges.

Set on an azure ground with cloud-effect, the Swift is a simple and artistic symbol implying the purpose of the College and the qualities sought in its members. Thus, the Australian Swift is one of the fastest high-altitude birds in the world; it flies in all weathers, it is tireless on the wing; its flight is steadier and faster than that of the smaller swallow. In autumn in Australia, the Swifts, distributed widely over the continent, forsake their summer hunting-grounds and, having made in their millions_ an accurately-timed rendezvous, navigate a course of about 5,000 miles, truly and powerfully and speedily, and in few apparent stages. When not in the air, the Swift climbs difficult obstacles by using its whole body: beak, claws and barbed tail. Finally, the tapering, swept-back wings find "their counterpart in the design of many modern aircraft.

The economical motto TRUE not only recalls the flight of the Swift, but serves to point the personal qualities and Service ideals of loyalty, steadfastness and accuracy which the College seeks to confirm in its graduates.

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FOREWORD

BY AIR MARSHAL SIR VALSTON HANCOCK, KBE, CB, DFC

The RAAF Air Power Manual (p.35) points out that air power 'has evolved with the realisation that it is a different form of combat power in a unique environment and is at its most flexible when regarded as a single entity rather than "penny packeted" out'. The early leaders of the RAAF chose to develop the institution for training the officers of this new force as a separate college rather than an annexe to either of the existing Service colleges. In particular they sought by this means to produce an *esprit de corps* in welding the components of the new force into a single entity. This history records the beginning of that College and the subsequent problems and assessments which accompanied its progress.

There is perhaps a tendency to see the air service as a band of gladiators concerned solely with hurling their machines around the skies in search of national enemies to destroy in the air or on the land and sea. This of course is the ultimate aim of an aircrew career, but it must be seen in its right perspective. The capacity to operate a weapons platform and its accessories can be likened to the surgeon with his scalpel and supporting services. Without that equivalent skill the RAAF General Duties officer has little professional competence.

A great deal of debate surrounded the importance of aircrew training in the College syllabus, which at times obscured other qualifications and qualities sought of graduates. The College charter was not only to develop a knowledge of the new force, its power and its application, but to inculcate in each graduate the qualities of integrity, initiative, energy, determination and a knowledge of the humanities to make him a well-rounded member of the Australian community. And who will argue against the need today of these qualities, when we experience around us so much social damage for the lack of them?

The history of the College reveals the friction which developed between the older leaders of the Service with their 'hands on' methods and the new generation fresh from graduation with a deeper academic background. Young Duntroon graduates also had to run the gauntlet of tests applied by their Army elders. The same reception greeted the Duntroon trained officer when he was seconded by the Army to the RAAF. It appears that the RAAF College graduates were also treated with some suspicion by their elders and reduced to the status of 'cadet' until they had proved their worth. A college training seemed to inflict a contemporaneous form of discrimination on its graduates as their competence in staff work resulted in their selection for mundane ground duties while their peers, less well trained in administrative duties, continued to enjoy flying duties. A limited analysis of this tendency seems to reveal that, notwithstanding, this handicap in flying experience, the College graduates held their own in meeting the acid test of operational flying.

It is within the experience of this writer that some General Duties officers during the World War were shocked to learn, somewhat dramatically, that they might have occasion to place their own lives at risk if posted to active service on operational flying. It would be interesting to learn if the Australian Defence Force Academy and the newly re-established RAAF College makes a positive effort to imbue graduates with the dedication to accept such risks as a natural occupational hazard.

It is clear from the contents of this history that the College had its growing pains in trying to meet the changing national defence environment. Had it been otherwise it might have justified a suspicion that all was not well with the institution. It is worth remarking, however, that the College has avoided the public attention and derogatory image associated at times with Duntroon from unnecessary harassment of its junior class of students.

The introduction of the Australian Defence Force Academy nullifies any attempt to draw conclusions about the relative merits of the first RAAF College system of training for General Duties versus the Flying Training School stream, as it is doubtful if sufficient time has elapsed since the introduction of the College in 1947.

However, it is pertinent to speculate whether the RAAF would have been as strong and competent as it is today if it had not been for the infusion of leaders from the College/Academy imbued with the esprit de corps and the benefit derived from a balance of the Humanities and Applied Science in its syllabus.

The author has shown skill and patience in collecting and collating a surprising amount of information to present a perceptive and objective record, tinged with humour, of the history of the RAAF College/Academy so far. That in itself may be a tribute to the success of his training there.

BY AIR COMMODORE P.G. HEFFERNAN, OBE, AFC

Firstly, let me say that I am greatly honoured by having been asked to write a foreword to this valuable history of the RAAF College/Academy. Secondly, I would congratulate Air Vice Marshal Frost on the excellence of his research, which has covered the 40-odd years of the activities of that institution.

A few words will explain the part which I played in the gestation and birth of the Academy, which I regarded as essential in order to maintain the high regard the RAAF had achieved during the Second World War. After my graduation from Duntroon in 1928, I chose to be seconded to the RAAF. The year spent in flying training was almost as strict as the discipline at Duntroon, but on being posted to one of the squadrons I was astonished to find a complete change in the attitude of the officers. The CO, a very gallant pilot of the First World War, was seldom seen and - to my knowledge - never flew. The morning colour hoist parade was attended by the Orderly Officer and airmen.

This lackadaisical attitude incurred the wrath of the CAS, Air Commodore Williams. In his autobiography, "These are Facts", he stresses the poor morale and unsatisfactory attitude of the officers - so much so, that he asked for Duntroon graduates to be transferred to the RAAF. As Air Vice Marshal Frost explains, the idea of an Air Force College had been mooted for some time with no success. However, in 1927, the RAAF had agreed with the Army that four cadets would be trained annually at Duntroon and, on graduation, would transfer to the young service.

The Second World War broke out in 1939 and the idea of a college was once again forgotten. When peace was restored in 1945, I was appointed Director of Training and, after discussion with some of my Duntroon colleagues, decided that this was the time to establish an institution

which, as the years went on, would turn out officers who would bring a professional spirit to the RAAF. I thereupon presented an Agendum to the Air Board suggesting that a college, on similar lines to Duntroon and the naval college, be established. To my surprise and pleasure, this was approved in principle, with planning to proceed forthwith. A contemporary of mine, Air Commodore Hancock was appointed Commandant, his work in setting up the College being well documented in this history.

When the Australian Defence Force Academy was first mentioned I became apprehensive that the story of the College (later Academy) would be forgotten. Graduates of the College had participated in two wars, Korea and Vietnam, proving that the training given to them had paid dividends. It therefore became vital to get a record of the life of the College/Academy while some graduates of the early courses were still around. With this thought in mind, I started putting pressure on senior members of the RAAF to appoint a suitable author to write this story. After some years Air Vice Marshal Roy Frost, a graduate of the second course, was appointed. The results of his researches are well recorded in this history and unlike some authors, he has not hesitated in bringing to light some of the unfortunate events which sometimes occur in Service establishments. For this he is to be commended.

Finally, it is a great pleasure to know that Air Marshal Ray Funnell, a graduate of No. 6 Course, is the current CAS - the first graduate to attain this high position. It will be some years before the effects of the Australian Defence Force Academy are felt on the RAAF Academy (now reverted to College), but I am sure that in its brief life, the RAAF Academy has made its name in the history of the Australian armed forces.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This work was commissioned by Air Marshal Jake Newham following petitions from Air Commodore Paddy Heffernan, who was afraid that memories of the College would simply fade away before anybody had put the salient facts on paper. In reality, however, a fairly comprehensive record has been maintained on Departmental files, particularly in regard to matters of a policy nature. Another major source of information has been the College and Academy journals which give a feel for the attitudes and outlook of the cadets of the day. My discussions with officials and graduates generally confirmed what I had already read on the files and journals, and only where I thought that some amplification or alternative view was required have I included quotes in the text. Quotes, either from evidence or from published material, are acknowledged in the text and, therefore, no bibliography is included.

Any statistics included in the document should be accepted only to the degree of accuracy of the source, which was generally the Air Force List, a publication not always noted for its accuracy, and bearing in mind the competence of the author, also not always noted for his mathematical accuracy.

Individuals consulted were, for the most part, very willing and forthright contributors. As I say, I have found their views to be generally in accord with the statements on file and I have reasonable confidence that the interpretations of events depicted in this document convey a fair reflection of the impressions of the majority.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by all, but particularly that of the staff of the Australian Archives and the staff of the Archival Section of the University of Melbourne.

R.E. FROST February 1987

PROLOGUE

The first submission to the Air Board and to the Air Council in December 1920, regarding the formation of the Australian Air Force included the following passage:

Later it is hoped that vacancies for permanent commissions in the flying branch may be filled from junior officers of the Naval and Military forces and from an Air Force College for cadets if formed, or from other approved sources.

This appears to be the first formal indication of the prospect for an institution devoted solely to the training of air force officers although it was to be another 27 years before the prospect was realised.

Military flying in Australia had its origins in 1911 when the government gazette of 30 December sought applications for 'two competent mechanics and aviators' to form a military aviation corps. A proposal was later submitted to the Military Board for a flying school to be formed at Canberra with the Royal Military College, Duntroon, providing medical and other services. Henry Petre, one of the selected applicants responding to the invitation in the gazette, was sworn into the Australian Army as a lieutenant and detailed to recommend a site for a flying school. As a consequence, the submission to develop the school at Canberra was dropped and Point Cook was selected as being 'ideally suited for both land and sea planes'. Apparently, Petre had no wish to be isolated in the bush. The first course began flying at Point Cook on 18 August 1914.

Towards the end of the first World War, Major General J.G. Legge, Chief of the General Staff, proposed the setting up of a permanent military air force, influenced to some extent, perhaps, by the decision of the British Government to form an autonomous air defence service, later to become the Royal Air Force. By 1920 an Air Corps, with Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Williams in command, had been established and following an Air Board recommendation to the Air Council on 15 February 1921, the Australian Air



The RAAF's first flying course, conducted at Point Cook in 1923, included six seconded officers (one from the Navy, five from the Army) and five cadets nominated by civil aviation authorities. As well, an RAAF officer and two airmen received training. Shown here are (at rear): D.P. Davidson (cadet), Lt C.H. Simpson, L.J. Brain (cadet), Lt D.C. O'Brien-Mortimer, F/0 T.A. Swinbourne, Lt F.M. Bladin, A.D. Davidson (cadet); (centre row) Lt U.E. Ewart, Lt J.E. Hewitt, RAN, Lt D.E.L. Wilson; (front) LAC H.B. Hussey and AC1 M.G. Hawkesford

Force was formed on 31 March 1921.

It had been appreciated in the discussions leading up to the creation of the Australian Air Force that there would be some difficulties in providing men of the right calibre to serve as officers in the new Service. General Legge had stated that whilst he considered that officers of the Australian Flying Corps were very good fliers, they were too inexperienced in Service administration to fill senior positions in a new Service. He therefore supported a request to the Royal Air Force for the loan of officers. Lieutenant-Colonel Williams recognized the same intrinsic problem and was of the opinion that 'for the Permanent Air Force we needed young men with a more complete service training'. Not having the funds to establish a cadet training college, he approached the Navy and the Army and sought their agreement for four volunteer junior officers who had just completed their cadet college training to be seconded to the Air Force for a period of four years, during which time they would be trained as pilots. At the end of that time they were to return to their parent Service or, if they so wished, could apply for transfer to the Royal Australian Air Force.

The first flying course began at Point Cook on 31 January 1923 with one naval officer, five army officers, and five civil cadets. Of these, the naval officer, J.E. Hewitt, and three army officers, F.M. Bladin, U.E. Ewart and D.E.L. Wilson, transferred to the Air Force. Hewitt and Bladin subsequently reached the rank of air-vice marshal and both had an important role to play in the formation of the Royal Australian Air Force College.

It is noteworthy that in England three years previously, in line with the 1919 White Paper formulated by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard (later Viscount Trenchard), known popularly as the 'Trenchard White Paper', the Royal Air Force College had been established at Cranwell, Lincolnshire. There are many similarities between the problems outlined in Trenchard's paper to those confronting the embryo Royal Australian Air Force. According to one biographer, Andrew Boyle, he wrote:


We now come to that on which the whole future of the Royal Air Force depends, namely the training of its officers and men...

He then laid down certain postulates, included within which were:

Firstly, to make an Air Force worthy of the name, we must create an Air Force spirit, or rather foster the spirit which undoubtedly existed during the war, by every means in our power. Suggestions have been made that we should rely on the older services to train our cadets and staff officers. To do so would make the creation of an Air Force spirit an impossibility. Thirdly, it is not sufficient to make the Air Force officer a chauffeur and nothing more. Technical officers are required for the development of the science of aeronautics, navigation, meteorology, photography and wireless.

Trenchard then went on to detail his proposals, including the concept that although permanent commissions would be available through university channels or from the ranks, the main channel would be the RAF Cadet College. Trenchard was known to oppose entrance to Cranwell by competitive examination although he was overruled on this. Nevertheless, he reserved the right to review personally those cases of young men who failed to satisfy the examiners, scrutinizing references and 'character' reports from headmasters and others.

He also favoured the remote locality of the College. Cadets, he felt, would be better off in the Lincolnshire countryside than anywhere near London. 'Marooned in the wilderness, cut off from pastimes they couldn't organize for themselves, they would find life cheaper, healthier and more wholesome. The practicalities of the matter were that the majority of the first intakes of cadets were from middle class homes and lack of money might prove a handicap to cadets in any college situated too close to the attractions of London. Moreover, they'd have less cause to envy their contemporaries at Sandhurst or Dartmouth and acquire any kind of inferiority complex.'



Point Cook of the 1920s and early 1930s

Several of the points raised in the White Paper are worth bearing in mind since they have similarities to the case made a quarter of a century later for the formation of the Royal Australian Air Force College. In December 1925, Ministerial approval was given for the annual intake at the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon, to be increased by four cadets per year to cater for Air Force needs. Each year from 1927, four graduates were to be commissioned directly into the RAAF. Even at that time, thirteen of the 75 permanent Air Force officers were graduates of RMC Duntroon. The proportion had reached almost 30 per cent by 1929.

A few months previously, in a minute to Squadron Leader A.T. Cole, Director of Personnel and Training (DPT), the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Group Captain R. Williams had expressed concern over his understanding that there had been difficulty in attracting suitable applicants in sufficient numbers to RMC, Duntroon and that, consequently, some modifications had been made to the pre-war medical and educational standards. Indeed, he was 'not impressed' with the cadets he saw there during a recent visit. As there were now ten prospective RAAF officers at the RMC, he 'had been given seriously to think whether we should not consider the submission of a proposal for the establishment at Duntroon of what might be called an Air Force Wing'. He went on to outline some controls that the RAAF would expect to exercise over such a formation and some of the advantages he saw in the collocation of Army and Air Force cadets in their early training.

In response, Cole expressed support for the CAS scheme, noting that 'at the present time Duntroon advertises, as a draw to attract young men, that there is an opportunity to come to the Air Force.' He considered, however, that the odds were heavily against an individual achieving that objective and that, therefore, a separate channel of entry to the RAAF was a definite requirement. He was also concerned that the medical standard set for RMC Duntroon was too low for the needs of the RAAF (the result of medical

examinations conducted by the RAAF Director of Medical Services in October 1925 on selected Duntroon cadets appeared to lend some credence to his worries); he believed that the entrance age for RAAF cadets should be 17; and he attached a consideration of the relevance of the Duntroon syllabus to the RAAF requirement. This latter document was prepared by Dr R. Hosking who had been Professor of Physics on the civil staff at Duntroon in 1911-22 and was, at the time, the Education Officer on the staff of No.1 Flying Training School. His analysis showed that there was little in common and notes that 'the syllabus of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, contains a considerable number of scientific and air force subjects which are not touched in the Duntroon course'. Cole suggested that Dr Hosking prepare a detailed syllabus from which it would be possible to estimate the educational standard of entry as well as a basis for cost.

Hosking prepared a proposed syllabus which was arranged to fit in with 'the Duntroon course but would be completed in two years as opposed to the Duntroon four year course. The Duntroon civil staff would need to be supplemented by a- Professor of Aeronautical Science and there would be a need to staff the Aeronautical Engineering Department.

Further consideration was postponed pending an indication of the funds which were likely to be available. By this time, it was evident that the problem which Duntroon had been having in attracting suitable applicants over the last few years was not markedly improving, although in his report of 31 May 1926 Lieutenant General Sir H.G. Chauvel, Chief of the General Staff and Inspector-General, had said that it should be possible to reach the approved establishment of 80 by the following February. The cadet strength at the time was 61 (of which ten were earmarked for the RAAF). In that report he went on to say that:

The number of applicants for admission this year was disappointing, and I am of the opinion that insufficient publicity was given to the fact that candidates for permanent commissions in the Royal Australian Air Force would be trained at Duntroon. Judging by the number of applications received for training at Point Cook for short service commissions, this is a popular service, and the sooner aspiring aviators realize that the only roads to the permanent branches of the Air Force will be through Duntroon or Jervis Bay the better it will be for all three services.

This confirmed the view of Squadron Leader Cole some six months earlier that the Army might use the possibility of commissioning into the RAAF as a drawcard for candidacy for Duntroon. Chauvel's opinion that Duntroon and Jervis Bay should be the only roads to the permanent branches of the RAAF was strongly contested by the Air Board.

In a minute to the Secretary to the Department of Defence (T. Trumble), the Secretary of the Air Board (Major P.E. Coleman) on 14 February 1927 stressed the technical nature of the Air Force and made the point that the 'Service Colleges did not cater for producing technical officers or for giving them the training for making them such'. There was, therefore, a need to leave entry open to university graduates and others who had had a definite technical training (as against the general education of the College graduates). He also emphasised the need for a higher number of officers required to serve on short service commissions than was necessary for the Navy or Army, brought about by the short useful life of an officer not qualified for any other function but flying, and by the need to build up a large reserve.

Coleman compared the situation with that existing in the RAF (and, indeed, foreshadowed in the Trenchard White Paper) noting that, although the RAF had its own Cadet College, it still found it necessary to grant permanent commissions to a proportion of those initially serving on short service commissions. He went on to say that the advertisement for Duntroon indicated that those cadets who were not accepted for the RAAF would be commissioned into the Army. He blamed some of the failure to attract RAAF candidates to the Duntroon course on this particular aspect of the advertising. Finally, he stated that the 'Air Board is of the opinion that it will never get a satisfactory number of applicants for cadetships until it has its own Cadet

College, or at least, its own course at one of the Colleges, and at which cadets will be trained to be Air Force officers and if found unsuitable will not be allotted to any other Service'.

The issue was of sufficient import for it to be taken to the Defence Committee which decided to request the Chief of the Air Staff to submit a scheme for the establishment of an Air Wing at Duntroon along the lines of Cranwell. The eventual aim of the scheme was to be the restriction of permanent commissions in the Royal Australian Air Force to graduates of the naval and military colleges.

In May 1927, Group Captain Williams sought the views of Wing Commander S.J. Goble, the Air Member for Personnel (AMP), on the Duntroon Wing with a suggestion that although the Cranwell course was two years, the Royal Australian Air Force cadet course should be three years in order that the general education of the RAAF cadets should not suffer in comparison with those of the Army. He also invited 'details as to personnel required and estimates of costs in connection therewith'.

In a draft response, presumably prepared for AMP by DPT, there was somewhat grudging acceptance of the CAS proposal which would 'serve until we are in a position to establish our own College'. The fundamental objections were that, firstly, it may have been difficult later to break away from Duntroon and that, secondly, the cadets would be trained on the military and air side with practically a total neglect of the naval aspect. Although the matter apparently remained under discussion, activity seems to have been dormant until 19 April 1928 when the CAS asked the AMP again to look at the question almost in the same terms of his request nearly twelve months earlier. In the meantime, steps had been taken by the Air Board to nominate four cadets for entry to Duntroon in 1927 and two for the 1928 course.

The Air Member for Personnel was not as enthusiastic about the scheme as the Chief of the Air Staff. In his opinion, 'the first principle should be standardisation of training with the Royal Air Force cadets on Cranwell lines. The Navy and Army have standardised the training of their cadets in the respective Navy and Army Cadet Colleges in Great Britain'. (He was not quite accurate in this as the model for Duntroon was West Point.) He believed that it would be difficult to modify the four year course at Duntroon to meet air force needs and would, in the end, prove unsatisfactory. As to the question of cost, he estimated that an initial outlay of £38,000 for facilities and £18,000 for a composite flight of eight aircraft would be required - 'at present loan rate (51/4%) this represents roughly £3,000 per annum without any allowance for depreciation of buildings or equipment'. He estimated staff pay, service and civil, at a further £10-15,000 per annum and the cost of training each cadet at between £4,800-5,400 over the three year period.

Goble then drew attention to the channel for training RAAF cadets through the RAF system. Under this scheme, suitable candidates between the ages of 17 1/2 and 19 years could be selected by the RAAF, through competitive examination, to undertake the Cranwell course either at the expense of the Australian government or of the candidate's parents. On completion of the course, they would be commissioned into the RAAF but serve with the RAF on secondment for a further 3-4 years. The cost to Australia for each cadet was thought to be about £3,050. The proposals had been considered earlier but rejected largely on the grounds that the RAAF would not have the use of the officer until 5-6 years after his induction as a cadet. Goble pointed out that by training at Duntroon the RAAF would not get the newly commissioned officer until four years after he began his training and that 'he would be of no real value for at least another two years'. He suggested that the RAF trained officer would come to the RAAF better experienced, valuable as an instructor and at considerably less cost.

Williams (now Air Commodore) does not appear to have been impressed by these arguments, writing tersely on 19 June 1928 that it was 'of course, largely a matter of Government policy as to whether Air Force officers should be trained in Australia or Great Britain, apart altogether from cost which, however, will have a bearing on the decision. I think we might hold this matter until Sir John Salmond arrives.'

Air Marshal Sir J.M. Salmond of the Royal Air Force arrived in Melbourne on 2 July 1928 in response to a request from the Commonwealth Government. He was invited by the Minister of State for Defence, Sir Thomas Glasgow, to submit a report covering the organization, administration, training and general-policy of

development of the RAAF. Salmond had had the opportunity to discuss with the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff the plan that had been proposed by Williams, namely that there should be a RAAF Wing at RMC Duntroon; that the first year of the course would be a general education as undertaken by the Army cadets; that a start would be made in the second year on RAAF subjects; and that the third year would be entirely devoted to RAAF subjects. Flying training was to be given in the second and third years at the Training Flight of the Permanent Army Co-operation Squadron which he had recommended should be established in Canberra. Those pilots destined for the unit working with the Fleet were to do a short course in flying sea-going aircraft at No.1 Flying Training School after leaving the College.

Salmond saw no need for similar arrangements to those made with Duntroon to be made with the Royal Australian Naval College, Jervis Bay. (Indeed, the Naval Board had put this question in abeyance in July 1928.) 'Ultimately', he reported, 'as the Force develops, it may be necessary to establish a separate cadet college solely for the purpose of training RAAF cadets.' For the present, he strongly recommended to the Government the establishment of the RAAF Wing at Duntroon as a means for the entry of officers to permanent commissions in the RAAF. In essence, his report of 20 September 1928, in so far as basic officer training was concerned, identified little that had not already been evident to the Air Board.

The issue of officer training had been picked up in an article in the Melbourne Herald on 15 September 1928. It noted that there 'is a Royal Naval College, a Royal Military College, but at present there is no Royal Air College.' It pointed out that the facilities available at the existing colleges were in excess of the requirements of the Navy and Army at that time and that amalgamation had been suggested as 'a means of cutting down expense', but that in practice such a scheme was generally regarded as impracticable. 'The immediate cause of their [the colleges] inactivity is the restricted scope of the naval and military services, which offers no future hope of great expansion. On the other hand, the Air Force is growing rapidly, and will require a college of its own.' It concluded that 'the present position is regarded by no one as satisfactory'.

Within a year, world economic conditions entered a rapid decline and the new Labor Ministry, under the leadership of Prime Minister Scullin, was forced to impose stringent cuts on defence expenditure. For economic reasons it was planned that the naval college should move from Jervis Bay to Flinders Naval Depot and the RMC from Duntroon to Victoria Barracks, Sydney.

Earlier, in June 1930, the Director of Training (Squadron Leader W.D. Bostock, later Air Vice-Marshal), in a minute to AMP and CAS, wrote that 'one of the essentials for the efficient training of youths for permanent commissions in the Air Force is that they should commence their Air Training early and concurrently with their instruction in basic Air Force subjects. In addition, it is of great advantage if young pupils are surrounded by an Air Force environment and become familiar with aircraft right from the commencement of training.' He saw Duntroon as well suited to the purpose. However, he noted that the removal of the existing military establishment to Sydney and a proposal to reduce the length of the course to include only professional training, would negate the chief advantages that Duntroon offered the Air Force cadet.

Bostock went on to say that 'one of the biggest incentives for the Short Service Commission Officer to improve his Air Force knowledge and increase his usefulness to the Service is his hope of gaining a permanent commission. This avenue for personal advancement is at present strictly limited and any improvement in this direction would undoubtedly result in improving the attractiveness of Short Service Commissions and therefore improve the class of youth willing to accept them'. His view was that the existing system could well work to the disadvantage of the Service in that the available number of vacancies did not allow highly qualified short service commission officers to be retained while most vacancies were being filled by inexperienced direct entrants. His recommendation was that the RAAF stop sending cadets to Duntroon and that all new General Duties Branch officers should be appointed to a short service commission on graduation from the Flying Training Course, thus widening the available selection for permanent commission officers, which should not be made until the second year after graduation.

These sentiments were later picked up in a minute from the Secretary of the Air Board (Coleman) to the Secretary of Defence (M.L. Shepherd) in which he wrote that:

The proposed changes now under consideration remove the chief advantages of the College from the Air Force point of view, because, in the first place, a suitable aerodrome is neither available nor likely to become available at the new site of the College and, secondly, if the basic educational curriculum is deleted, then the course offers little common ground for the training of both Army and Air Force cadets.


The Air Board has for some time past had a much better selection of candidates for direct entry from civil life to the Royal Australian Air Force than has been the case with candidates for Royal Military College. Further, many of those trained at No.1 Flying Training School on direct entry for short service commissions have turned out to be better officers than some of those trained at the Royal Military College for permanent commissions.

The training of candidates for direct entry is carried out at No.1 Flying Training School, Point Cook, during a course of instruction in flying and ground subjects, covering a period of one year. Officers trained at the Royal Military College must also complete this course before they are available for duty as Air Force officers.

The present system of giving cadets an Army training at the Royal Military College followed by a further period of one year at No.1 Flying Training School is unnecessarily expensive.

The Board considers that it could carry out the training of its present requirements in permanent officers by direct entry to the Flying Training School with a better selection, lesser cost, and with no increase in present establishments, and as the proposed change in location as well as in the course of training given at the Royal Military College will be even less suitable for the training of Air Force cadets than was the case previously, the Board recommends that the entry of cadets to the Royal Military College for training for the Air Force be discontinued.

There were twelve RAAF cadets at Duntroon at that time: four in the first year, two in the second, four in the third and two in the fourth year. Their futures, in terms of conditions of service, were very much open to doubt. There were a number of options to be considered. Firstly, they were all to be given the option of electing to accept appointment in the Commonwealth Public Service (one of the austerity measures adopted at that time); the Military Board would not guarantee the transfer to the Staff Corps of any of the officers or cadets who went to the RAAF and were later found to be temperamentally unfit for flying; the Air Board would be prepared to nominate a cadet or officer on graduation as a pilot to a short service commission in the RAAF; or the Air Board would be prepared to nominate a cadet to the RAF College Cranwell if he so desired. In the event, the four senior cadets, A.G.



Eleven of the twelve RAAF cadets to be transferred from RMC Duntroon in December 1930, as a result of stringent cuts in Defence expenditure which necessitated the transfer of the military college from Canberra to Victoria Barracks, Sydney. Cadet McLachlan is the person missing. All except Sharp, who was injured in a flying accident, successfully graduated as pilots.

Pither, CM. Blarney, W.L. Hely and H.E. Sharp, graduated as lieutenants on 9 December 1930 and were seconded to the RAAF from the Australian Staff Corps and were to 'report to RAAF HQ, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, at 9.15am on 15.1.31 in readiness to proceed to Point Cooke'. Cadets R.A. Holmwood, W.H. Garing, T.C Curnow, A.C Mills, A.M. Murdoch, H.F. Boss-Walker, CD. Candy and I.D. McLachlan were placed on Course A, along with the RMC graduates, to begin on 15 January 1931. Graduating seniorities were to be determined by their date of entry into Duntroon, and assuming satisfactory service, all would eventually be granted permanent commissions in the RAAF.

All officers and cadets successfully graduated from No.10 Flying Training Course 'A' on 10 December 1931, with the exception of Cadet Curnow, and were appointed to either permanent or short service commissions depending upon their entry date into RMC Duntroon. Cadet Curnow subsequently passed a supplementary examination in 'engines' and was also commissioned. By April 1933, all officers had been granted permanent commissions other than Sharp, who had been discharged as a result of injuries sustained in a flying accident, and Boss-Walker who had transferred to the RAF.

CHAPTER 1

PRELUDE

The conclusion reached by the Air Board in 1930 that the RAAF's need for permanent officers could be met by commissioning of graduates from Flying Training School appears to have put to rest any proposals for a separate college for the whole of that decade. In the light of the existing economic situation such a proposal would, in any case, have been almost impossible to sustain and, of course, the declaration of war in September 1939 put any such thought totally in abeyance. Indeed, it was not until 1945 when planning for the post-war Air Force was getting under way that the matter again came to the surface.

In a minute to the Air Member for Personnel (Air Commodore J.E. Hewitt), the Director of Training (Group Captain P.G. Heffernan, later Air Commodore) suggested that:

[As] post war planning is now in full swing, it is thought that the time is ripe to put forward proposals for the establishment of a RAAF Cadet College. The Army has Duntroon and the Navy trains its officers at Flinders. The Air Force, prewar and at present, had to rely for its officers on seconded Army, Navy and short service commissioned personnel. These officers no doubt did an excellent job in running the Air Force and in organizing the terrific expansion that was necessary during the hostilities period, but there is one thing that is lacking and that is an "RAAF Esprit de Corps". To my mind there is only one way to inculcate this spirit - and that is to start at the beginning. In other words, to get young men and to sow the seed of this spirit in their minds and allow it to flourish under the right type of instructor and environment. A Cadet College based on Army and Navy lines would fulfil these ideas. For the next three years the Air Force is in the process of stabilisation and our staffs, composed of permanent and duration officers, are ample to cope with this period. By 1949 the Air Force will be needing new officers to supplement its staffs.

Heffernan then outlined his proposal for a three year course involving civil and military training, progressively emphasising military and technical aspects. Flying training was to start in the second year and continue through to the third year of the course. He laid down some basic pre-entry qualifications and suggested an intake of fifteen per year, expecting a wastage of three. He further went on to recommend that certain students be sponsored for university training and that all graduates should be required to sign an undertaking not to leave the Service for ten years otherwise they should forfeit a sum of £750 (\$1,500). Of interest was his proposal that the location of the College should be at Canberra 'in view of the necessary liaison with Army personnel and it is thought that if possible some use might be made of the instructional staff of Duntroon'. The link that graduates still had with the RMC was still in evidence and, indeed, for some was to persist throughout their air force careers and beyond.

The proposal was strongly supported by the Director of Personnel Services (Group Captain H.A. Winneke). The dis-bandment of the Empire Air Training Scheme had left the Service without an initial entry training organization and, Winneke advised, 'unless something is done soon to revive or replace the pre-war organization, the Service will be left for some years after the conclusion of the war with an ugly gap in its ranks'. He considered that a better system than that operating pre-war was required and that if the Service was to flourish, it must have the best possible permanent cadre which, he believed, could only be achieved by the institution of a cadet college which would be 'the only means of entry for permanent officers'. Hence, there is a marked difference between his view and that of Heffernan who specifically highlighted that 'this [the college] is not intended to be the sole source of entry for this type of officer'.

The Air Member for Personnel (Hewitt) agreed that the proposal should be submitted to Air Board to seek its agreement in principle. Later, Heffernan was to express some surprise at the readiness with which his proposal was received, since 'when I showed my first drafts of the agendum round RAAF Headquarters, there wasn't much enthusiasm shown, except from my Duntroon mates.' A number of drafts were prepared which varied little from the original Heffernan proposal other than that the course had now been extended to four years, which brought it into line with RMC Duntroon and the RANC, Jervis Bay.

The submission drew heavily on the pre-Second World War background of officer provisioning for its justification. Its main arguments stemmed from the view that there were few officers holding permanent commissions 'whose training had been intrinsically an air force training from an early age'. It was claimed that although the various civil, military or naval experiences of the officer corps had contributed considerably to the broad administrative development of the Royal Australian Air Force, such diversity of background was not conducive to the development of an 'air force spirit'. The inference was that the ideas of the young officer were very much influenced by the background and attitude of his seniors, the results of which need not necessarily be good. In short, the Air Board was persuaded by virtually the same argument that had been used by Admiral Henderson and Lord Kitchener in regard to the RANC and RMC respectively and by Lord Trenchard in regard to the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell.

The Air Board approved the proposal in principle and referred the agendum back to the Air Member for Personnel and the Chief of the Air Staff (AVM G. Jones) conjointly for elaboration. At the suggestion of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Air Commodore F.M. Bladin) a sub-committee was formed comprising the Director of Training (Heffernan), Deputy Director of Organization (Group Captain W.L. Hely, later Air Vice-Marshal) and Director Air Staff Plans (Group Captain M.O. Watson, later Air Commodore). These officers were to confer with Director of Postings (Group Captain A.M. Murdoch, later Air Marshal) to submit proposals leading to plans for the implementation of the college. All participants, it might be noted, were former students at RMC, Duntroon; both Murdoch and Watson later becoming commandants of the RAAF College.

By November 1945, a considerable amount of preparatory work had been done towards producing an establishment table, an outline of conditions of service, and other details in connection with setting up the college. Unfortunately, little real progress towards implementation of planning was being made. Heffernan urged Hewitt to bring the matter to the attention of the Minister so that his approval in principle might also be obtained.

The Chief of the Air Staff did not, however, favour a piecemeal approach to the Minister. He preferred to go forward with a submission outlining the airmen aircrew scheme, noting that airmen aircrew selected for a second term could be commissioned, and that in parallel with this would be an avenue to a permanent commission through a cadet college with candidates chosen from serving airmen, Air Training Corps cadets, and persons in civil life. Jones felt that 'if the Minister saw the general outline of our proposed schemes, he would be in a better position to approve the -principles we propose, including the Cadet College'.

The Air Board approved, in principle for planning purposes, a scheme submitted by the Air Member for Personnel as the basis for aircrew provisioning in the post war air force, which satisfied Jones' requirements and cleared the way for further consideration of an organizational plan and curriculum for the establishment of the RAAF cadet college. This had been prepared by February 1946 and was submitted to the Air Board, as a proposal for implementation, on 8 March 1946.

The submission laid down the qualifications for entry; selection processes; conditions of service; bases for discharge; pay and allowances; leave; staffing; and system for instruction. The submission also argued for the location of the college to be at Point Cook, based mainly on the availability of accommodation, technical and sporting facilities, and the presence of the Central Flying School and Aircraft Performance Unit.

The Air Board strongly supported the establishment of the college along the lines suggested, visualising that its graduates would be the major, but not exclusive, source of the supply of officers. The Board recommended

that the first course of not less than 24 air cadets should start in January 1947 at Point Cook, where the cost of its establishment should be inconsiderable. The Board saw the main recruitment pool being apprentices and the Air Training Corps.

On 24 October 1946, and it is not clear what engendered the delay, the Minister for Air (A.S. Drakeford) asked the Minister for Defence (F.M. Forde) to refer the proposal to the Defence Committee which was about to consider and report on the post-war organization of the three Services. He also requested that the Committee be asked to consider the establishment of the college as a separate and urgent matter. To the Air Board, however, Drakeford expressed some reservations on the need for cadets to spend the first two years of the course on academic studies.

The Defence Committee (in effect, the composition was that of a Chiefs of Staff Committee) agreed in principle with the proposal, noting that the pre-war system by which the RAAF obtained officers through Duntroon was unsatisfactory both to the Army and to the RAAF. In any case, the accommodation and general facilities at the RMC, Duntroon, were then such that the Army would not be able to train personnel for the RAAF as its own requirements would fully tax the resources of the college. In responding to the Minister for Air, the Minister for Defence (now J.J. Dedman) noted that the questions of strength and organization of the post-war defence forces would be submitted at an early meeting of the Council of Defence. In the mean-time, he sought estimates of the capital and maintenance costs.

At about that time, the responsibility for planning for the RAAF cadet college had passed from AMP Branch to the CAS Branch and an ad hoc committee chaired by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Air Commodore J.P.J. McCauley) was formed for the purpose. Such fundamental issues as course population, entry standards, location and duration were to be re-examined. Coincidentally, there also seemed to be a growing appreciation that the prospect of a RAAF cadet college could be realised and some urgency began to be injected into the planning process, since it was clearly intended that if Cabinet approval to establish the college was given, the first entry was to be January 1948. Costing for example, was 'to take precedence over the Guided Weapons Range project'. Considerable staff effort went into the preliminary planning phase, but no significant differences from the original submission emerged except the broadening of the range of the age of applicants to make the upper limit 18 years instead of the proposed 17.

It is evident, however, that those involved were having some difficulty in coming to terms with what precisely the Air Board had in mind as the academic graduating level for cadets. At one meeting, the DCAS advised that he had discussed with the army the formation of the RAAF cadet college and the aims and organization of the RMC, Duntroon. 'The RMC is aiming at a high standard, the intention being to bring students up to the Bachelor Degree standard in Arts or Science or second year in Engineering.' In regard to the RAAF cadet college, 'second year standard in Arts, Science or Engineering should at first be aimed at, but the ultimate aim should be Degree standard in Arts or Science or second year in Engineering.'

In March 1947 the CAS submitted a document in response to the Minister's query of the previous October regarding the length of the course. It was, he wrote, the opinion of the Air Staff that the tendency in modern military colleges is to broaden the basis of education and to concentrate more on imparting instruction in science, engineering and the humanities. The comments made earlier in the ad hoc committee by the DCAS in regard to the end academic graduation standards were reiterated. Additionally, he outlined the difficulties that the Army was having in its attempts to gain university recognition of the standard of education being achieved. Even though examination papers had been set and corrected by the university authorities of Sydney and Melbourne alternately, a pass did not automatically entitle the graduate to credit in any faculty with the possible exception of those who had specialised in engineering. He used this to argue that the RAAF cadet college would need to demonstrate 'the soundness of its teaching' before it would be allowed to confer degrees. When it had done this, he continued, a move should be made towards obtaining recognition of the college so that its graduates could be awarded a bachelor degree in Arts or Science. At that time, the

entry qualification would be raised to matriculation standard. This, taking into account the cadets' military activities, would justify the course being of four years duration.

At about that time, progress towards implementing any plans for the establishment of the cadet college appeared to be stagnating. The government looked likely to defer taking a decision on the proposal until the strength and organization of the post-war RAAF had been determined. This seems the likely period to which Air Vice-Marshal Hewitt refers in his book *Adversity in Success* when he writes: 'I made repeated visits to Drakeford's office, needled on by Hancock, Murdoch and Heffernan' (Heffernan, at this time, would actually have been on the staff of Overseas Headquarters, London.) Jones, in order to keep things moving, recommended that the Minister for Air should take up with the Minister for Defence the question of obtaining approval to establish the College without awaiting the outcome of considerations on future RAAF strength and organization. He was able to make this recommendation because it had been determined that the cadet college could be afforded within agreed basic allocations of annual funds. The Acting Minister for Air (H.C. Barnard) forwarded a letter to the Minister for Defence along the lines proposed by the CAS on 8 May 1947.

On 30 May 1947, the Council of Defence considered 'Matters Relative to Post-War Defence Policy and the Allocation of the Vote'. It noted that the establishment of a RAAF cadet college, for which provision was made in the Air Force Plan, was the subject of consultation between the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Air, and that a submission thereon would be made to the Council as early as possible. This caused Jones to again point out to the Minister in a strongly worded minute on 10 June 1947 that the cadet college could be afforded out of the basic annual allocation of funds and that, in view of earlier Defence Committee approval in principle, the Minister should therefore seek immediate approval from the Minister for Defence to enable the preparatory work to be completed in order to be ready to accept cadets for training in January 1948. The next day, the Minister (Drakeford) simply repeated that he and the Minister for Defence were to discuss the matter and that a submission would be placed before the Council of Defence at its next meeting. In the meanwhile, no decision regarding the establishment of the college could be taken. DCAS then directed the Director of Staff Duties (Group Captain J.A. Cohen) to prepare the required submission.

On 3 July the Council of Defence finally recommended that the establishment of a cadet college be approved; that the College be located permanently at Canberra, and that the Minister for Air should arrange for a detailed examination of what this would involve, and submit revised proposals, including estimates of capital and maintenance costs and personnel establishments; and, as it was desirable that the college should commence to function in January 1948, that approval be given for its establishment on a temporary basis at Point Cook, pending consideration of the arrangements for its permanent location in Canberra. This advice together with a statement of approval by Prime Minister J.B. Chifley was passed to the Secretary, Department of Air, from the Department of Defence on 9 July 1947. It was duly noted by the Air Board on 16 July and the CAS directed the Director of Staff Duties to take the necessary action to establish the College and arrange for the first intake, and the Director of Air Staff Plans (Group Captain V.E. Hancock) to prepare a plan for the establishment of the college at Canberra covering all aspects including site, buildings, staff and flying facilities.

The sequence of events at the time is interesting in that the Prime Minister had approved the recommendations well in advance of the submission to Cabinet, the next meeting of which was not to be held until 15 August 1947, at which time Cabinet endorsed the Prime Minister's action. This probably accounts for the passage in Hewitt's book in which he writes that Drakeford sent for him one afternoon to say that 'the Prime Minister says you can have your College provided it is at university level agreed by Melbourne University and it is at Point Cook'. This, of course, is not an accurate reflection of what the Cabinet agreed to but it may well have been Drakeford's version, coloured perhaps by his own background knowledge. At the Cabinet meeting, incidentally, Drakeford had pointed out in regard to siting at Canberra, that in all probability the government would be required to undertake the establishment of another aerodrome in the vicinity of the

RAAF cadet college. This would have become necessary because of the risk involved in cadets carrying out flying exercises at the same time that civil traffic, which was expected to increase, was using the aerodrome.

A number of concomitant planning and administrative activities were taking place round about this time. The Air Board agreed that the establishment should be known as the Royal Australian Air Force College rather than Cadet College. Its Charter was agreed on 26 September 1947 and a pamphlet detailing the conditions of entry and service for the RAAF College was approved.

In the meantime, the question of the academic staffing of the College was being examined. Agreement had already been reached that there would be a need for a division into two departments: Scientific and Technical, and Humanistic. Each would be headed by a Senior Tutor under the control of a Director of Studies. There were to be, at maturity, two lecturers in the Scientific and Technical branch and one in the Humanistic. First priority, naturally, was given to the selection of the Director of Studies. Apart from all else, his contribution to the development of the syllabus and instructional methods, standards and like matters would be vital in these late planning stages and the formative months of the College. It was evident that a great deal of difficulty was anticipated in being able to find somebody of sufficient quality prepared to accept the job, so much so, in fact, that an exploratory message was sent to RAAF Overseas Headquarters asking them to investigate the possibility of obtaining 'a member on loan from RAF' to fill the appointment. This request was still active as late as August 1947.

In the event, a paper was prepared for the AMP to submit to the Air Board on 13 August 1947 which sought to initiate action for the appointment of the Director of Studies. It argued that, because the RAAF College aimed to complete the equivalent of not less than three years academic work including matriculation and up to second year university standards in Science, Arts and Engineering, the qualifications required of the College's academic staff would be far in excess of those required by the staffs of the naval and military colleges. "The duties of the Professors and Lecturers at the Royal Military College,' AMP claimed, 'are in no way comparable with the duties proposed for the Director of Studies, RAAF College. There is not the standard, nor the range nor the coordination with Service requirements that will be required by the Air Force.' The reasoning led to a proposal that the Director of Studies should, therefore, be paid at a considerably higher level than his counterparts at either of the other Colleges. Indeed, the salary proposed was about twice that of the Director of Studies at the naval college. At the same time, it was acknowledged that the academic staffs of both colleges were considerably underpaid and that discussions were being held between Army and the Universities Commission with a view to reaching graduate standards in RMC studies.

Almost echoing Trenchard's words, AMP argued that it was 'almost a truism that the future RAAF can be no better than the Air Force College.' The Director of Studies was seen as holding a key position in the College and great stress was placed on the need for careful selection. The qualities to be sought would include both the highest academic attainment as well as a capacity to fit into the pattern of Service life. A salary range of £1,300-1,500 (\$2,600-3,000) was recommended. The Air Board, however, although it recognized the need to attract applicants with outstanding qualifications and merit and having regard to salaries paid to comparable staff at the RMC, saw fit to recommend a salary range of £1,000-1,100 (\$2,000-2,200). In the event, and despite the force of the foregoing argument, the office of Director of Studies was gazetted on 23 October 1947 with salary limits of £840-912 (\$1,680-1,824), identical to those of the professors employed at the RMC.

A note on the Air Board minute shows that Mr A.J. Black, BA, BSc, Dip Ed, was appointed to the post on 13 February 1948. It is doubtful whether a better choice could have been made than the late Alec Black, who served the College in this capacity until 16 March 1954. He died returning from an overseas visit during which he was to examine British educational trends and to make a special study of the organisation of service colleges there. He was regarded as 'an organiser of extraordinary ability, a character of steel-like inflexibility tempered with a generous heart' who commanded the respect of the cadets, drew their admiration and inspired their confidence.

Some months later, Ministerial approval was sought and granted to appoint a Senior Tutor (Scientific and Technical), a Senior Tutor (Humanistic) and a lecturer (Scientific and Technical). Again, attempts to win higher salaries than those available to the staff at the RMC were unsuccessful. An eventual need to increase the staff to the full complement of six was also foreshadowed. A submission leading to that end was put to the Minister in July 1948 but before agreeing, Drakeford sought justification for the full establishment being provided so early in the program; that is, before the full student population had been achieved. The AMP was able to satisfy the Minister as to the need and he approved the increase the following month. Changes to the academic strength of the College were to be a continuing feature of its management.

Concurrently, Ministerial approval was being sought for the expenditure of £3,200 to provide urgent preliminary works to enable the College to function by January 1948. Works were to be undertaken only on the basis that Point Cook was to be the temporary location and they included adaption of a hut to be used as a dining hall served by the Officers' Mess; provision of an ante-room; conversion of huts to laboratories; adaption of huts to lecture rooms and for accommodation; and other minor alterations. The cadets were to occupy officers' quarters to the north of the Officers' Mess (a fibro-cement construction known by cadets as 'The Annex'). Other huts were to be progressively transferred to the area as quarters as the need developed. Ultimately, the College facilities were to be taken over by the Flying Training School. It would be of no surprise to later generations of officers to find that the revised Department of Works and Housing estimate of costs exceeded that of the Director of Works and Buildings by between 200 and 300 per cent in some areas, giving rise to some unfavourable comment by the Minister.

The RAAF College officially formed at Point Cook on 1 August 1947 as a separate Air Force unit within the command of Headquarters, Southern Area, and under the immediate command of Headquarters, RAAF Station Point Cook, for the purpose of administration. Functional control of the College was to be exercised by Air Force Headquarters. Present-day planners and project managers might, therefore, be excused for having misgivings over the prospects of a project timed to start in January 1948 which appeared to have so many loose ends well into the late months of 1947. Indeed, although applications had been called for in early October and were to close by 31 October 1947, detail such as the principles and procedures to be adopted in the selection of cadets had not been resolved as late as November 1947. Nevertheless, an interview team comprising the Air Member for Personnel, the Commandant and a psychologist were able to conduct interviews during the first half of December. A total of 160 applications were received for consideration. Of these, preliminary processing eliminated 110 and of the 50 called up for medical and psychological testing, 14 failed. The remaining 36 were interviewed and of these 18 were selected as suitable, although five were provisional being subject to attaining satisfactory passes at the current Leaving Certificate examinations.

The Air Board recommended these nominations to the Minister on 19 December, advising that the first course would now commence on 23 February 1948. Understandably, the Minister expressed concern, in view of the substantial overheads associated with the establishment of the College and the desirability of maintaining an output of 20 graduates per year, that the initial course target of 24 students had not been met. He suggested that efforts should be made to bring the intake up to 24 even at this late stage. Accordingly, the Minister was asked to raise the upper age limit to 20 years, which he agreed to do for that course only. This allowed another five applicants to be regarded as eligible and, in addition, three late applications were also considered. In the long run, 14 of the original 18 selectees were attested and commenced training at the College on 23 February 1948, one on each of 25 February, 1 and 2 March, and 12 April and four on 21 April. Thus, the total intake for the first course was 22 air cadets and it was intended that deficiencies in strength would be made up on the second course. In fact, 112 of 201 applicants were interviewed for the No.2 Course, resulting in 28 eventual selections, five of whom were destined for the Technical Branch.

One matter which remained outstanding from the earlier negotiation in regard to the establishment of the College was the direction that Point Cook was to be a temporary home only and that its permanent location

was to be near Canberra. A committee had been appointed by the Chief of the Air Staff to examine possible sites under the chairmanship of Air Commodore Hancock, now commandant of the College.

The final report of the Committee, produced some time in June 1948, laid down what it regarded as essential features that a suitable site should embrace. It mentioned aerodrome requirements, noting that the 'training aircraft of tomorrow will have the characteristics of the operational aircraft of today'; topography, particularly in regard to approach lanes; meteorological conditions; buildings and development including married quarters 'to ensure that members of the staff are available at all times to provide essential services and to exercise that close supervision and personal supervision vital to the balanced development of air cadets'; engineering services; road access; rail service; isolation from other units, claimed to be desirable on the basis of the adverse effect which 'premature contact with any but carefully selected personnel' could have on impressionable young cadets; proximity to centres of population, and hence there was marked variance with Trenchard's view that the cadets should be isolated, since the Committee saw social contact with their civilian contemporaries and the ability to experience literary, artistic, musical and dramatic cultural activities as important elements of the cadets' development as leaders; and, finally, the need to site the College contiguous to an aerodrome. The Committee physically inspected three sites in the area and concluded, largely on the grounds of meteorological conditions, terrain and potential civil air traffic, that a suitable site did not exist in the ACT or adjoining territory.

CHAPTER 2

DEBUT

The RAAF College formed as a unit on 1 August 1947 under the temporary command of Wing Commander A.D. Swan. Air Commodore (later Air Marshal Sir) V.E. Hancock was appointed Commandant with effect from 15 September 1947. Staff were gradually built up over the next few months, including Flight Lieutenant C.G. Thomas (later Group Captain) as Adjutant, Squadron Leader L.T. Spence as Senior Administrative Officer (later killed in Korea while commanding No.77 Squadron), Wing Commander A.B. McFarlane as Assistant Commandant (later Secretary, Department of Air), Warrant Officers Huggan and Dolphin as Warrant Officer Disciplinary and Engineer respectively, Squadron Leader W.D. Hardy for instructional duties and Mr A.J. Black as Director of Studies. His staff was in place just before the bulk of No.1 Course marched in on 23 February 1948. The College was formally opened by the Chief of the Air Staff (Jones) on 25 February 1948.

It became evident, almost from the outset, that there would be - difficulty in achieving the required academic standards as far as No.1 Course was concerned. At the end of four weeks instruction, the Director of Studies submitted to the College's Board of Studies a report that the teaching staff was gravely disturbed by the unsatisfactory educational records of many of the cadets and the slow rate of progress being made by them. Indeed, he believed that the general level of ability seemed to be lower than that required to complete university Science course, starting with matriculation in that year.

Demonstrably, several cadets had failed critical subjects at Leaving Certificate level and others had not met the qualifications specified for entry. Between the 17 cadets then in attendance, there had been 68 subjects failed at Intermediate Certificate and higher standards.

Another five cadets were yet to be inducted at this stage, primarily as potential candidates for commissioning in the Technical Branch. These educational limitations imposed considerable burdens on the staff, to which were added other difficulties created by the comparatively late entry date, the absence of a qualified lecturer in English Expression and the delay in appointing the remaining members of the teaching staff (Mr S. Lowe, Senior Lecturer Humanistic, was not appointed until 15 June 1948 and Mr B. Schaefer, Lecturer Scientific and Technical, until 2 December 1948).

Remedial measures which generally increased the number of teaching periods and aimed to allow scope for more individual tuition were put into effect. The situation was regarded as sufficiently important for the Commandant to acquaint RAAF Headquarters with the current and potential problems. On the whole, the immediate reaction at RAAF Headquarters was not as despondent as might have been expected - perhaps rightly so since, in the end, only six of the 22 members of No.1 Course were discharged through failure to meet the required academic standards. Even so, the overall suspension rate was high, and the seeds of future doubts among several senior officers as to the justification for the College may well have been sown about that time.

Quite evidently, the diverse entry standards and the length of the course were to create problems for some time to come. Indeed, in January 1951 the RAAF Senior Psychologist observed that entry standards were lower than those required for Duntroon and that at interview some candidates had selected the RAAF simply on the basis that they were not up to the Duntroon standard. Moreover, he pointed out that the three year age range disadvantaged the younger cadets which, as a group, tended to have a higher failure rate. This gave rise to a reasonably lengthy debate between the Air Member for Personnel (Air Vice Marshal Bladin) and Hancock (then Deputy Chief of the Air Staff) as to whether provision could and should be made for entry to a three-year course at the College for those candidates with matriculation qualifications. In effect, this would be tantamount to a special entry into the second year of the regular course.

Hancock argued against the proposal on the grounds that not only was the first year designed to bring members from different States up to a common standard but also that future RAAF leaders required a liberal

basic education in the arts and sciences with emphasis on logical thought and clear expression. 'Such a standard,' he wrote, 'inevitably means a lengthy course in which the student is trained to special air force needs which cannot be fully met by any institution outside the Service.' In this he was echoing the views of the acting Director of Training to the effect that unless the College graduate received a training in leadership, Service matters generally, and received an academic and cultural background on a very much higher level than that obtainable at the Flying Training School, 'the reason for the existence of the College would seem to disappear'. Bladin was not convinced, however, and in February 1952 he directed that a panel be set up to review the College syllabus.

Coincidentally, the Defence Forces Establishments Committee had also concluded in 1951 that 'the syllabus of the Royal Australian Air Force College should be reviewed with the object of effecting a reduction in the length of the course'. The panel was to be chaired by Group Captain Watson, Commandant of the College, and was to make recommendations on a broad range of issues but particularly into curriculum, standards of entry and output, broadening the field of selection, and the introduction of flying at an earlier stage.

The panel completed a comprehensive review. Its major conclusion was that the best interests of the RAAF would not be served by reducing the course to three years and it recommended retention of the existing four year course.



This group comprised the first batch of cadets of No.1 Course to march-in to Point Cook on 23 February 1948. It did not reach its full complement of 22 until April of that year. Curiously, of the fourteen shown here, the seven on the right were suspended whereas the seven on the left all graduated. They were Cadets Owen (Navigator), Collinson (Navigator), Howard (Pilot), Robertson (Pilot), Charlton (Equipment), Ingall (Navigator) and Boord (Pilot).

The rationale was based on the time required to develop officer qualities; the desirable minimum level of education required of an officer, particularly basic scientific knowledge, to cope with trends in future scientific development; the need to integrate flying training without upsetting the balance of the course; and

the somewhat nebulous imputations in regard to the process of Service indoctrination. It is, perhaps, worth quoting here from the report of the panel:

In the development of many qualities and qualifications required of a trained officer, it is essential that he be indoctrinated (when a cadet) into the habits, ethics, customs and traditions of the Service. This indoctrination is as much a part of an officer training system as formal education, the development of officer qualities and such-like. It embraces a very wide field, ranging from a knowledge of service customs, procedures, methods, etc, to all those refinements pertaining to officer status.

Instruction in service indoctrination entails paying continuous attention to details, so as to ensure that each individual cadet is adopting a proper and healthy outlook in his development of those attributes of officer status and the maintenance of high standards of behaviour under all conditions. It calls also for the observance and proper application of those many written and unwritten procedures and methods of administration, discipline, and of living which are part of and peculiar to the armed services.

Officers with experience of pre-war conditions of the ethics, customs and traditions, etc, of the service seem to be adamant that much atmosphere and service-mindedness have been lost because officers trained during the war years are lacking to some extent in the observance of those customs and ethics, etc, of the everyday life of an Air Force Officer. There is, indeed, a wide difference in outlook between officers trained in the pre-war era and a majority of those commissioned in the Permanent Air Force in the postwar era. If this leeway in outlook, which amounts to a proper Service indoctrination, is not soon made good, it may well be that the Service will not retrieve its former high standards in this field. Whilst there is no reflection on the general professional competence of junior officers, there is real criticism of their ability, mainly through lack of appropriate training, to fulfil their role as officers.

The Panel considers it relevant to express the opinion that, in a world of easy standards, where there are tendencies towards levelling of the social strata, it is simpler to follow a current trend in social conditions than to aim at high standards, including those of integrity and ethics, which are not always popular. For this very reason the highest standards in the field of service indoctrination of officers should be the objective.

The panel was also of the opinion that the investigation was premature because there had been insufficient time to prove the quality of the graduates of the College. No.1 Course had, of course, only graduated a few months earlier.

By the end of 1955, however, four courses had graduated, one of which had had four years experience in the field, and doubts were being voiced both as to the value of the course and the quality of the product. Air Member for Personnel, Air Vice Marshal F.R.W. Scherger (later Air Chief Marshal), in a letter to the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Training Command, expressed concern at the time over the low annual output of the RAAF College graduates when measured against time, manpower and effort. By the time the fifth course had graduated, there had been 73 graduates from an intake of 118. Of those, 46 were pilots, 13 were navigators and the remainder were divided between Technical, Equipment and Administrative Branches.

Scherger complained that a 50 per cent General Duties output was too low, suggesting that the minds of cadets were being channelled away from flying because of early and sustained emphasis on academic studies. The aim of the College was 'to graduate qualified General Duties officers with a suitable academic background and not vice-versa'. The alternatives he proposed for investigation were either to reduce the course syllabus, modelling it on the Cranwell course of two years and eight months, or to reduce it even more drastically to two years only with the latter part of the course parallel to the existing aircrew syllabus of 44 weeks. Scherger was obviously not persuaded by the arguments of the Watson report.



(Top) Wing Commander L.T. Spence, first Officer Commanding Cadet Squadron (later killed during air operations in Korea)

(Middle) Air Commodore V.E. Hancock, first Commandant of RAAF College (later Air Marshal and Chief of the Air Staff)

(Bottom) Mr A.J. Blaci Director of Studies



As a consequence of Scherger's criticism, the Air Officer Commanding Training Command (Air Vice Marshal A.M. Murdoch) sought a report on the matter from the College. Each of the issues raised was looked at and it was reported that although wastage at the RAAF College was higher than was visualised when the course was instituted, it was no higher than that in comparable institutions. In fact, when all the requirements that demanded of a RAAF College graduate were considered, it was apparent that the College figures were, by comparison with similar institutions, quite good.

The College was as productive for the General Duties Branch on a percentage basis as the Flying Training School system. In addition, it produced good officers for the Equipment and Special Duties Branches. On the flying side, no evidence was found of a lack of enthusiastic anticipation for flying training; indeed, quite the opposite applied. Only three cadets had voluntarily transferred to the Flying Training School and there had, in fact, been two offsetting transfers in the other direction. The length of the College course had not been found to be a deterrent to applicants who were keen to fly.

An analysis of the reorganisation of the course syllabus along the lines proposed by Scherger was undertaken and virtually the same conclusions were reached as those of the Watson report insofar as syllabus, course length and objectives were concerned. It also pointed out that the cost of training a cadet for four years was only £2,500 (\$5,000) above that of the Flying Training School graduate since the bulk of the cost was taken up in the flying training element and this was common to both organisations. Moreover, only a small percentage of the overall College wastage occurred after the cadets were committed to the flying stage. Further, as would be expected, from the flying stage onwards the percentage of successes under pilot training was about the same for the two streams. Details of the report were passed to Scherger by Murdoch who, as well as supporting its findings, made the comment that the value of the training would not become apparent for 20 years or more when graduates started to occupy senior appointments.

Again, Scherger appeared to be unconvinced by the arguments proposed by Training Command. He restated his views that the greatest need was to ensure that the cadets selected for the College course were able to become efficient aircrew members, preferably pilots, and that there should be greater bias towards technical training. He had by now, however, apparently accepted the need for a four year course. He put great emphasis on the technical aspect, regarding it as the most important, but he was uncertain as to whether it should be combined with flying training or which should precede the other. Once again, the Director of Training was directed to look into the question in detail. Consequently, a reasonably in-depth investigation was undertaken and a paper prepared by the Directorate of Training, the purpose of which was to consider whether the RAAF College was producing the required type of graduate and, if not, what steps should be taken to improve the standard.

The paper (hereinafter called the 'Pearce paper') dealt with the standards achieved by graduates and career prospects of cadets, undertook a comparison between College and Flying Training School (FTS) graduates, and discussed methods by which the College course could be improved. The document is of interest firstly because of the content and, secondly, because it provides a fairly accurate reflection of the attitude toward College graduates taken by some senior officers and, by implication, many middle ranking officers.

Earlier, in October 1955, a visit had been made to Point Cook by an Assessing Team from the Central Flying School. The report of that team concluded that the FTS course was likely to produce the better pilots, and would continue to do so, mainly because of the more intensive rate of flying at the FTS and because of the fact that whereas aircrew trainees were free to concentrate almost exclusively on flying and associated subjects, the cadets' efforts were diluted because of leave, visits, final examinations, administrative responsibilities and other requirements of the College curriculum.

The Assessment Team would have been primarily concerned with No. 5 Course which would have been nearing the end of its flying training, as would have been No. 20 Course of the FTS. It is of interest to note that the pilot failure rate was slightly less for the RAAF cadets than it was for the FTS course, some 30 per cent

against 50 per cent; the numbers would be too small to be significant. Nonetheless, of the eight pilot graduates, six completed the fighter Operational Training Unit (OTU) course, and most went on to squadron command.

Much was made of a 'comprehensive study' which had revealed 'alarming facts' about the performance of cadets (GD) on post-graduate flying courses. This revealed, for example, that of the three cadets who attempted the Flying Instructors' Course in 1955, all passed; albeit one was top and one was bottom in order of graduating merit. The latter, incidentally, would not have begun operational flying training until at least January 1954 and would have had considerably less practical flying experience than other members of that course. Of the OTU courses, three College graduates were suspended out of a total intake of 28; the same percentage, as it happens, as that for FTS graduates. Sixteen cadets began navigation courses at the School of Air Navigation. The 14 successful graduates 'obtained reasonable results' although it was considered that they should have done much better in view of their previous academic training at the College. This, indeed, was a comment typical of reportage on ex-cadets at the time. There was an evident expectation that the performance of cadets should and would outshine that of others, irrespective of the nature and content of the course. Occasionally even that was not sufficient and there is evidence that in the case of one officer graduating from a course of eight there was comment that he could have done better - despite his graduating top of the course!

One of the points not made in the paper was, of course, that the College graduate was competing with aircrew who might have graduated as far back as August 1949 and whose responsibilities had, by and large, been restricted to that of squadron pilot. This allowed considerable advantage where practical application was involved. It is also worth remembering that the levels of education required for entry into either scheme were not very different and that the subject material taught at the FTS could have had as much, and perhaps more, relevance to the material required on the various flying oriented courses. In any case, the only 'alarming facts' that seem to be revealed by the data presented were that on postgraduate courses some ex-cadets outperformed some ex-aircrew trainees and vice-versa. Presentation in the Pearce paper does appear to have been a little jaundiced.

The analysis of career prospects for both College and FTS graduates was more significant in that it suggested that of the annual output from the flying training scheme 20 permanent commissions would be granted each year. This, of course, outnumbered those awarded to any graduating course of the College up until that time. It argued, therefore, that the career prospects for both groups would be equal. Indeed, it went so far as to claim that almost half of the graduates of the College would retire as flight lieutenants and very few would reach group captain rank. On this point, at least, the accuracy of the forecasting can be challenged.

A claim was also made that of the 203 FTS graduate pilots and navigators serving at that time (up until end of 1955) the post-graduate wastage was 80, or 28.3 per cent. It failed to point out, however, that for the earlier figures, up to the end of 1952 say, the figure for wastage was nearer 50 per cent. Moreover, the retention rate dropped markedly in the earlier courses. The 203 graduate trainees serving at the time were from a total course output of 283, or a retention rate of 72 per cent. If the figures until the end of 1952 had been considered, however, the percentage drops to 52 per cent. Again, the data was presented in a way to best suit the investigators' case, but, in truth, the time span was too short and the sample too small to reach such definitive conclusions.

Based on their findings, or more accurately points of view, the investigators made a number of recommendations which were ultimately to change the nature of the RAAF College. They were of the firm opinion that the flying training element of the cadets' course should be separated from other non-related studies and that flying should be undertaken preferably at the airmen aircrew training units. They recommended also that cadets be granted the rank of flying officer on graduation. It had been pointed out earlier that airmen aircrew commissioned six months after graduation could reach flight lieutenant rank five years after entry, whereas it would take the average cadet seven and a half years. Further, the course should be reduced to

three years duration and, finally, the College syllabus should be reviewed by a specially selected committee comprising mainly General Duties officers.

There were two statements embodied in the document with which the average College graduate officer of the time would have found little disagreement. The first was that it seemed that the College graduate was a 'jack-of-all-trades and master of none.' The second was a truism that was often lost sight of by supervisors and, indeed, by the authors of the very document in which it was written. It stated that, 'RAAF College, irrespective of ideals, can only produce a junior officer of Pilot Officer or Flying Officer rank. The RAAF requirement for an officer of that rank (or any other) is that he carry out the duties commensurate with that rank. He should not be expected to graduate with the knowledge of a Group Captain.' All too often this was an attitude encountered by the early graduates, and some views on the impact this had on the College graduate are discussed in a later chapter.

The Air Member for Personnel was apprised of the views put forward by the various contributors to the above investigation and the Director of Training (Group Captain C.W. Pearce) expressed support for the three year course, which included the flying training which should be undertaken at the Flying Training Schools. He recommended the formation of another investigating committee, noting that 'previous committees appeared to be biased in favour of the education aspect and, indeed, when carrying out investigations at Point Cook, ran into a very effective lobby for a four year course.'

The Directorate of Training views, not surprisingly, found favour with Scherger, and with those views as a basis he submitted a proposal to the Air Board for a review of the College course. There is no evidence to suggest that the somewhat slanted presentation was in any way challenged by Board members, perhaps because the only recommendation being sought was that a committee be appointed to enquire into a number of matters concerning the rationale for and the management of the RAAF College. One aspect not covered in the Directorate of Training paper but included in the Air Board submission dealt with the future needs of the RAAF. It was argued that although the manned aircraft was unlikely ever to disappear from the air forces of the world, an increasing number of officers were required who could fully understand both the manned aircraft and the guided missile and their use:

It is becoming evident that we shall have to train officers who are able to comprehend the guided missile as a weapon. At present we have separate specialists in the armament, electronics and engineering aspects of guided missiles which (as operational weapons) will presumably be 'used' by the GD officer; but we have only a very few officers who could encompass all aspects of guided missiles. They are the small group of technical officers who are also skilled and experienced pilots. Such an officer could at present best be described as 'GD-Technical'. He will need to be chosen from men of fairly high academic attainments and potential, and it appears that the best place to give him his air force training would be at the RAAF College. It is assumed that his technical training could best be given at a University.

It is not clear precisely what Scherger had intended by this inclusion. Certainly, it seems that he intended that his earlier theme of enhanced technical training was to be pursued and that the opportunity to gain university qualifications would be open only to a selected few General Duties cadets. It would, however, seem to be a fair deduction that the desired outcome of the proposed investigation would be a three year course, the first two years being devoted to general academic subjects, including scientific and technical, with the third year limited to flying training and associated subjects. In the event, the Air Board agreed to Scherger's recommendation and Air Commodore I.D. McLachlan (later Air Vice-Marshal), at the time on an exchange posting with the Air Ministry, was appointed chairman of a committee to enquire into and report on the RAAF College. The Committee held its first meeting on 12 March 1957.

CHAPTER 3

ROUTINE

By 1951, the College had reached maturity in terms of student population and it is worth digressing at this stage, away from the external policy and administrative decisions which looked very likely to lead if not to the disbandment of the College then certainly to a major reorganization, to look firstly at the internal working of the College itself and, secondly, at the post-graduate activities of those officers who had been cadets at that time. A different perspective from that presented in the somewhat selective reporting of the departmental bodies might conceivably have led to different conclusions as to whether or not the College was achieving its aim, namely, 'to provide young men with the theoretical and practical training essential to launch, them on their careers as permanent officers of the RAFF'. That aim, as defined in the Charter, was to be attained by imbuing cadets with high standards of honour, personal conduct, moral courage, loyalty, self-reliance, devotion to duty, and the many other qualities desirable in future leaders.

At the same time, the cadets were to be proficient in a broad range of academic and Service subjects, as well as being required to achieve a satisfactory standard of flying skill. Throughout, there was to be a need to maintain physical and mental fitness through participation in sporting and other leisure time activities. To the modern inclination, the Charter probably reads like an extract from the 'Boys Own Annual' but it was, nevertheless, precisely what the progenitors of the College had in mind when they wrote of 'air force spirit' and 'esprit de corps'.

The College was fortunate in the choice of its first Commandant. Hancock was a graduate of Duntroon, a traditionalist, yet progressive in outlook and determined to avoid the deficiencies he had found in the Duntroon system. He saw the College as a university in which as much emphasis was to be given to study of the arts as to the sciences, and as much to the development of corporate life as to familiarity with developments in the technique of scientific warfare. He stressed the importance of clear and incisive thinking, of free and full discussion and of creative thought. 'The success of the training received by cadets at the College', he wrote, 'is not to be measured by the extent of their technical knowledge; the important results of the course will not be readily assessed in any tangible form.' He wrote these words at the end of the first College year in 1948. Unfortunately, critics of the system were less perceptive and by 1955 were, indeed, demanding tangible results.

As evidenced by the difficulties encountered by the first selection panel it was, of course, always going to be a problem to find sufficient candidates who would fulfil all the demands of the standards set. In essence, the panel would have been trying to identify the equivalent of 24 potential Rhodes Scholars - competent students, very high standards of personal qualities, fair sportsmen and with good prospects of qualifying as pilots. Assessment of the balance between these hoped-for attributes and the priority to be given to each would have been problem enough, but this would certainly have been exacerbated by the range of eligible ages. Nor did it make the management of the student body any easier, since the very young student was not usually amenable to the university approach and many of the older students, some of whom had not attended school regularly for a number of years, felt overly constrained by the high school approach. There were adjustment problems for both groups which could not be altogether remedied by the staff.

So the idealistic aims of the Commandant were at the outset confounded to some extent by the simple practicalities of the selection and entry processes. One of the major weaknesses which seemed to be recognized early by the student body, perhaps earlier than by the staff, was that where selectees lacked the educational background or the capacity to handle the academic training with reasonable ease, then it would be a rare youth indeed who could cope with both those demands and those of the non-academic pursuits. The reverse was also to apply to a lesser extent. Deficiencies in either area were likely to lead to termination of training and

it should have come as no surprise to the RAAF hierarchy that the wastage rate would be of about the same order as that in comparable academic and military institutions.

By the end of 1951, four courses had marched into the College and the first intake was nearing graduation. The annual routine had been well established and elements of it were to last throughout the life of the College and later Academy. Activities began with a field training camp of two weeks at Waratah Bay on the Mornington Peninsula, Victoria (held at a number of different sites in later years), during which cadets were given training in unarmed combat, small arms and field-craft and were generally 'toughened-up'. Apart from a few days orientation at Point Cook it was the first contact the new entrants had with the College's student population. Here, also, the new cadet went through his initiation ceremony, a modest affair compared with those of like institutions, but adequate to ensure that the junior class understood its proper place in the hierarchy.

The camp was an arduous affair, physically demanding and doubtless presumed necessary to restore the old hands to a peak of physical fitness, following six weeks of undisciplined leave amongst the civil community, before renewing the rigours of the year ahead. For the junior courses, the camp culminated in a two to three day route march through the surrounding bush, while the senior course embarked on an exercise known as 'Operation Sore Feet' (for some later courses known as 'Walkback'). This exercise involved cadets being dropped in pairs in South Gippsland whence they were required to find their way back to either Frankston or Dandenong. The idea was to simulate downed aircrew making their way back to base through foreign territory. Cadets were given emergency rations only, English was not to be spoken to strangers and riding on vehicles was prohibited. It is conceivable that some cadets may have complied with all of these rules. Local and co-opted police, national service trainees and the public, whose cooperation had been sought, were enjoined to assist in the capture of the cadets. Capture, regrettably in the eyes of some cadets, did not entail an early and speedy return to the relative comforts of Point Cook.

Generally speaking, the camp was not an episode looked forward to with any measure of enthusiasm; it was, in the words of one cadet writing in the College Journal, an 'unsuccessful end to a perfect leave'. If nothing else, however, over the two weeks of the camp, for most cadets the College began to assume the mantle of a most desirable residence to which to return.

The year was divided into three terms with breaks of a week after the first and second terms. These breaks were used to provide organized vacations to cover aspects which were applicable to the particular phase of development the class had reached. As the first two years of training were devoted mainly to academic study the vacations were of a recreational type, but 'designed to permit the cadets to display and develop their initiative and powers of leadership'. In the third and fourth years, where emphasis was placed on Service training, the vacations were programmed to broaden the cadets' knowledge of Australian industries. In order, they involved a bicycle trip to Ballarat; a skiing holiday at Mount Buller; a 100-mile canoe trip, usually down the Goulburn River; a visit to Darwin, which also included calls at Townsville and Amberley; an industrial tour of Melbourne; a similar visit to Newcastle and Port Kembla; and an inspection of the Long Range Weapons Establishment at Woomera.



The annual camp, later bivouac, was a cadet's first real contact with the RAAF and his contemporaries. The photograph here is of the flag-raising ceremony during the 1949 camp at Varatah Bay.

Equipment for both the course and the ski trip was made by the cadets. In the main, the canoes were constructed by the first two courses and the skis by the second course. Later courses added to or repaired the stock as required. The original plans for the 14-foot canoes were taken from a 1925 copy of the Melbourne *Argus* and consisted of a half-page of worn and dirty sketches together with a few hints on what to do. Two prototypes of the spruce and canvas 'Indian canoes' were built and tested during the 1949 Easter Camp at Tallarook. The tests were successful and a decision was then taken to go ahead with the construction of another nine canoes to be used during the May break by members of No.1 Course.


The building project was described as being 'popular with the cadets' who were 'building the canoes completely by their own labour as a hobby, and the standard of workmanship was very high'. Few cadets had had any experience handling canoes and skilful needlecraft quickly became more of an asset in a partner than endurance with a paddle. Despite wet clothing, frequent icy dunkings, dubious victuals and restless nights, this particular activity appears to be one that won the universal approval of all cadets; ingenuity and initiative were certainly tested.

The need to manufacture skis arose from the cost of ski hire, £1.2s.6d (\$2.25) which together with board and lodging and membership fees came to a total of £6.13s (\$13.30), a not-inconsiderable sum from the pay of a first year cadet in 1949. The method adopted was one developed by the CSIRO. Jigs were made to match the under surface of the ski, nose blocks were cut to the correct turn-up and three six-inch wide strips of mountain ash were placed in the jig, being glued together with Beetle Glue to form a laminate. The resultant ski was later grooved, shaped, edged with brass strip, coated with aircraft dope and Ski-Vac and bindings attached. The quality of the product depended much on the capability of the cadet with saw, spoke-shave and paint brush. A few cadets used some of the left-over timber to fashion a crude toboggan which also found its way to Mount Buller.

The official report of the vacation included a statement to the effect that 'providence was a real factor in the sport' and called for 'nice judgement for two men to bale out of a bucking frame careering along at approximately 40mph before it crashes into rocks and snow gums'. Even more judgement was required at night

when 'the snow had iced up and really good turns of speed and less control than ever were evident'. Of the skis, the report said that they were excellent and stood up well to the 'severe tests of energetic but most inexperienced skiers'. The cadets, however, found them 'stiff and considered that by and large, home-made skis and Service boots with grooves in the heels were not the ideal combination with which to practise 'snow plows' and 'stem turns'. They were also looked upon as something of an aesthetic eye-sore which, together with Service overalls in lieu of regular ski gear, put them at somewhat of a disadvantage in the pursuit of the available 'lasses of their own age', to again quote the official report. Even so, sufficient interest was aroused among the cadets for several of them to repeat the experience on a number of occasions in their own time. The skis must also have been reasonably satisfactory, or were improved by later courses, since they were in use at least into the early 1960s.

Sport, as required by the Charter, was an important part of College activity. The College was able to field cricket, rugby, hockey, basketball and tennis teams, although at that time only one, the Rugby XV, was entered in local regular competition. It played in the Second Grade of the Victorian Rugby Union competition and won that competition in 1951. Other sports were generally confined to matches with sister Service institutions and Melbourne secondary schools and colleges. In these early years, swimming and athletics were limited to individual and inter-flight competition but, even so, several cadets were to represent the RAAF at inter-Service sports meetings in both swimming and athletics. In addition, the RAAF College Surf Life Saving Club, an active club patrolling Ocean Grove beach and affiliated with the Surf Life Saving Association of Australia, made its first appearance in competition in February 1951.



The College cricket team, 1948 (at back, from left): Air Cadets A. Lawrie, R.W. Collinson, J.G. Poynten, B.N. Tennant, I.S. Charlton, T.C. Owen; (front) D.A. Delaney, J. Gibbes, H.A. Hughes (capt.), D.N. Robertson, H.B. Howard. Cadets of the first few courses were issued with a powder blue blazer and matching cloth cap of the type pictured here. These were worn with grey flannel trousers, white shirt and black tie on social occasions and with a woollen scarf at sporting events. It was not a rig cheerfully worn by cadets of the era - as is reflected, perhaps, in the mien of team members.

The College objective was to encourage cadets to participate in a wide range of activities rather than to specialise in a few. Apart from the physical benefits resulting from such a course, wrote the Commandant, 'a general proficiency in games will enable an officer to bring a great many leisure time activities within range of his men and assist him in getting closer to them by virtue of a common interest.' In line with this philosophy was the decision to introduce the 'Canberra System' of school athletics on a modified basis. In this system, contestants are grouped according to a weight, height and age formula. By so doing, the competitive basis was still preserved but participants were competing against other members of their own athletic potential. Its aim was to avoid the 'Champion Athlete' concept and to encourage all to excel.

The sporting program would have to be deemed to be one of the College successes since, although several faces appear regularly in a number of different team photographs, there would have been few cadets in those early years who had not participated in all sports at one time or another. And, certainly, the names of ex-cadets were later to appear frequently in Unit Routine Orders as Officer-in-Charge of one sport or another.

Cultural activities were an important element of College life and they were to feature prominently in the monthly reports to the Air Board prepared by the Commandant. In fact, so much of the content was devoted to extra-curricula activity that the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (Scherger) wrote in a minute to the Air Member for Personnel (Hewitt) in May 1949 that 'I get a peculiar (do not mistake me) impression from these reports. Do you?'

Perhaps, even at this early stage, Scherger was beginning to ponder the merit of the College. Word of his feelings must have reached the College, since in the July report the Commandant was to write:

It seems that our monthly reports on the activities of the College have led to a somewhat unbalanced assessment of the value of cultural training on the part of readers whose contacts with the College are rare or non-existent.

Perhaps it is appropriate, then, to restate that 'cultural activities form a vital part of College life not only as a means of providing balance in a syllabus which is predominantly technical in nature but to ensure that young officers have that wide range of interests essential in the development of complete human beings.'

The modern concept of total war demands close integration of the Fighting Services and the national economy. Our officers will need more and more to identify themselves with the interests and life of the community not only as a means of evoking their maximum support but for greater personal contentment as a considerable part of an officer's time will inevitably be spent away from Air Force units. He will be an unhappy, uncomfortable creature if he is unable to understand and integrate himself with the corporate life of the community with which he is thrown into regular contact.

We try, then, to bring Air Cadets into contact with all those elements which make up our society: their contemporaries in the schools, the Press, the Radio, Arts, Music, Political Science, Industry, etc.

Some of these contacts are made during the course of War Studies, Psychology, Social Studies, etc., in programmed time, but experience of the broader humanities is acquired in the Cadets' leisure time. This experience is widely spread and includes an acquaintance with those so-called 'softening' influences, such as music, art, social conventions, and social relations with girls. Here the College curriculum provides adequate counter-balance in the form of camp life; physically exacting excursions such as skiing, hiking, canoeing, rigger, boxing, unarmed combat, obstacle courses, and cross-country runs.

Scherger appeared to be satisfied with this explanation.

Certainly, representatives of a broad cross-section of the community were prepared to give freely of their time towards the cultural development of the cadet body. Contributors included, among others, such distinguished persons as Professor W. MacMahon Ball, Miss Margaret Sutherland, Mr Alan Marshall, Dr A.E. Floyd and Mr Hubert Opperman, MHR (later Sir Hubert). Mr Ian Bond conducted art classes while Mr

Walter Lindrum exhibited his skill with a billiard cue. To this variety was added talks by well-known officers of the Australian, Commonwealth and allied armed forces, whilst cadets participated in debates, plays and play readings.

All such activities were looked on as something of a mixed blessing by cadets since the preparation for debates and plays required time which might otherwise be more profitably or pleasurably devoted to other pursuits, while talks by guest speakers inevitably took place on a 'closed' weekend when no leave was permitted. It was not clear whether the talk was to relieve the monotony of the closed weekend or whether the closed weekend was created to ensure attendance at the talk. The latter was the favoured view. It is arguable, naturally, whether any lasting benefit was derived from this exposure to the arts but it certainly did no harm. The intention was most commendable and it is just possible that as many enjoyed listening to excerpts from Prokofieff's 'The Love of Three Oranges' as enjoyed being thrust into the second row of a rugby scrum.

Flying training for cadets began in the second term of the third year. Contrary to the views expressed by Scherger that the cadets' keenness for flying might be eroded by the early emphasis on academic studies, the cadets themselves saw those studies mainly as necessary evils to be overcome before the real business of being an air force officer could start. As mentioned elsewhere, flying training for the cadet (compared with that of the aircrew trainee) was a protracted exercise complicated by additional academic and service subjects not related directly to flying, and by their responsibilities in regard to the administration of the College. Further, the cadets were by then committed to a permanent RAAF career and it was quite evident to them that any failings in this area would have severe consequences in the pursuit of that career. The pressure to succeed was intense.

Moreover, at about the same time that No.1 Course began its flying training, war broke out in Korea and No.1 Squadron had been committed to operations in Malaya. Despite Scherger's misgivings, there was no lack of enthusiasm on the part of the cadets over the prospect of serving in either of these theatres. Indeed, rumour circulated among, and was readily accepted by, members of Nos. 1 and 2 Courses that their course would be shortened by accelerating the flying phase. Such, however, was not the case.

Predictably, the success rate in pilot training was no better than that among aircrew trainees. A small proportion were found to be unsuitable for any form of flying training, but, generally, those cadets who failed pilot training were sent for navigator training at the School of Navigation, East Sale. By 1951 there were four First Class and three (later five) Second Class cadets attending the School. The course was initially of twelve months duration and was divided equally into basic and applied stages. Later, the course was reduced to nine months. These cadets graduated as officers, as did the technical cadets, with their College confreres, although they had not necessarily been awarded their brevet by that time. In seniority, navigators graduated below pilots and ahead of technical officers. Establishing the position of navigator graduates on the Graduation List was of some concern to College and Headquarters staffs alike. There was little that could be sensibly done, however, other than to grade the pilots and the navigators by comparison within their own groups.

Later in the history of the College, the fact that no indication of a cadet's ability to fly was available until two-and-a-half years after his entry into the Service, gave rise to a suggestion that some form of modified flight grading should be given to junior cadets at the end of their first year. The proposal was eventually adopted for No. 6 Course after a trial with No. 5 Course had been conducted in its second year. Although primarily intended to assess suitability for future pilot training, the assessment was also used in conjunction with other indicators of officer potential to determine whether a cadet's training should be terminated altogether, or whether he should be offered training as a navigator or as an officer of the Equipment or Technical Branches. It is an interesting reflection that what surely should have been one of the most cohesive forces of the College, particularly in regard to the GD element, eventually proved to be one of the most divisive, firstly in the separation of the navigators from the mainstream and, later, because of the unsuitability of Point Cook as a jet training base, the removal of final year students to No.1 Applied Flying Training School (AFTS) at Pearce to complete the advanced phase of their flying training.

To manage the day-to-day routine, the cadet squadron was organized into three flights. Each flight was under the control of a Cadet Flight Sergeant and he was assisted by a number of Cadet Sergeants and Corporals drawn from the First and Second Classes. Superimposed were two senior cadets, the Cadet Warrant Officer and his deputy, a Cadet Flight Sergeant. The Cadet Warrant Officer, through the Officer Commanding the Cadet Squadron, was the main link between the academic and military staffs and the Cadet Squadron. Much of the daily routine of the College and the supervision of cadet activities, outside of the allocated duty periods, were left to him and his assistants.

The Cadet NCOs had very few privileges; such as they did have were more a mark of longevity than rank. They were able to hand out minor punishment in the way of extra duties and cancellation of leave, although there seems to have been little occasion to mete out such punishment. Certainly, the harsh treatment handed out to first year cadets at Duntroon was not evident at Point Cook, nor would it have been tolerated by either the staff or the senior cadets of the day. Physical embarrassment or discomfiture was limited to no more than the cleaning of a senior cadet's floor or a ducking in the 'fish pond'. The latter was generally the result of a judgement by a cadet's contemporaries rather than by his seniors, but even this ceremony was usually reserved for juniors to perpetrate on seniors to commemorate such matters of importance as a first solo or promotion. During 1953, the command structure of the Cadet Squadron was changed to allow command and administrative experience to be obtained by as many cadets as possible. The NCO titles and badges were replaced and instead of one senior cadet the new system provided for three cadets to rotate through the old Warrant Officer post at monthly intervals. This system was retained throughout the life of the College and the Academy.

Leave was administered by the Flight Commander and was considered to be reasonably liberal for such institutions at that time. The original Conditions of Service document stated that 'no leave would be granted except at definite leave periods between terms. Pupils' weekends would be spent in sporting and domestic activities on the station.' This was similar to Trenchard's isolationist approach for Cranwell. Fortunately for the cadets, Hancock, who was later given fair leeway in such matters, was in favour of cadets becoming involved with the community, in most of its facets.

As mentioned earlier, organized activities were arranged for breaks after the first and second terms, while there were six weeks of home leave at the end of each of the first three academic years. Otherwise, first year cadets were allowed no leave for their first term at the College but, thereafter, some leave was allowed on weekends other than the last of each month which was designated a 'closed camp'. The leave allowance was progressive, starting at one day of a weekend in the first year, up to three full weekends a month in the fourth year. The cadet with a Melbourne-based family was, of course, advantaged but for the remainder the amount of leave was about commensurate with the funds available. (Cadets' pay in the first year was 7s (700) per day with 1s6d (150) deferred until graduation.) Cadets, especially juniors, were expected to attend weekend sporting fixtures in which the College was involved and their absences were duly noted by the senior cadets, particularly by those actually participating!

Initially, freedom of action was inhibited by a requirement to wear uniform on leave, by lack of money and by lack of transport. There would be few cadets of the early years who would not recall the wild scramble to get a seat on a Fraser's Bus from Spencer Street Station on a Saturday mid-night. To miss the bus meant a very long walk or a £5 (\$10) taxi fare, usually beyond the means of a cadet and generally beyond the worth of most available feminine companionships. Consumption of alcohol was, of course, strictly forbidden and, indeed, serving alcohol to most cadets would also have been illegal. Nevertheless, despite these constraints, junior cadets managed to arrange matters sufficiently satisfactorily to use the leave allocated to the full. As the cadets became more senior, so did the restraints become less inhibitive. Civilian clothing was permitted; finances improved, particularly for those drawing flying pay; cadets could make use of the weekend leave by either staying with friends or at hotels in Melbourne; some of the more wealthy were able to acquire their own transport, much used by their colleagues; and restrictions on the use of alcohol were lifted, senior cadets

even being invited to use the facilities of the Officers' Mess on Friday evenings and weekends. Rarely were the privileges of leave abused by the cadet body as a whole, although some individuals were noted for their special commitments and were generally shielded from discovery by authority.

In the original Air Board Agendum which dealt with the establishment of the College, two applicants were to be nominated by the Air Member for Engineering and Maintenance as prospective candidates for entry to his Branch. This appears almost to have been overlooked in selecting students for the first entry. Engineering cadets were late selectees and two subsequently attended University engineering courses including I.T. Sutherland, who was later to become Chief of Air Force Technical Services. This apparent oversight was remedied by the time selections were being made for the second entry. Five of the 28 applicants selected were recommended for the Technical Branch. The practice was continued in subsequent years although there was never any guarantee that selection as a 'technical cadet' would assure a place at university. In fact, the exception proved to be the rule. All cadets were required to complete the first year at the College before initially entering the first year of the appropriate engineering course at Sydney, Melbourne or Adelaide universities.

Later, cadets who completed two years at the College were admitted to the second year of their university course. Those cadets who were medically fit for flying were given training either during or on completion of their degree courses and those who were successful were generally posted to units at which use could be made of both their technical and flying qualifications, although some completed regular squadron flying tours before taking up technical duties. Priority was given to the cadets' academic endeavours at the university but where the opportunity arose they would also participate in the organized vacations and activities such as the field camp at Waratah Bay.

By 1951 the College had also assumed an international character. Two cadets from each of the Royal New Zealand and Royal Pakistan Air Forces were admitted that year. Their terms of appointment were the same as those of the RAAF cadets and they were distinguishable only in that they wore their own uniforms. The RPAF sent two cadets per year to the next two courses as did the RNZAF which also sent one cadet a year for a further three years. Three of the six RPAF cadets were to graduate from the College. One, Shamim, continued his training in Australia and went on to attend a Fighter Operational Training Unit course in 1955 before returning to Pakistan. He is probably the most successful of all College graduates to date, having gone on to become Air Chief Marshal and Chief of the Air Staff of the Pakistan Air Force. There were to be five graduates from among the RNZAF cadets, all of whom came from the first six entrants.

All of the 'Dominion' cadets had some difficulty with the academic requirements of the College which were, generally, the main reasons for failure to graduate. In all other respects, however, they had surprisingly few problems in assimilating into the routine of the College, taking a full part in all of its administrative and social aspects and making useful contributions to its sporting activities, notably rugby and hockey.

By the end of 1951, the College could be said to have 'bedded-in' in terms of staffing and routine, both academic and Service. Those cadets who sought entry to the College had done so, for the most part, with probably a number of objectives in mind. For a start, the entrants were of an era where job security was a strong attraction and a permanent commission in the armed forces gave such an assurance. But given that this could well have been a factor, there was no doubt whatsoever that those who succeeded in gaining entrance to the College did so on the bases that they wanted to be air force officers; that they wanted to fly; and that they were embarking on a permanent career. Certainly, they had not joined with the short-term objective of receiving some form of valuable training to be put to use later in industry or commerce. This happened, of course, but not as the result of a consciously premeditated decision. The staff, then, if not overly enthusiastic about the academic quality with which it had to work, could at least feel reasonably confident of the cadets' motivation towards an 'air force spirit'.

Within the Cadet Squadron there were no extremely strong feelings between the courses, either of antagonism or of companionship, and activities were seldom shared except on the sports field. A possible exception was that between Nos.1 and 2 Courses which, perhaps because they more closely related to common

experiences in the first two or three years, did seem to share closer ties. On the other hand, class unity was relatively strong and early courses spent a great deal of time together in communal activities. However, even this relationship was not as close or as durable as it might have been owing largely to the detachment, for the greater part of the final year, of those doing the navigators course and, for at least half of the course, those who were attending the universities. In later years, the segregation became even more marked as graduates became spread amongst the various aircraft types, some not to meet again until many years later. Even so, the Cadet Squadron had settled down to a comfortable class and inter-class relationship.

The cadets were not, naturally enough, nor were they ever intended to be, a homogeneous body and like any other such group, individuals had their strengths and weaknesses which were to become manifest later. Even so, for the most part, those cadets who completed the four years at Point Cook would have come as close to meeting the aims of the charter as the founders of the College might reasonably have expected. If there was one major weakness in the strategy for the development of the ideal cadet it was, perhaps, an apparent lack on the part of senior management, either of awareness or appreciation of the depth of changes in attitude that were taking place, not only in the community as a whole, but in the Service as well. The attitudes of those senior officers who received their grounding in the pre-war days of the RAAF and who were to determine the pattern for the post-war cadet were not necessarily shared by the war-time officers, many of whom were by now in middle-management positions and were most likely both to influence and to judge the young graduate officer.

CHAPTER 4

RECEPTION

Pilots of the first graduating course were posted to No.78 Wing, Williamtown, in January 1952 while navigators of that course were posted to No. 82 Wing on completion of their navigator training in March 1952. Each of the pilots was subsequently posted to No.77 Squadron, Korea, and each navigator to No.1 Squadron, Singapore. Their reception by the rest of the RAAF, if not directly hostile, was not enthusiastic.

At the time of their graduation there were about 300 flight lieutenants, 75 flying officers and 20-odd pilot officers serving in the General Duties Branch. Of these, approximately one-third of the flight lieutenants, nearly all of the flying officers and all of the pilot officers were holding short service commissions. Most of the flight lieutenants and flying officers were war-time enlistees, although not all had completed training in time to see active service in the Second World War. The pilot officers were commissioned airmen aircrew from the early post-war courses of the Flying Training Schools. Many of these officers resented the arrival of the graduate cadets in the ranks of the permanently commissioned officers and it was generally seen by them to have been achieved by an easy route. Moreover, they regarded, with some justification but without the benefit of hindsight, the presence of the ex-cadets as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of their attaining permanent commissions.


Among all officers there was a common belief that the cadets had a predestined career-path and that preferential treatment in the way of job opportunity and promotion would assure that the chosen career-path was followed. In reality, of course, the cadets were given no such assurance and were told, in fact, that only very few would be likely to reach wing commander rank. This was the view, it will be recalled, expressed in the paper leading to the Scherger Air Board submission which claimed that most would retire as flight lieutenants. It transpired, too, that more permanent commissions were awarded to graduates of the Flying Training Schools than to those of the College. In short, this new class of officer, yet to prove itself anywhere outside of the College environment, was eyed with at least circumspection by the middle and junior officer ranks.

Pilot Officers W.H. Simmonds (1) (later Air Vice Marshal) and J.L. Surman (1) were posted to Korea on 1 April 1952 and the remaining pilots of No.1 Course the following month. Simmonds was one graduate not impressed by his reception in No.77 Squadron. He recalls that during a conversation with an RAF officer serving with the squadron, the matter of the Commanding Officer's introductory briefing came up. The RAF pilot mentioned that the squadron's complement was described to him as comprising so many airmen, so many NCO pilots, so many officers and 'six cadets.' Quite evidently, the College graduates had some way to go yet before they were likely to be accepted as other than a special group, at least in the fighter world. Simmonds and Surman were between them to be credited with two of only three Chinese MiG 15 aircraft destroyed in the air by pilots of No.77 Squadron. Even this, says Simmonds, was more a cause for sour grapes rather than congratulation among the more senior squadron members.

More seriously, Simmonds claims that there were acts of positive discrimination. He cites, for example, that as a result of heavy casualties sustained in the ground attack role, a ruling was made that pilotage of the last aircraft through the target, usually the sixteenth, should be rotated through all squadron members. Apart from being the most vulnerable position of the formation, the pilot was also required to follow-up with another pass to carry out a damage assessment. Straight after that decision was taken, he says, he flew six consecutive strikes in the sixteenth slot and could recall no occasions when either a cadet or a newly-arrived NCO pilot did not fill that position.

Regrettably, it is difficult to confirm whether Simmonds' view is representative of the majority of the ex-cadets serving with No.77 Squadron at that time, since four of the six are now deceased. Pilot Officer D.N. Robertson (1), winner of the Sword of Honour and the King's Medal for 1951, and Pilot Officer J.L. Surman

were both killed on operational flights, the former on 15 May 1952 and the latter on 9 June 1952. Flying Officer H.B. Howard (1) was killed on 29 July 1953 while serving in Germany with the 2nd Tactical Air Force when his aircraft collided with a member of another formation. Flight Lieutenant G.A. Boord (1) died of a heart attack while serving at Williamtown in 1958, where he was flying Sabre aircraft. The only other survivor of that time was Pilot Officer H.A. Hughes (1) (later Air Vice Marshal) who was the first graduate to be decorated for operational service.



(Left) Pilot Officers Simmonds and Surman congratulate each other, after each destroyed a MiG 15 fighter in air-to-air combat. Surman was later killed in action.

(Middle) Pilot Officer G.A. Boord, who died of natural causes at Williamtown in 1957.

(Right) Pilot Officers Howard and Robertson. Robertson was later killed in action, and Howard was killed in a midair collision while serving with the 2nd Tactical Force, RAAF, in Germany.

All of No.1 Course who graduated as pilots served in Korea, The only graduate not pictured here is H.A. Hughes.

Hughes flew 139 Meteor sorties and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for displaying throughout his entire tour:

outstanding aggression and determination to destroy the enemy wherever he found him. His high sense of duty and complete disregard of personal safety, often in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire, inspired other members of the Squadron. By his own personal courage and behaviour in operational duties Pilot Officer Hughes has brought great credit upon himself and the RAAF.

Of his recollection of the attitude of the more senior ranking officers, Hughes says:

[E]ven as a cadet at Point Cook, by virtue of my exposure to the RAAF and its members through the College visits program, it was patently obvious that the majority of Air Force officers regarded the cadet as a pampered and privileged individual who would find life in the real world after graduation something less than the bed of roses enjoyed at Point Cook. Upon graduation, and for many years afterwards as a junior officer, I, and my fellow graduates, were regarded perpetually and offensively as “cadets” and, therefore, someone both to be avoided and exploited. In reality, this attitude only served to stiffen

my own determination, and that of most of my Point Cook colleagues, to perform at the highest possible personal level. Indeed, I was positively motivated by this hostility rather than depressed or deflected by it.

Only two other graduates of Nos.2 and 3 Courses, RAAF College - Pilot Officers R.E. Frost (1) (later Air Vice-Marshal) and T.J. Withington (2) - arrived in time to complete any operational sorties. Withington was killed in an aircraft accident at Williamstown in 1957 while attempting an ad hoc conversion of a medical officer to the Meteor aircraft. Frost does not recall any problems at all with settling in at No.77 Squadron, although he points out that by then, the composition of the Squadron had changed from a predominant mix of older hands, to one mainly of graduates from the Flying Training Schools and the College. In this regard, despite differences in basic air force training and career aspirations, relationships between ex-aircrew trainees and ex-cadets were harmonious. They shared a lot of experiences in common and, as squadron pilots, the difference in airman and officer status seemed to be of less import than might otherwise have been expected.

Those College graduates who, either as navigators or pilots, were posted for operational duty with No.1 Squadron, Singapore, do not appear to have suffered the same degree of hostility as Simmonds and Hughes. The complement of the bomber squadron aircrew was, of course, much larger than that of the normal fighter squadron and the need to include the ex-cadets as part of permanent aircraft crews would have militated against any tendencies which might lead to friction and ill-feeling. By and large, the more senior officers were considered to be generally helpful although they would 'kid you a bit', says Air Commodore T.C. Owen (1), a navigator with the squadron in 1952. 'Condescension rather than hostility' was the view of Wing Commander M.W. Buchanan (2) a pilot there a year later.

One aspect of unit life to which most graduates were to become accustomed was the demand for their services in the myriad unit appointments which fell to the lot of the junior officer. This was prevalent for at least the period under consideration in this chapter. Although the number of pilot officers and flying officers in the RAAF was steadily increasing (it nearly doubled between 1952 and 1956), secondary and peripheral duties appeared to attract a somewhat disproportionate number of ex-cadets to their fulfilment. This probably stemmed both from the mistaken belief that the College syllabus catered for such mundane matters as unit routine and from the fact that commissioned aircrew, who had not been so trained, would be disadvantaged. One senior officer, quizzed on this issue, simply replied that he 'gave the ex-cadets the job because he knew that there was a good chance of it being done properly'.

Some graduates felt that they were unfairly loaded with such tasks compared with their fellows, but generally accepted their fate without argument. It is doubtful whether any were to suffer from this peculiarity but, in any case, a lot depended on the availability of other junior officers and this varied within the types of unit. It is probably fair to say, however, that the College turned out its graduates no better equipped to perform at unit level than does a university turn out its graduates to produce immediately in industry.

Even so, apart from the fact that the junior officer commissioned from the NCO aircrew ranks was usually relatively free of secondary duties, the graduate was sometimes disadvantaged in that he had frequently spent considerably less time flying than had his ex-Flying Training School contemporary at the same rank level. There is little doubt that performance in the primary function had considerable influence on the content of an officer's confidential report and it is possible that some ex-cadets suffered in this comparison. Moreover, there appeared to be, probably unwittingly, a tendency to expect more of one group and to make allowances in the case of the other.

On returning from Korea, the four remaining graduates of No.1 Course were posted for exchange duties with the Royal Air Force, to serve either in the United Kingdom or with the 2nd Tactical Air Force in Germany. This was the beginning of a program known colloquially as the 'Cadet Exchange Scheme' in which graduates of the RAAF College were exchanged with graduates of the RAF College. Technically, this was a misnomer since navigators were not graduated from Cranwell. In the early 1950s the RAF was still a sizeable force, the

scale and scope of its activities were well beyond those available in the RAAF and, generally speaking, its techniques and equipment were in advance of the RAAF's. The RAF was where most of the early graduates of the College consolidated their basic trade and that exchange tour is looked back on by many ex-cadets as one of, if not the most, enjoyable of their entire career.

Unfortunately, the exchange scheme was soon to run into difficulties and not all graduates were able to participate. The main problems arose from 'increasingly specialised training requirements of the operational RAF Commands on the one hand and, on the other, mutual difficulty in providing finance'. In essence, this meant that because of the different aircraft in use within the two services, some roles were not available to RAAF officers without additional costly training outside of the agreed conversion to aircraft type. In turn, this brought about a restriction on the numbers of graduates to be exchanged to eight per year, from an envisaged 20, and a requirement that officers be posted only to roles in which they had experience. This led to a suggestion from the Director General of Personnel, Group Captain C.T. Hannah (later Air Marshal) that consideration needed to be given to posting some graduates to maritime reconnaissance squadrons instead of to the bomber and fighter streams. The Air Member for Personnel (Hancock) responded, interestingly in the light of the equipment used in today's operational maritime environment, that:

I am not at all keen on introducing young pilots of the PAF to M.R. squadrons early in their career. The hard core of an air force is in its bombers and fighters and as we are in the throes of converting to jet aircraft it is important that officers of the PAF should acquire experience in this field as early as possible. This is all the more important in view of the limitations on the human frame which grow with age for high flying conditions. In short, as a general rule, we should pass the young officers through the jet aircraft stage early in their career and leave the M.R. units for manning by those members who are disqualified by medical disabilities from high flying.

This is not to be interpreted in any way as a policy of manning the M.R. units with inefficient aircrew. M.R. squadrons are an essential element of our pattern of air defence and they must be manned by competent aircrew.

In view of these comments, Hannah wrote to the Director of Postings that 'we should make every endeavour to post College graduates to fighter units. Any over from the fighter units should most certainly be sent to Canberra squadrons'.

The above correspondence was taking place during late 1953 and early 1954 after only one year of the scheme's operation. By October 1955 all General Duties officer graduates of No.1 Course, most of those of No.2 Course and a few of No.3 Course had either completed or were undergoing exchange duties with the RAF. At that time Scherger, as Air Member for Personnel, wrote to the Secretary that:

It is confirmed that I have some doubts about the value of the ex-cadet exchange scheme between the RAF and ourselves.

The scheme seems to have been based on a similar Army arrangement existing many years ago. There is little doubt that it is desirable to have our young graduates from the College given overseas experience. However, it is not clear whether this experience would not be of greater value later in the officers' careers.

We have an extensive exchange scheme (apart from this particular facet) with the RAF and I believe that this is adequate for our total needs. The present arrangement seems to be an irresistible temptation to the young officer to marriage as the two years in England appears to him as an ideal honeymoon with the transport provided at taxpayers' expense.

DGP is to have a staff examination made of the scheme from its initiation until the present day with an assessment of its value in individual cases. Until this examination is completed and assessed, exchanges are to be limited to unmarried officers who can be transported on the courier service to and from the United Kingdom.

This directive was presumably stimulated by late advice from two graduates of No. 3 Course of their intention to marry before embarkation for the United Kingdom. Ministerial approval had been granted for each to travel unaccompanied by RAF transport aircraft, and although ministerial approval was sought and given to an amendment to allow the first officer to proceed on exchange accompanied by his new wife, such amendment was not sought for the second officer whose impending marriage was notified some two months later.

Those two officers were certainly not the first to take advantage of a sea trip to the United Kingdom. Indeed, a first class passage by sea to Europe was exceedingly difficult to resist and for those officers contemplating marriage in the near future, in any case, a separation for two years would have been regarded more as a penalty than a benefit. However, the unfortunate juxtaposition of those two pre-embarkation weddings, even though the value of the exchange scheme may still have been queried, undoubtedly denied some ex-cadets the opportunity of both a beneficial and enjoyable experience. Despite efforts by the Director of Postings to revive the scheme in 1958, its death knell was certainly rung in October 1955. From then on, graduates were to 'take their chances along with others for the other approved General Duties exchange posts in the United Kingdom and United States.'

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the graduate exchange scheme, occurring at the time that it did, was to ensure that there was a reasonable number of ex-cadets trained in some of the latest operational techniques and on some of the latest aircraft available. This meant that those graduates who, on return from Europe, were fortunate enough to be employed in areas where their expertise could be utilised, became acknowledged leaders in that field and could confidently make major contributions to the operational training and performance of the units in which they served. In this respect, the early graduate perhaps had some advantage over his Flying Training School contemporary.

It was, of course, no fault of the system that home seldom took full advantage of the overseas tour. Yet graduates who had been employed on swept wing aircraft in the United Kingdom and Germany, and who subsequently did not participate in the RAAF's Sabre project, particularly during the introduction phase, saw their exclusion as being simply another act of 'anti-cadet' discrimination at the worst or grossly inefficient use of experience at the best.

It was at about the time that Scherger closed down the graduate exchange scheme that he was also questioning the value of the cadet training system. Presumably, his criticism could not have been levelled at individual cadets and, quite palpably, there had scarcely been the opportunity for even a cursory assessment of general performance. After all, the longest serving graduates had spent at most two years with RAAF squadrons, which included training and an operational tour. Opportunities to assess officers of the other three courses which had graduated by that time were just as limited and there is no evidence of complaint from either RAAF or RAF sources on that score. Indeed, each of the officers proceeding on exchange duty was 'well reported on.'

As to whether or not the College was achieving the aim of its charter, each graduate had received a liberal academic education to a level somewhere beyond the first year of a Bachelor of Science degree; they had qualified as either aircrew, technical or equipment officers; they were imbued with the "air force spirit"; and, by and large, were well prepared to be launched on their careers. Allowing for individual differences, and having regard to the resources available, there would seem to be little more that could have been done.

The counters to this are, firstly, that despite attempts to broaden their outlooks, cadets did live in a relatively cloistered environment and did not come into a great deal of contact with the Service at large; and, secondly, that much of their Service education was pitched at a level more appropriate to a staff rather than cadet course, which accounted for some of the orientation necessary on first reporting to an operational base. Even so, the ex-cadet was frequently singled out to undertake special functions which authority considered might not be confidently left to other unit officers who, more often than not, lacked any of the training in RAAF administration, law and allied subjects in which the ex-cadet had had a very considerable grounding.

None of which, of course, answers Scherger's basic question of whether the result was worth the cost and effort. The answer, as Murdoch had said, would only be known in 20 years time. Even then, it would be difficult to draw valid conclusions since the national social framework within which the RAAF was required to work would change markedly and beyond any that was likely to be envisaged by the RAAF's senior officers at that time.

Some comparisons might be made between commissioned aircrew who chose to make a full career of the RAAF and ex-cadets of about the same vintage, but the significance of any inferences drawn would always need to be qualified because of, firstly, the very different base parameters and, secondly, the subjective nature of the decisions made by individuals which disturbed an otherwise reasonably predictable career pattern. For example, it might reasonably have been expected that the first appointment as Chief of the Air Staff to be made from post Second World War enlistees, would have been a College graduate. In the event, however, although Hughes (1) and Frost (2) filled the two senior positions on the Gradation List of air vice-marshals in 1983, and might reasonably have been seen as strong contenders for the post, each became ill and was consequently advised to retire and had left the scene by 1984. That is not to suggest, of course, that either would automatically have gained selection over the actual appointee, Air Marshal J.W. Newham, but the example is used merely to illustrate the inexactitude of prediction.

Of the first four courses to graduate from the College, and at the time of writing, from No.1 Course, three graduates achieved the rank of air vice-marshal (one technical officer) and two that of air commodore; from No. 2 Course, two reached air vice-marshal rank; from No.3 Course, three, including one technical, reached air commodore rank; and from No. 4 Course, five, including one equipment, have reached air commodore level. Two air vice-marshals of No.1 Course and one of No. 2 Course are still serving at this time, as are four of the air commodores of No. 4 Course. All other officers of those courses have retired or resigned; only one officer who served to retirement did not reach air rank.

From among their contemporary general duties graduates of the flying training schools, there has been one air marshal, five air vice-marshals and nine air commodores. On the face of it, having regard to output versus input, it would seem that proportionally the ex-cadet had the advantage of the ex-aircrew trainee. However, because there is no group which could be considered to have been closely controlled, any inferences that are drawn would seem to be statistically meaningless. Occurrences appear to be too random to be of significance.

Samples of rank progression taken over the period suggest that the ex-cadet had filled a marginally higher percentage of the promotion lists beyond squadron leader level than his ex-aircrew trainee contemporary. By 1964, for example, about 21 per cent of post-war ex-aircrew trainees had reached squadron leader rank against 28 per cent of eligible ex-cadets. But this can change from year to year; for example, in the 1974 list of group captains, only four of the fifteen post-war enlistees were ex-cadets of the first three courses; by the next year, the ratio had changed to eleven out of 26, a jump from 26 per cent to 42 per cent.

Quite evidently, officers other than graduates of the RAAF College were capable of reaching the higher ranks. In that light, perhaps Scherger's contention was justifiable. On the other hand, all of the ex-cadets who had graduated by the time the worth of the College was being called into question, and who remained in the Service until retirement or near retirement, with one exception were able to reach air rank. Whether all would have reached air rank if all had stayed in the Service is, of course, an imponderable but it is probably safe to say that most were on track before they separated from the RAAF.

There is little doubt, however, that ex-cadets made a considerable contribution to the middle-level management of the RAAF at both unit and staff levels which, by virtue of their early training, was not available from the majority of either the war-time or post-war trained commissioned aircrew. It might be reasonably said, perhaps, that the judgements in the Pearce Paper were made a little early and based on too flimsy evidence to stand up to even superficial analysis, but that nevertheless, the question was probably worth asking. Perhaps some justification for Murdoch's opinion can be found in the 1986 Air Force List of

General Duties Officers, which shows that six of eight air vice-marshals are College graduates¹ and that of 21 air commodores twelve are ex-cadets. Although precedent suggests that there is no assurance that this position will prevail, on the whole, there seems to have been no major reason why the RAAF should not have been satisfied with the output from its College.

¹ One, R.G. Funnell (6), was promoted Air Marshal as Vice Chief of the Defence Force in June 19 86 and became CAS in July 1987.

CHAPTER 5

REDIRECTION

'I would suggest that Air Commodore McLachlan be told our reasons why he is doing the inquiry, namely the product of the four year course has not been particularly successful, and secondly we consider a four year course too long.'

This was part of a minute from the Director of Training (C.W. Pearce) to the Air Member for Personnel (Scherger) in September 1956 and reflects the climate in which the McLachlan review (vide Chapter 2) was initiated. The initial draft of the directive to McLachlan stated that there had 'been some discussion on whether it would not be possible to give a university undergraduate his flying training during university vacations and thus dispense with the College entirely'. The inference was that this, or a similar concept, would be received favourably by the Air Board. Scherger subsequently circulated the draft for comment by members of the Air Board.

The document was not particularly well received. In particular, the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal Sir J.P.J. McCauley) was to write that:

I think that the Chairman of the proposed committee should be left in no doubt as to the standard to be attained. Whilst there are references to this matter in the documents put forward, I consider that these should be together in one clear and unequivocal statement in the special directive to the Chairman. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the ultimate aim should be the attainment of a Bachelor Degree in Science.

We should, I think, avoid giving the Chairman bias towards, or in favour of, particular points of view, based upon opinions which are open to doubt. The draft directive states, in para 2, sub-para (a) -'It appears to be difficult for cadets in our College to sustain their keenness for flying until their basic flying training begins in the third year..'. Whereas, the AOC Training Command, an ex-Commandant of the RAAF College states, 'It has been found from experience by the staff that the first two years of the course in no way dampens the cadets' enthusiasm for flying.'

I think such statements of opinion should not appear in the directive because it is of the utmost importance that the Committee's investigations should be wholly objective.

Similarly, the Secretary of the Department of Air (Mr E. Hicks, later Sir Edwin), wrote:

I have examined enclosure 9 in the light of the consideration by the Air Board of Agendum No 12605 and the other papers on this file which I have not previously seen.

It appears to me that enclosure 9 has been drafted too rigidly along the lines of the Air Board Agendum and tends to give McLachlan a suggested answer before he has made the proposed investigation. This no doubt emanates from the somewhat rigid views of D.T. which are shown clearly in Minute 10 and to which, at the moment, the Air Board is not committed.

I find it difficult to understand why the report by AOC Training Command at enclosure 2A, supported by the report by the RAAF College at enclosure 12B, was not submitted to the Air Board at the same time as the Agendum. Some of the information incorporated in enclosure 2B indicates that an intelligent approach has been made by the College Authorities in anticipating the type of questions to which answers might be required.

In my opinion enclosure 9A should be reworded to give McLachlan a more flexible directive and that if it is considered necessary to attach a copy of the Air Board Agendum (and at this stage I oppose it), copies of enclosures- 2A and 2B must also be forwarded.

Somewhat surprising is McCauley's reference to the 'Bachelor Degree in Science', since although tertiary recognition was stated early as one of the ultimate objectives of the College, the view seems to be somewhat at variance with the sentiments of both Pearce and Scherger, who looked to be working towards quite a contrary aim, despite Scherger's somewhat cryptic comments regarding the need for 'greater bias' towards the technical side of cadets' training. Moreover, both McCauley and Hicks seem to have recognized the intrinsic one-sidedness of the Pearce Report and it is difficult, at this stage, to understand why Air Board members had not challenged the content of the Scherger submission during their deliberations which led to the McLachlan review.

Scherger's rebuttal to the allegation of bias by both McCauley and Hicks was simply to state that there 'were marked differences of opinion between the College authorities on one hand, and this Branch (AMP) on the other. It was for this reason that the Board Agendum was submitted (with a suggestion that there should be a committee appointed to enquire into all aspects of the College). The proposal by the Commandant that it was only the syllabus which needed revision was not acceptable.' This latter comment presumably refers to a recommendation in the Mason Report that 'to ensure continuity of doctrine, and still provide for a fluidity of syllabus to meet ever-changing requirements, it is proposed that a Syllabus Reviewing Committee be established.' This Committee was to visit the College each two years to investigate standards and to review the syllabus.

The McLachlan Committee, which included representatives of all Air Board Members and two academics from the University of Melbourne (Sir Leslie Martin, Professor of Physics, and W.H. Frederick, Professor of Education), but no representatives from Training Command or the College, except on an ex-officio basis, was to meet for the first time on 12 March 1957. The Terms of Reference for the Committee appointed were to enquire into and make recommendations concerning the RAAF College, with particular reference to the following:

- The object of the Course
- The size of the annual intake
- The length of the Course
- The syllabus of training
- The standard of entrant
- Staff establishment
- Location
- Cost

The following additional aspects were also to be explored:

- The relation between the planned intake/output and
- the officer establishment of the respective Service
- Career prospects of the College graduate The importance of pilot qualification in particular, and aircrew qualification in general (for College graduates)

In conjunction with the investigation into the College, the Committee was also to consider the implications on the future of the College and its graduates (particularly in regard to the recruiting of suitable applicants for the College) if a policy of commissioning aircrew on graduation from the FTS was introduced (graduates at that time were given NCO rank only). The particular aspects to be examined were the effect that such a policy (commissioning aircrew) would have on the availability of suitable applicants for the College and the consequent impact on the career of College graduates.

The Committee had completed its report by November 1957. Broadly, its recommendations were that:

The name of the Royal Australian Air Force College should be changed to the Royal Australian Air Force Academy.

Point Cook should be the permanent location of the Academy because of its proximity to a RAAF aerodrome, a major university, a main centre of population and a major headquarters, and because of less developmental costs.

The course for the General Duties cadet should include instruction to Bachelor of Science degree standard (a 'compromise' selection deemed to be the most suitable available), the basic stage of flying training, and physical, military and leadership training. The University of Melbourne had agreed that graduates of the Academy would be granted the Bachelor of Science degree by that University, subject to certain conditions which largely related to the maintenance of staff, research, facilities and examination standards. At this time, the syllabus of the College was such that cadets would reach a standard at the end of their second year which would gain them credit for Part One of a Bachelor of Science degree at the University of Melbourne. Additional subjects needed to be studied before a first year exemption for an engineering degree could be obtained. Technical cadets spent their second year attending to such studies in order to gain admittance to the second year of the Engineering Degree course at any of Melbourne, Sydney or Adelaide universities.

The length of the course for General Duties cadets would remain at four years. Pilot graduates would complete the applied phase of their flying training at the Applied Flying Training School, this being necessary because Point Cook was unsuitable for training in jet aircraft.

The minimum educational standard for entrants was to be equivalent to the matriculation requirements of the University of Melbourne and include physics and mathematics. There was to be no relaxation of these minimum standards. (In this Section of the Report was a statement that 'the offer of a recognized Degree will attract a greater number of applicants with the necessary academic standards - thereby permitting the selection of cadets with higher personal qualities and greater pilot potential!') The initial premise is probably indisputable but the logic of the inferences is somewhat obscure. In anticipation of the transition, Headquarters Training Command had already determined that the entry standard for the 1958 Course would be at matriculation level.

The new scheme should commence from the January 1959 entry at an increased level of 4.2 per intake. Action should be taken immediately to provide the full range of facilities by June 1962. These were to include a Science Block, Applied Science Block, Arts and Military Studies Block, Cadets' Mess, Administrative Block and Tarmac Aircrew Facilities. The cost would be about £850,000 (\$1.7 million). The recurrent cost of the scheme at maturity was estimated at £228,000 (\$456,000) per year covering Service and civilian pay, equipment and facilities for research.

The major argument in the Report appears to be confined to two paragraphs, namely:

In twenty to thirty years time (when the graduates of this new scheme would be reaching high rank) the Air Force will be primarily a "missile" Service. There will probably be a need for closer integration of the General Duties and Technical Branches, the executive officers responsible for direction and future planning should thus have a very broad and advanced education, primarily in the science field. For the next ten years at least, General Duties officers' training should include instruction which leads to an aircrew qualification.

Scherger's theme of a year or so earlier had been picked up, but in view of the preamble to the establishment of the review Committee, the outcome seems hardly to be what the Personnel Branch had in mind when the decision to review the affairs of the College was taken by the Air Board in August 1956. The Air Member for Personnel, Air Vice-Marshal A.L. Walters, submitted the McLachlan Report to the Air Board on 12 December 1957, expressing support for its major recommendations. In this submission he added comment

to the effect that the 'reports of the Murray Committee on the Australian Universities have highlighted earlier discussions on the serious shortage of scientists and technologists in Australia. The proposals in the Report upon the Academy, therefore, appear at least to be an attempt to meet the challenge of providing the Service with the technical competence it will need in the future.' He also noted that there was no assurance that the inducement of a university degree would automatically attract an adequate quota of applicants from the very narrow stratum of youth available nationally to both private and government sectors.

In its Minute of that Agendum, the Air Board confirmed the contents of the report and supported its recommendations. It noted that the seven College courses completed to the end of 1957 had produced 60 pilots, 20 navigators, ten technical officers, seven equipment officers and one administrative officer from a total intake of 167 entrants. It stated, further, that an assessment of the quality of graduates in relation to their subsequent record in promotion examinations and on post-graduate courses indicates that the extra time and training and the higher standards sought at the RAAF College had not achieved 'the expected results.' Once again, it is not clear whether the relevance of the training or the quality of the graduate is at fault, but precisely how even more time on training and an even higher standard would rectify the position is not at all clear.

Also included in the Minute is a repeat of Scherger's earlier statement in the original submission as regards the future needs of the RAAF in respect of 'the training of officers able to comprehend the guided missile as a weapon.' Indeed, the whole rationale for the need for an institution such as the College seems to have hinged on this statement, despite the declared aim for the new academy which 'should be to provide instruction, experience and incentive to each cadet so that he will graduate with the knowledge and the qualities of leadership required of a junior officer in the RAAF and of service to his country leading to readiness for responsibilities as an air commander.' Why this should be more readily attainable because of a year's additional academic study is, again, not easily discernible. It is a brave assumption, as Walters hinted, that academic reward would necessarily attract a youth of higher officer-like potential.

The Minister for Air (F.M. Osborne) formally approved the Air Board minute on 31 January 1958. He submitted the matter to the Minister for Defence (P.A. McBride) seeking his concurrence on 2 June 1958. Osborne's letter was given only a lukewarm reception by McBride. It was his view that a change of this magnitude involving an augmented academic and support structure was not one that could be considered in isolation. He referred to the government's directions regarding the development of common services, including education, and the need for integration where possible. He believed, therefore, that 'the possibility of merging officer cadet training for the three Services at the academic, educational and basic Service training levels' was one which merited examination. He sought information on overseas practices and commented on the possibility of using the expanding university development program for the purpose of training cadet officers to degree standard. He suggested that some further thought be given to the RAAF proposals in that light.

Commenting on McBride's suggestions, McLachlan in a letter to the Chief of the Air Staff (Scherger) reiterated that the RAAF College was required to train high-quality Air Force officers and to develop a strong motivation towards an Air Force career. He briefly summarised and compared his impressions of the systems in use in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. In short, he found that while the United Kingdom system provided very good Service training in a short period, it was directed towards educating an officer for junior rank only. It did not provide its graduates with sufficient scientific background to fit them for senior rank 20 to 30 years later. The Canadian system he regarded as cumbersome and long (five-and-a-half to six-and-a-half years for the Air Force) and most expensive. The United States system was able to provide a full Science degree in four years and, at the same time, give an excellent grounding in humanities and a wide range of military subjects. More time would be required, however, if the USAF College were to undertake full flying training.

McLachlan saw considerable advantage in a system which would enable its graduates to undertake high-quality post graduate courses and to understand the scientific problems in advanced weapons and, thus, be able to associate usefully with 'the scientists studying military problems.' He concluded that the Service college system was the only proven method by which a hard core of dedicated officers with high education could be developed and which would be likely to continue in a Service career through long periods of peace-time and still retain the enthusiasm and qualities necessary for command and direction in war. Youths of the required intellectual capacity, he argued, were only likely to be attracted if offered education to degree standards. This, quite evidently, is a very complicated equation depending on a number of assumptions which may not have been valid at the time or were to become invalid in the light of changing social and Service conditions.

At the beginning of October 1958, Osborne again approached the Minister for Defence seeking his approval to introduce the new syllabus and to plan for the provision of the necessary works. He restated the need to expand the intake of cadets to strengthen the proportion of graduates in the ranks of the permanently commissioned officers; he clarified the reasons for the high expenditure on works; and he set as the most pressing need that of raising the standard of the permanent officers. He specified two objections to relying on universities for the education of future General Duties officers, namely, that the wastage rate would probably increase and that the Science faculties of the universities were already overcrowded and entry was limited. He also included McLachlan's views on overseas institutions and joint service training. On this latter score, however, he was perhaps even more equivocal than McLachlan.

Despite the differing levels of scientific standards required by the three Services, the material difficulties of bringing the three Colleges together and the particular needs of each Service in regard to specialised training, Osborne did not exclude the possibility that at some time in the future cadets for all three Services might be put through the same training or trained together for part of their Service education. He was, in essence, drawing a distinction between long and short term planning and he did not envisage that the present proposal would in any way impede future integration.

On the issue of tri-service cadet training, McLachlan opined that the very high capital cost likely to be involved, three to five million pounds (six to ten million dollars at 1958 prices), would probably be prohibitive and consideration was discounted on that basis. At the same time, although recognizing the advantages of inter-Service education and association at an early stage of officer development, he saw serious -disadvantages in regard to reduction in standards of specialized Service training, unless the courses were lengthened. McLachlan probably feared the prospect of the adoption of the Canadian system in order that existing facilities might be used to avoid the very heavy capital outlay envisaged. He did say, however, that if the funds were available the proposal for a Joint Service College would be worth investigating. The only other alternatives to the scheme proposed by his committee were a development in association with the proposed new University Science College at Canberra and the sending of General Duties cadets from Point Cook to a university to complete the major portion of their Science degree course. Although either scheme was feasible, at a cost, based on his examination of United States and Canadian experience McLachlan believed that both alternatives would seriously prejudice the aim of the College.

Once again the Minister for Defence, at this time A.G. Townley, was not enthusiastic and it was nearly five months before he replied. Although agreeing with the basic aim of raising the standard of permanent RAAF officers, he was very concerned over the cost of the project and with such a significant project being progressed unilaterally. Despite Osborne's short term objections, Townley was still of the opinion that the possibility of integration should be thoroughly explored. Further, he pointed out that a scheme to progressively raise the RMC Duntroon academic standards, in collaboration with universities, to a level of, or close to, a university degree was rejected in 1954 by the Minister for the Army on cost grounds alone. Townley thought that the greater use of university facilities should also be closely examined in the review of the standards and curricula of the Service cadet colleges. He directed that there should be no action to develop the RAAF College to undertake a degree course, pending consideration by the Defence Administration Committee.

By now, March 1959, Scherger was pushing the Minister to press as hard as possible for the establishment of the degree course. His emphasis stayed on the need for 'the executive officer of the future to make best use of both the manned aircraft which will still be in service, and their increasing replacement by guided missiles', as the basic thrust of his argument. In this particular, he had been consistent since first raising the issue in January 1956. The matter was not formally raised again with the Minister for Defence until June 1960.

Part of the reason for the moratorium presumably lay in the fact the the Cadet Colleges had already been selected by the Defence Administration Committee as a field of investigation for the furtherance of inter-service cooperation and for the possible reduction of overlapping in academic and basic military education. The task of investigating the desirability and feasibility of integrating the whole or part of the cadet training scheme was given to the Services Integration Committee. On 28 May 1959, that Committee circulated to the three Services a position paper which embodied a variety of independent views drawn from the experience of the Canadian experiment, from some deliberations on the matter from the United States and from some informal discussion as the result of a lecture given by Field Marshal Montgomery at the Royal United Services Institute in 1955. It included, also, a statement of Australia's situation together with a comparison of the curricula, objectives, standards and administrative detail. The position paper presented a reasonably well balanced argument, although its structure leaves an impression in favour of integration.

By November 1959, the Services Integration Committee was able to submit its final report. Each of the Services had confirmed a need for higher education for its officers, not only to meet the demand of increasingly complex equipments but also to enable them to compete effectively with their counterparts in industry and the public service. Army, in fact, was already contemplating an approach to some universities to seek accreditation up to Part 2 standard in Arts and Science for its Duntroon students, much along the lines of that existing at the RAAF College. Despite this, the Services were still able to find little common ground for agreement on academic level or scope, and the Services Integration Committee concluded that the 'advantages of integration are not so great as to justify jeopardizing any of the Services' essential cadet training requirements'.

The main perceived disadvantages related to the proportion of military curricula which could be integrated, the cost involved in relocating or expanding the existing facilities, and the fact that none of the existing sites suited the particular training needs of all three Services. The Chairman of the Committee did not agree with the conclusions and submitted a dissenting view in which he argued that the separate needs of the Services could be met in one institution, that Point Cook would satisfy the requirement and that much of the cost could be offset by transferring other units, such as the Army and Air Force Staff Colleges to Canberra, and by discounting existing Army and Air Force plans for capital works at the RMC and RAAF College.

Indeed, there was probably much emotiveness in the Services' objections; the Services Integration Committee was later to state that 'there have been a few occasions on which arguments put forward seemed to us to be magnified out of proportion'. Even so, the splitting of its cadet body between different establishments along Canadian lines, the loss of existing traditional facilities, and the prospect of being outnumbered in a large joint environment, were not attractive possibilities for the individual Services.

The report was taken by the Defence Administration Committee on 15 December 1959. There appears to have been little discussion on the matter, according to an unsigned minute of the Secretary, Department of Air. He reported that it was to be referred to the Minister for Defence (Townley) with advice that it be considered at ministerial level when Service ministers had had the chance to discuss it with the respective Service boards. Apparently, the question was also raised as to whether the RAAF might not be allowed to proceed with minimum development of Point Cook, sufficient to enable the introduction of the degree course.

The Administration Committee was not prepared to make such a recommendation to the Minister for Defence. 'It appeared from Mr Hicks' (Secretary of the Department of Defence) comments, however, that the Minister for Defence might be sympathetic to our plans and might be prepared to allow us to proceed'. On 16

February 1960, the Minister for Defence advised that: 'After a lengthy and detailed discussion (with Service Ministers) I am persuaded that benefits arising from integration would be more than offset by the disadvantages accruing. I feel, therefore, somewhat reluctantly, that the status quo must be accepted'. Subsequent events, however, show that this was not to be the case.

The initial failure of the cadet colleges' integration proposal, and the disbandment of the Services Integration Committee in the following May, cleared the way for the Minister for Air to write once again to the Minister for Defence, seeking to upgrade the academic level of the RAAF College. He wrote on 8 June 1960, reiterating the substance of earlier submissions and adding that 'the recent decision on the purchase of a guided missile weapon makes it all the more necessary to start training to degree standard as soon as possible'. (He was writing of the introduction into Service of the Bloodhound Surface to Air Missile which became operational with No.30 Squadron in January 1961). On 29 June 1960, Townley concurred in principle with the proposal subject to the availability of funds within the approved Air Force allotments and the normal procedures for review and approval of works projects.

On 19 August 1960 the Minister for Air sought the formal approval of the University of Melbourne to the constitution of the RAAF Academy and recognition of its graduation standard. The Vice-chancellor, Sir George Paton, advised that the Council of the University had accepted the scheme on 6 September 1960 and that it was appropriate that the agreement be the subject of a ministerial press statement. The Minister for Air announced on 11 September 1960 that the College at Point Cook would be reconstituted from the beginning of 1961 and would be known as the Royal Australian Air Force Academy. The Air Officer Commanding Support Command was to exercise full command.


In the meantime, changes to the routine had been evolving. Despite the fact that deliberations on the possible integration of the cadet colleges of the three Services had delayed the full implementation of the proposals of the McLachlan report, steps were taken to introduce as many of the proposals as possible into the existing College framework, presumably in anticipation of the eventual introduction of a full Science degree. Indeed, by 1959 all aspiring entrants were required to have qualified for matriculation at their local universities and in addition were required to have obtained passes in subjects specified by Headquarters Support Command. This meant that the course at the College would now begin at the standard of Part 1 Science at the University of Melbourne, rather than with a year spent raising all cadets to the same standard of education as had been the case previously.

A second change in the syllabus which occurred in 1959 was to mark the end of a program which had started with No.1 Course. From the end of No. 8 Course, cadets now completed three years of their academic studies before starting flying training, which would then be carried out in their final year. Scherger's concern over the ability of cadets to retain enthusiasm was to be exacerbated by this change; on the other hand, the concentration of the course should have improved the output of the cadets, if what the October 1955 report of the Central Flying School claimed, proved to be true.

Despite some early resistance on behalf of the Air Officer Commanding, Training Command (McLachlan), in which it was reportedly a 'firm view of that Command that the flying training of pilots on each cadet course must be undertaken by the staff of the Royal Australian Air Force College', the Flying Training Squadron of the College was disbanded on 31 December 1958. Thereafter, basic flying training was to be conducted at the Basic Flying Training School, Point Cook, and the applied flying phase at the Applied Flying Training School, Pearce. The establishment of the Cadet Squadron was amended to include three qualified flying instructors who, in addition to performing RAAF College duties, would also be made available for flying instructional duties with No.1 BFTS if required.

The organizational change was virtually forced on the College because of the introduction of the Vampire T-35 aircraft as the RAAF's advanced trainer. Whereas it was possible to maintain course integrity during pilot training while Tiger Moth/Winjeel and Wirraway aircraft were in use, Point Cook was totally unsuitable for jet flying training. Moreover, the redeployment of flying training effort rendered the retention of a dedicated

College flying capability, simply to give cadets basic training and to undertake flight grading, a palpably uneconomical use of RAAF resources. The established routine was, therefore, disrupted and from that point onwards, classes spent the first half of their final year at Point Cook and the second half at Pearce. Nine of the fourteen cadets who started flying training with No.9 Course were to qualify as pilots at Pearce in 1959 and to graduate from the College at Point Cook in December 1959.



A familiar sight for cadets of the College courses, most of whom completed their flying training on either Tiger Moth or Winjeel and Virraway (top) aircraft. After 1958, because of the unsuitability of Point Cook for jet aircraft, the applied flying phase was conducted at the Flying Training School, Pearce, where initially Vampire and later Macchi aircraft were used. Later Academy courses completed their basic flying on the CT4 aircraft.


Otherwise the routine of the College remained much as it had developed in its first few years. Sport still featured heavily in the schedule of activities: the various camps, tours and exercises originated in the late 1940s and the 1950s remained in being, generally in similar format; social activity was still encouraged, although this was increasingly organized by the cadets themselves; and the Cadet Squadron still performed regularly on ceremonial occasions.

By and large, there was probably little to distinguish the cadet of 1960 from the cadet of 1950 in terms of experience and attitude. However, by 19 61 a cadet was able to write in the Academy Journal that, 'under the new curriculum a much greater study burden is placed on cadets. This has necessitated a reduction in the number of extra curricular activities. The amount of "housework" to be done has been reduced to give cadets the maximum amount of time for study... and an attempt has been made to lighten the loads falling on cadets' shoulders as much as possible.' This statement presaged, perhaps, some of the reservations that many of the College's earlier graduates had regarding the possible output from the Academy versus that from the College. Their own experiences would generally have suggested that there would be little immediate advantage in the higher education and some disadvantage in the leavening of those practices designed to inculcate self-discipline and orderly conduct.

CHAPTER 6

ACADEME


Twenty eight cadets of No.14 Course were inducted into the RAAF as the first Academy course at Point Cook on 23 January 1961. At that time, there were three other classes in residence and the transition from College to Academy was to create a few headaches for the administration. Not only had the approvals for major building programs yet to be obtained and suitable academic staff recruited, but the cadet body itself was geared to a different educational objective. The affiliation with the University of Melbourne was immediately useful, however, and selected cadets of Nos.12 and 13 Courses were allowed to attend the university's Science Faculty to continue their studies towards a Bachelor of Science degree, before undertaking their flying training. The term coined to describe students under this system was 'Unibod'. They lived at Point Cook and were taken to and from the University by RAAF bus. It was, of course, close to one of the options discarded in the deliberations of the McLachlan Committee. In many- ways, exposure of the cadets to the less regimented environment of the lecture room and the campus, contact with the broad spectrum of the university population, and the requirement to compete with their civilian contemporaries on their home ground as well as establishing contacts for the future might, if managed properly, have well proved beneficial to the RAAF in the longer term -certainly it would have been more economical. Six 'unibods' were eventually to graduate through the system and of those, three are serving at the present time and two are employed in defence related activities. No.13 Course, to which the three officers currently serving belonged, graduated fifteen officers of whom six are still serving, including one technical officer who gained his Engineering degree from the University of Sydney. It appears, therefore, even though the numbers are small, that contamination by universities has little effect on retention, or indeed promotion, despite fears which were often expressed to the contrary. Indeed, one graduate reported that he doubted that he could have stood the petty discipline and routine of the Academy and that his attendance at the university was all that saw him through.



Four 'unibods' of No.13 Course, pictured with the Assistant Commandant of the new RAAF Academy (Group Captain M.G. Cowan), after receiving their BSc degree in August 1963. From left: Group Captain Cowan, G.J.J. Beck, K.R. Blakers, R.A. Budd, M.E. McDonald.

During this period a number of ex-cadets were also permitted to complete their Bachelor of Science degrees at the University of Melbourne. At one stage, there were nine officers on the strength of the Academy undergoing external university training as well as some who were not resident at Point Cook. Later, a number of College graduates were to return to Point Cook to complete their degrees at the Academy where their presence was welcome as an example to the cadets and, also, for their contribution to the routine of the Academy.

In the meantime, the University of Melbourne agreed to advertise for and to appoint the necessary extra academic staff required. The RAAF would, of course, reimburse the University for salaries and incidental expenses. The council of the University invited Dr V.D. Hopper to become the Professor of Physics and the Dean of University Studies in the RAAF Academy. Professor J.N. Greenwood was appointed as the coordinator of activities between the University and the Academy. Later, Dr B. Rennie was appointed as Professor of Mathematics (RAAF Academy). Mr W.D. Hardy, an original staff member of the RAAF College, was appointed Warden and Head of the Applied Science Department. Most of the lecturers on the staff of the College in 1960, including Messrs B.H. Schaeffer, O.C. Matta, D.G. McIntyre and W.J. Gravell who had been with the staff from the very early days, transferred to the Academy and together with newly recruited members made up the complement of the five departments - Arts and Military Studies; Physics; Chemistry; Mathematics; and Applied Science.



RAAF College staff, mid-1949. At back, B.A. Schaeffre; middle row (left to right): W.J. Gravell, L.T. Spence, C.G. Thomas, D.G. McIntyre; front row: S.C. Lowe, D. Kingwell, V.E. Hancock, A.J. Black, W.D. Hardy. Some members of the original College academic staff stayed until retirement in the 1970s; Mr Schaeffre remained at Point Cook until 1983.

The building program lagged well behind the recruiting program. In 1961 the Academy was still operating in converted wartime huts. In giving evidence to a Parliamentary Committee on Public Works reporting on the proposed construction of a science block, Professor Hopper expressed the view that the existing facilities were


quite unsuitable for a university degree course and that the University could not be expected to carry on for any long period under such conditions. The Committee was persuaded to that view and recommended that the proposed science block should be completed and ready for use in February 1963 at an estimated cost of £190,000 (\$380,000). In fact, the building was not opened formally until 15 August 1963.

In June 1964, the Minister for Air (D.E. Fairbairn) sought Cabinet approval for further works to be carried out at the Academy. Cabinet agreed that this matter should be referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works and that there should also be interdepartmental discussions between the Department of Air, the Treasury, Prime Minister's Department and the Department of Defence on the need for a cadets' mess and an assembly hall on the scale proposed. In the event, the need for the latter facilities was agreed, but the hall at a lesser cost and the construction of the mess should be deferred until the strength of other categories of cadets based at Point Cook was known (the mess was to be a joint user facility).


The Parliamentary Committee tabled its report on 18 March 1965 and recommended that the proposed complex go ahead but that the design be modified to enlarge the size of study/bedrooms by another twelve square feet, to provide each bedroom with a wash basin and mirror and to increase the number of showers in each ablution block. These modifications, pushed by Academy staff, were resisted by Treasury officers who argued against them on the basis of comparison with Duntroon. The Minister for Air (P. Howson) resubmitted the proposal to Cabinet on 8 April 1965. Cabinet approved one million pounds (two million dollars).



The College and the Academy complex. The site of the College is to the east of the parade ground and to the south of the Academy living quarters. The College living quarters can be seen between the Officers Mess and the RAAF Museum which was formerly the College Headquarters building.



Academy buildings under construction, showing the Assembly Hall complex.



Completed Academy buildings

In making its report to the Air Board, the McLachlan Committee had recognized the virtual obligation of universities to provide research facilities for its staff and, accordingly, drew attention to the fact that qualified staff would only be attracted to the Academy if such facilities were provided. In March 1962, the Air Member for Personnel (Air Vice Marshal W.L. Hely) informed the Air Board that a building suitable for research activity was to be included in the Works Program for 1963-64 at a cost of £40,000 (\$80,000) and he sought endorsement for an annual research grant 'of the order of £15,000 (\$30,000)' for use by RAAF Academy staff. The grant was to be administered by the University and dispersed by the University Accounts Department. The University was to account for its payment to the Air Board.

In support of his case, the Air Member for Personnel pointed out that members of the Academy staff were at that time involved in research activities into the effect of cosmic rays on the atmosphere and low level propagation of radio waves. He also submitted for approval that the terms of the draft Statute of Affiliation should be amended to enable the grant of higher degrees to students and staff at the Academy. Air Board recommended these proposals to the Minister for Air (L. Bury) who gave his approval in April 1962.

In May of that year, however, there were already concerns being expressed in regard to the balance of the course between science and officer training, the motivation of the cadet body, and the method of disposing of those cadets who failed either the academic or flying segments of the course. A meeting chaired by the Air Member for Personnel (Hely) was held at Point Cook during November 1962 to discuss those issues. It was evident from the attitudes taken at that meeting that the attainment of the degree was to be the main academic aim and that other activities of the first three years should be subordinate to that aim. Indeed, much was made of the difference between the greater 'degree of individual freedom' of the normal university student compared with the regimented life of the Academy cadet and the seeds had already been sown for a relaxation in the institutional routine and, as the Commandant (Air Commodore K.R.J. Parsons) is reported as saying, the programme had 'been liberalised quite considerably' by that time.

Certainly, the mood of the meeting was one that inclined towards a campus rather than military college atmosphere. Arrangements were being made for third year cadets to attend certain lectures at the University 'to make them feel more a part of University life'. More importantly, however, was a consensus between the military and academic staff that the existing syllabus did not allow adequate training time either for Arts and Military Studies or for Applied Science. The Dean of Studies (Professor Hopper) and the Warden (Mr Hardy) both regarded the pure sciences as being largely wasted if there were to be no bridge to the aeronautical sciences. There needed to be a link between theory and guided practice. The view was that the fourth year of the course should be devoted entirely to this bridging process and flying training deferred until the fifth year if the balance in education envisaged in the McLachlan report was to be achieved. This, in itself, would create other problems such as relative promotion prospects between the cadet graduate and the aircrew trainee graduate of the Flying Training School system and questions as to precisely when a cadet should be deemed a graduate and commissioned.

Based largely upon the discussion held during that meeting, a paper was prepared in the Directorate of Training which reviewed the syllabus of training at the Academy and was submitted to the Air Member for Personnel in March 1963. This was translated into a submission which was eventually put to the Air Board in October 1963. The submission reiterated the scope and intent of the original syllabus objectives and highlighted the reduction in time allocated to the Arts and Military Studies and Applied Science syllabi, despite the increase of six months over the College syllabus. It suggested that the McLachlan Committee had over-assessed the advantages that the cadets would obtain by living on the campus with everything found for them and had, consequently, over-estimated what the cadets could reasonably accomplish in the time available. It noted, moreover, that 'despite the high scholastic and intelligence level' of the first intake, eleven of the original 28 were suspended for academic failure during their first year. Two more were suspended 'at own request' early in the course. (This refers to No.14 Course which was not, in fact, recruited as an

Academy Course. This Course was recruited under the College concept and many of them joined to fly and did not approach the degree course with enthusiasm).

Progressive modifications to the syllabus reduced the time and content of the non-degree subjects to allow cadets to concentrate more on that side of their studies. Compared with the old College syllabus, reductions were 61 per cent in the case of Applied Sciences and 44 per cent in the case of Arts and Military Studies, or a reduction in total hours devoted to these subjects from 1863 to 894. This revision, it was claimed, had reduced the academic failure rate from 40 per cent of the first intake to 6 per cent of the second. 'Many factors may have influenced this: settling in of the staff, some relaxation of discipline, elimination of junior class "fagging" for the seniors, probably contributed.' Reduction in student workload was thought to have been the major factor. The figures proved overly optimistic, however; by the end of 1963 a further seven students of the second intake had been suspended on academic grounds, together with four of the third intake, and with two others at their own request.

It was the opinion of the Academy that the course lacked balance and that it was out of step with comparable institutions which devoted as much as 75 per cent of their curriculum hours to Applied Sciences, Humanities and Military Studies. It was stated that in these important areas the cadets would be less well trained than their counterparts in other armed services and their predecessors from the College. At this time, there was a strong move within the University of Melbourne to increase the length of the Bachelor of Science course to four years. It was argued that in order to retain acceptance, the Academy could be forced into a four year academic term, but it was hoped that sympathetic considerations would be given to allowing some of the missing elements of the existing course as part of the extended curriculum.

The counter argument to lengthening the Academy course lay in the fact that the graduate would become further disadvantaged in competition with the ex-cadet-aircrew officer who, because of his extra three years of field experience, was likely to be considered relatively more efficient and, therefore, likely to be preferred for promotion at the flight lieutenant level. It was expected, however, that the additional training should markedly increase the ex-Academy cadet's efficiency when and if he reached senior rank. It was also argued that, although the cadets may not have fulfilled the charter until they were aircrew qualified, there were precedents for commissioning before that time and that as the cadets had left the direct supervision of the Commandant by the time they departed for the Applied Flying Training School, their commissioning should take place at the completion of the fourth year.

In the event, Air Board deferred consideration of the Air Member for Personnel's submission, noting that 'the product required from the Academy should be restated and the content of the courses at the Academy reviewed in the light of present requirements.' Hely passed this intelligence on to Headquarters Support Command which, in turn, forwarded it to the Academy with a suggestion that a further conference be convened to discuss the matter. Beforehand, however, Mr Hardy had prepared an Applied Science Course syllabus which would parallel the University's General Course, modified to include all the professional Air Force subjects required in an acceptable curriculum. This would be a four year period over which was spread both the pure and military-related academic subjects to be completed before the start of flying training.

Nevertheless, despite recognizing the advantages of such a course, Hardy strongly advised against pursuing this line since the Academy lacked the staff, experience and facilities to do so effectively. He pointed out that the smooth transition from College to Academy had been achieved only because of a very considerable preparatory period which started when university recognition was given to the first two years study of the old College course. He argued that the University of Melbourne was insisting on being in full charge of the degree component of courses conducted by affiliated bodies and was, therefore, less flexible in its attitude than it had been in 1957. Hardy could not see the Applied Science degree scheme succeeding unless the Academy had its own degree conferring powers. He firmly believed that the best approach at that time was simply to extend the length of the existing course in order to restore the balance.

In a note circulated to Air Board Members by Hely on 30 July 1964, as preliminary advice in anticipation of a Board Meeting to discuss the Academy syllabus, Mr Hardy is reported as having said that:

The first three years of the Academy course, excepting the Military Term, were devoted almost entirely to the Bachelor of Science studies. It had been found that cadets could not cope with planned studies in the humanities, applied science and Service subjects recommended by the McLachlan Committee. Under pressure from university staff, it had been necessary to reduce non-science time to less than half that planned and to refrain from setting assignments for members to do in their own time. Teaching in these subjects was therefore less effective than it should be. As a result the cadets came to think of themselves as university science students rather than as cadets of the Academy: the desired motivation towards the Service application of their studies and a Service career was lacking.

Mr Hardy went on to say that the attempt to cram into the fourth year the humanities, applied science and air power studies considered essential to the cadets' professional education was unsuccessful. Not only was it impossible to teach the subjects adequately in the six months available but it was too late. By this time some of the students had become motivated toward a career in Science and had lost the interest in the Service they had originally felt. Whereas on the old RAAF College course students had shown great interest in air power studies, psychology, management and political studies, this was no longer so.

In brief, the course was too short for the overall curriculum and study of pure science had become too dominant.

The proposed solution was to prepare an integrated course of pure science, applied science, air power and management studies and general service training. Gradually, by negotiation with university staff, the pure science subjects should be given greater RAAF bias. Such a solution would, however, only have been a compromise between an existing unsatisfactory curriculum and the ideal. Mr Hardy is again reported as having said that a Bachelor of Applied Science course, in which certain subjects slanted towards industry were amended to be given a RAAF bias, would best suit RAAF needs. The Air Board was told however, that:

Mr Hardy opposed our negotiating such a course with the University of Melbourne at present because:

- a. New laboratory and other teaching facilities would be needed immediately. In negotiations for the new course, the University would not take kindly to the fact that little progress has been made in replacing sub-standard laboratories and other buildings with new buildings.
- b. As Department teaching staff with a sound knowledge of Service requirements would not be available to teach applied subjects, the University would completely control the instruction. The University and not the Academy would provide the cadet's education and influence his outlook. This would create a worse climate than at present in which to develop the Service outlook desired in our cadets.
- c. Professor Hopper and his staff would not be prepared to remain.

There appears to have been some genuine disquiet in Mr Hardy's mind at the direction the Academy was beginning to take and some considerable apprehension that the real aim of the Academy was beginning to be subsumed by an overriding accent on academic achievement in a somewhat irrelevant discipline and by a desire in some quarters to establish the Academy as a seat of academic excellence rather than an institution established to turn out military officers.

Subsequently, and in preparation for yet another conference, a paper was prepared at Point Cook as a statement of the situation at the Academy. This paper, written in July 1964, covers much of the old ground

and re-states the case for an extension of the course to allow more time for military-related studies. It does, however, make the additional points that:

The aim of the Academy is not being attained.

The motivation of cadets to the degree studies suffers because they do not see in the course an obvious application to Air Force requirements. As a result, their performance on the degree studies falls below what they are capable of.

There is a tendency among cadets who have completed the degree component part of the course to feel that the training which they have undergone will not be utilized within the RAAF. As a result they look around for civilian careers which will make more use of their training.

The paper argued, moreover, that flying training at the Basic and Applied Flying Training Schools could be achieved, within one calendar year. Thus, an additional year of study at the Academy only extended the time taken for a cadet to obtain his 'wings' by four months, since the existing course actually lasted four years and eight months.

By the time the Air Board considered the question of the Academy syllabus in October 1964, it was evident that the members were disenchanted with trends at the Academy. It restated the purpose of the Academy as being 'to ensure that the RAAF will have a nucleus of leaders capable of conceiving and applying all the elements of Air Power essential to the support of the Government's policy for the defence of Australia.' This was a watered-down version of the aim expressed by the McLachlan Committee and there seems to be little doubt as to the path that Air Board members expected the development of their graduate officers to take.

The deliberations of Board members lessened the value of pure science and stressed the importance of the application of science and the humanities to air power but against a background of a fundamental knowledge of the political, military and economic trends affecting the balance of world power. The need for training in psychology and human relations was seen as a fundamental requirement, together with the need for physical fitness and the desirability of students developing tastes in some of the fine arts. Indeed, the views of the hierarchy evoke those expressed by the equivalent senior officers of fifteen years or so earlier.

At that time, the Minister for Air (P. Howson) had been in touch with the Vice Chancellor of the University of Melbourne regarding the possibility of pursuing a course along the lines of the degree of Applied Science conducted at the University. The Minister had, in fact, written to the Vice Chancellor asking that the degree of Applied Science be written into the Statute of Application. Aware of this and the possibility of spreading Physics III over the last two years of the course which would allow the humanities, applied science and air power subjects to be dealt with more effectively and at an earlier stage in the course, the Air Board decided that the academic course at the Academy should be extended to four years and, pending further consideration of the proposal to adopt a course closer to the Applied Science course, the Academy course should be varied along the lines proposed above. Moreover, a syllabus was to be drawn up which would include at least 25 per cent humanities in the total course content.

Headquarters Support Command was instructed to prepare a syllabus in accordance with the new guidelines and this was duly submitted to Air Board for approval in December 1964. The new course was to comprise Pure Science 45.8 per cent; Applied Science 12.6 per cent; Humanities 22.1 per cent; Physical Exercises 19.5 per cent, and was to be instituted in 1966, provided staff and facilities were available. The cadets would graduate on completion of the fourth year and undertake their flying training as commissioned officers. No.15 Course was the first to graduate under this system, but the implementation of any changes towards the introduction of applied sciences earlier in the cadets' training did not eventuate and the pure science degree element was retained intact.

CHAPTER 7

ACADEMICISM

By 1967, it was evident that all was not well at the Academy. Indeed, two quotes from the Journal of 1966 serve to illustrate the low morale of the student body and the seeds of a trend which should have been recognized even at that early stage. Firstly, from the senior course: 'our strength is barely enough to carry out the quite modest tasks of the squadron'; and, secondly, from the junior course: 'we are just a bunch of cadets who know what we want and where we are going, but find that it is much more interesting if to attain it we go along the way that seems most appropriate to us' and, in relation to units of the course conducted at the Melbourne University which provided 'a chance to be real, live, university students,' these were 'regularly looked forward, to'.

There had been a gradual relaxation of regulations during the 1960s and the system of progressive privilege had declined. Matters such as leave, car ownership, set study hours, drinking and compulsory sport were liberal-ised, la part, this was a simple recognition of the fact that many of the rules were overly restrictive and, indeed, impossible to enforce, and that students at high schools or boarding schools frequently had more freedom than the cadet, particularly in his first year.

It was an era, of course, when established social behaviour and conventions were being increasingly questioned by the young, particularly those attending tertiary institutions, and it seems that Academy cadets were not exempted from this general trend. Traditional military regard for authority did not sit comfortably in an organization established to stimulate intellectual freedom, and petty impositions, accepted readily by earlier courses as being part of the induction into Service life, were not seen in the same light by members of later courses.

Indeed, many Academy regulations were openly flaunted by the junior cadets. It could be argued, of course, that junior cadets of other military institutions such as West Point, were and still are subjected to a far more extensive regime of personal repression than ever existed at Point Cook, and yet these institutions were still able to retain their particular codes of conduct.

The answer to this and the roots of a number of other problems which beset the Academy at the time may well be found in a report prepared at Point Cook and submitted by the Commandant, Air Commodore C.F. Read (later Air Marshal, Chief of the Air Staff) to Headquarters Support Command in July 1967. His first concern was with the failure rate which, he wrote, based on the trend shown for the first five courses would lead to an expectation of graduating no more than 40 per cent of the General Duties entrants over the next four or five years. Together with those who opted out at 'own request' this would give a combined loss rate of some 60 per cent.

A number of possible individual and inter-related reasons were advanced for this which included: the military activities and discipline, together with the introduction of Humanities subjects in the first three years overloaded the cadets and stultified their zest for free enquiry; the course in Pure Science was unrelated to the future careers of the cadets; further, it was presented by lecturers who were research oriented and who had little in common with the aims of the Academy and, consequently, there was a gulf between cadet and lecturer and cadet and course; the hard work offered little reward within the Service, either in the form of advancement or prestige; the degree course merely postponed the main objective of the cadet which was to fly aeroplanes; cadets were attracted to the Academy by the prospect of a cheap degree course and not because of a calling for military life; the tight programme allowed insufficient time for the attainment of fitness and training in sport where poor performance had produced a drop in morale which was reflected in all aspects of Academy activity; and the problem of state educational differences, despite the introduction of a bridging course.

The overriding reason for failure, Read suggested, appeared to be loss of interest in the course and inability on the part of the cadets to see significance in the academic studies they pursued. This is undoubtedly true and has been confirmed by a number of ex-cadets. There was, unfortunately, little scope for making changes and Read believed that the 'only hope for salvation [was] to get back most if not all control over our courses of study'. He also thought that this might only be achieved if the three Services were to form a defence university. By and large, Read did not see much improvement in the Academy course over the College course.

Read then went on to outline what he believed to be other general disincentives towards an Air Force career as perceived by cadets at the Academy. These related to the status of both the officer and the cadet and, he claimed, contributed to the failure rate and the low standard of entry. He concluded that, apart from the relevance of the course, the lack of flying; the low pay (of officer and cadet); disillusionment with life at the Academy; the failure of the RAAF to recognize that the Academy cadet is superior to other RAAF cadets; and the lack of standing of the Service officer in the Australian community, were all significant factors. Further, he wrote that unless some or all of these aspects could be remedied it was unlikely that first class officers would graduate in sufficient numbers, and that unless the position could be improved rapidly 'the sad conclusion must be reached that it is economically unsound to continue'.

Much of what Read says regarding the administration of the Academy is substantiated by officers such as Group Captain W.J. Emery (11), who along with Air Vice-Marshal E.A. Radford (3), joined No.14 Course as officers to continue their studies towards a Bachelor of Science degree. Emery says that:

In the years 1960 through 1963 there were no major changes in cadet activity from what had gone on in the latter years of RAAF College. Cadets were still required to 'panic' [thoroughly clean] quarters and classrooms, serve in the mess, and during the winter months participate in compulsory sporting activities. During the summer months sport was virtually on a voluntary basis and there were no major organised competitions against Melbourne clubs. However, it was during this period, with the introduction of a new group of academy instructors, that the military organisation came under considerable pressure to relieve the cadets of some of their more onerous chores so that they could devote more time and effort to academic studies. As a side-light, I remember a number of discussions in the staff room at RAAF Academy whereby the new academic educators were deeply concerned over the fact that cadets fell asleep during lectures. I noted at the time that this behaviour was no different from that of students at Melbourne University nor of cadets that I knew at RAAF College.

The new academic instructors who arrived at Point Cook during this period took some time to find their feet. For most of them they had spent all their life in the university environment and had great difficulty in coming to grips with the fact that they had 'military authority' over their students. Some of them just simply could not handle this situation and did not last very long at the Academy. Others had difficulty in understanding how the cadets could manage to perform in an environment which had two quite distinct standards of accepted behaviour. On the one hand the military staff insisted on traditional military standards, courtesies and codes of conduct, whereas on the other the academics adopted the traditional lay-back casual university attitudes. There is no doubt that this conflict in standards put pressure on some of the cadets and there are almost certainly some members who left as a direct result of these pressures.

Emery was in a good situation to draw comparisons since, as a 1961 graduate of the College, he simply stayed on after graduation to complete six years at the establishment. Overlapping and extending that period of attendance at the Academy as a cadet was Group Captain S.T. James (15) who writes that:

My overall impression, which developed progressively during my time at the Academy, was that the degree became the dominating criterion almost to the exclusion of other considerations. This feature was most prominent in selection and suspension judgements

where the assessed ability to pass, or performance in passing the BSc were determining factors. This almost exclusive academic screening appeared to produce a situation in which leadership, personal qualities, service motivation, military orientation and non-scholastic attributes were not emphasised or accounted for in determining who should graduate.

Related to the above point, the adoption of a relatively 'hard' (in terms of being specialized and narrow rather than difficult) and inflexible pure science degree gave little scope for providing an avenue for 'prime' military education being made available to those cadets who were strong on non-academic qualities but lacked the aptitude for Physics and Mathematics. I have never been able to comprehend, and could not understand at the time, how the RAAF could draw such a firm connection between the ability to pass a pure Physics and Maths tertiary course and the qualities it sought in its senior officers. The Academy did not generate or sustain a strong esprit de corps. There certainly was solidarity within a particular course, but this was largely a defensive reaction derived from the first year when a 'Don't let the bastards get you down' mentality developed. My impression is that the strongest bonds were formed by the end of first year; from then on they weakened as the prospect of graduating depended almost exclusively on the personal (individual) challenge of passing the degree. Collective support had little part to play. My own feeling was that the Academy was something I had to 'pass through' (like an obstacle) to get to something I wanted, rather than an institution which provided something of value.


Those are retrospective views, of course, and are perhaps stated more strongly than were actually felt at the time, but conversation with other graduates of that era certainly supports the assertion that the Academy course, and the Science degree part of it in particular, was a hurdle to be overcome before getting on with the main business of learning to fly. Parental and peer pressures were major - but not exclusive - reasons for cadets seeking entry to the RAAF through the Academy, rather than through the Flying Training Schools.

As regards Academy routine through to the 1970s, the impression gleaned from officers who were cadets at that time suggests that such changes that had taken place were evolutionary and, therefore, not as readily discernible to the cadets themselves as they would have been to graduates of some years past. There was, however, recognition of a gradual liberalisation. Apart from such matters as leave and discipline, this seems to have been particularly noticeable in the degree of control that the senior courses were able to exercise over the juniors. Much of the routine organization and administration of the cadet body had been in the hands of the senior cadets and the concentration by the Third Year cadets on their academic pursuits appears to have undermined the disciplinary structure to the extent that the First Year cadets became less and less subjected to an enforced and regimented daily routine. Some of this the ex-cadets also attribute to changes in the military staff, observing that the cadets were quick to identify any weaknesses of which they might take advantage. Complaints about tiredness, for example, perhaps induced by sport or disciplinary drills would be used as test cases for trials of strength between the military and academic staffs. Boots were the order of dress for cadets at the time and the wearing of boots instead of shoes to lectures was held to be a sufficiently valid contributory cause to cadets' weariness to warrant change.

Not all cadets would agree that there was a detachment by the university element of the academic staff from the cadets but there would be general agreement that there were considerable differences between the attitudes and approaches of the cadets towards the old College academic staff and those of the university academics. Even here it would be difficult to generalise since some of the university staff did use the discipline available through the military connection to good effect.

One of the more unfortunate aspects of the curriculum was that satisfying the requirements for the award of the degree became the prime objective for the cadets. Its place in their future careers meant little to them other than that without it they would not progress to the next stage. Unfortunately, a concomitant to the

drive towards academic attainment was an apparently inevitable assumption of superiority of academia over the military.



Perhaps there would be few better examples of the changes that had taken place in the lifestyle of the pre-1960 and post-1960 cadet than is provided by these photographs from the early 1950s and mid-1960s.

In the minds of the cadets, the overwhelming importance of the degree trivialised the importance of their military studies, at least in their first three years. Failure in their university studies meant termination of their course; failure in their military studies seemed unlikely to affect graduation prospects. This aspect of training received scant attention during their first three years at the Academy and although the applied science and military studies element of the course in the fourth year provided welcome relief from the Pure Science course, it was still regarded as a reasonably demanding segment and a further extension to an already extended preliminary training period.

Throughout their course, it will be remembered, the cadets were given very little air experience other than a short period of passenger flying at the Central Flying School, East Sale. The relevance, therefore, of their applied studies to their flying training was not as readily identifiable to them as it had been, say, to the College cadet or aircrew trainee. The Air Board agreed in 1968 that formalised pre-basic flying training would be undertaken at the Academy and the effect of this program is discussed later.

As with the graduates of the early College courses, complaints regarding the performance of Academy graduates in the field were not slow to reach the Department of Air. As a consequence, a check was undertaken in 1970 on the reporting history of Nos.16, 17 and 18 courses. Again, as in 1956, the numbers were small and the reporting period short. However, the review did reveal that some officers had exhibited character defects which caused the Air Member for Personnel (Air Vice-Marshal B.A. Eaton) to comment in a letter to Headquarters Support Command that it was 'disturbing that these traits are reported upon by training units to which the officers are posted following graduation from the Academy'.

Certainly, there were discrepancies between the Academy report and the Training School report in a number of cases and the Personnel Branch staff placed the blame squarely with the Academy for failing to pay enough attention to the personal qualities development of the cadets. Only three cadets of these three courses were suspended on the basis of 'personal qualities' which, the departmental staff point out, stemmed more from a refusal to conform to military discipline early in the course than from lack of officer-like qualities emerging later in the course. It was noted, also, that some of the pilots had indices below the cut-off for pilot training and should not have been selected for General Duties training at the Academy. The Air Member for Personnel asked Headquarters Support Command to correct this latter selection anomaly and to 'bring to the attention of the Commandant of RAAF Academy the findings in respect of deficiencies in personal qualities of recent graduates from the RAAF Academy'.

In his response, the Air Officer Commanding Support Command (Air Vice-Marshal K.S. Hennock) suggested that any uncorrected recognizable character defect would have led to suspension, but at the ages of 17 to 21 personality traits discernible were not easily assessed. He opined that there were marginal areas of uncertainty where it was hard to know, firstly, whether a particular personality trait was permanent or merely temporary as part of the growing-up process and, secondly, whether it was good or bad. In the main, however, he was not convinced that the extracts quoted from the confidential reports of the officers in question contained comments which were 'ultimately inconsistent with the Academy assessments'. On the more general question of suspensions, however, he wrote:

There are many suspensions from course at the RAAF Academy. Most of these are ostensibly for academic failure because the member concerned has failed his University year. The number of suspensions raised on purely personal qualities grounds is comparatively negligible. But in point of fact there is a large PQ element in every suspension; the cause of academic failure is frequently seen to be a character defect of one kind or another.² Consequently, success in the BSc course is usually an indication of high PQ level. Further to this, a cadet who graduates from the RAAF Academy, in addition to having gained the Bachelor of Science degree, accepts a ten year return of service obligation. It is reasonable to assume therefore that in all of these cases motivation is strong and the resolve to pursue an Air Force career firmly established.

Whenever any of these graduates subsequently changes his mind, or loses interest, or otherwise fails to realise a potential clearly displayed, the Academy takes a keen interest in the possible causes. It is very probable that the key to the matter complained of in Reference A [the letter from Eaton] is lack of motivation. The means to maintain motivation has been elusive at the Academy since its establishment in 1961; that same problem is greater in the Service at large, particularly in the case of officers who are highly qualified. It is the view of this Headquarters that the complaints made by Commanding Officers of self-interest and lack of co-operation stem from this cause.

² In fact, Mr Hardy was to say later in conversation that the military staff were reluctant to recommend suspension on the grounds of personal qualities and that academic failure was frequently given as the prime cause for suspension when this may not have been the case.

The statistics for Nos.16, 17 and 18 Courses are of some interest. Twenty-seven cadets enlisted with No.16 Course, five transferred to other courses, four left the Service, six re-enlisted as cadet aircrew, and thirteen graduated, including one from No.15 Course. On No.17 Course, 34 enlisted, four joined from the previous course, five transferred to other courses, fourteen left, nine enlisted as cadet aircrew and ten graduated. Twenty-three cadets enlisted on No.18 Course: four transferred from No. 17 Course and one to No. 19 Course, nine left, five transferred to cadet aircrew and twelve graduated. An intake of 84 produced an output of 35 officers, about 41 per cent and slightly lower than the three courses preceding and succeeding them, as against about 62 per cent of what would have been the equivalent College courses, Nos.3, 4 and 5. From the Air Force List of 1986, all graduates of Nos.16, 17 and 18 Courses who are still serving have reached the rank of wing commander and three are, or are about to become, group captains.

By way of comparison, of the 20 who transferred from the Academy to cadet aircrew training and who were still serving in 1986, one is about to become a group captain, two are wing commanders, two are squadron leaders and one a flight lieutenant. Retention rates for each group are about the same. Seniority at graduation within or between courses, either at the Academy or the Flying Training Schools, is not necessarily reflected in the officer seniority gradation.

Or again for the statistically minded, a typical cadet of No.16 Course transferring to the Flying Training School system would graduate from that school as a pilot officer about mid-1966, where his ex-course fellows would have graduated in December 1966 as flying officers. They would have reached flight lieutenant level about the end of 1970 and December 1969 respectively. Such a course, of seventeen students, graduated from No.2 Flying Training School in August 1966. Of those serving in 1986, four are wing commanders, three are squadron leaders and one is a flight lieutenant. Some of these are senior to, equal to, or junior to graduates of No.16 Course of the Academy. Proportionally, the Academy graduate seems to be marginally ahead of the Flying Training School graduate, but it would be difficult to draw any significant conclusions from such a comparison, especially when considering that out of the 140 or so General Duties officers of wing commander rank, something less than 15 per cent are graduates of the Academy.

Very approximately, College and Academy graduates fill about 33 per cent of the group captain establishment, about 50 per cent of the air commodore and 75 per cent of air vice-marshal positions. On the face of it, it seems unlikely that in view of the low proportion of ex-cadets filling wing commander positions that the higher percentage in the more senior ranks could be sustained. In the era from which the present group of two-star officers was drawn, about 30 per cent of the wing commander ranks were filled by College graduates.

The Royal Australian Air Force was, of course, committed to the Vietnam conflict from July 1964 until early in 1972, although it started reducing activity in May 1971. The war appears to have had little impact on the routine of the Academy or of the cadets, even when attending classes at the University of Melbourne. Despite civilian dress, the military haircut apparently was sufficient to identify them as RAAF cadets but they seem to have escaped any major antagonism on the part of the civilian student body.

Some 45 graduates of the College or Academy completed operational tours in Vietnam. Understandably, about three-quarters were graduates of the College, and College graduates provided the commanding officers for No. 2 Squadron twice, No. 9 Squadron three times, and No. 35 Squadron twice. Apart from service with the three RAAF squadrons, ex-cadets also served with the United States Air Force as forward air controllers and with the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing flying Phantom F4D aircraft. Four graduates were awarded the Distinguished Service Order and seven the Distinguished Flying Cross for operational service in Vietnam. One pilot, Flying Officer Michael Herbert, a graduate of No.17 Course, unfortunately failed to return from a night bombing mission on 3 November 1970 and is presumed dead.

The reception of these ex-cadets in the operational theatre was, of course, considerably different from that experienced by the early cadet courses in Korea and Malaya. Further details of the graduates' contribution to the conflict in Vietnam may be found in George Odgers' book *Mission Vietnam*, which describes RAAF operations in that theatre from 1964-1972.

CHAPTER 8

DECLINE

In mid-1967, a committee was appointed by the Minister for Defence to conduct an inquiry aimed at developing a plan for the establishment of an armed forces academy. This was known formally as the Tertiary Education (Services' Cadet Colleges) Committee and was chaired by Professor Sir Leslie Martin, Dean of the Faculty of Military Studies at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, with General Sir John Wilton, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Professor Sir Hugh Ennor, Secretary of the Department of Education and Science, as initial members.

The Committee submitted an interim report in November 1967 which quite clearly indicated that the most likely finding of the Committee would ultimately be a recommendation that a tri-Service academy be established and located at Duntroon. The interim report makes the point that 'in their anxiety to preserve academic standards the Universities have sometimes encouraged standards which, for Service requirements, are unrealistic. Coupled with this there has been an under-estimation by the Universities of the educational content of the military studies which must be undertaken by the cadets. In our opinion the RAAF Academy provides an illustration of the difficulties which arise from a close association between a university and a Service college. A baccalaureate course in Science..., with its emphasis on physics, is not wholly suited to the needs of the RAAF'.

The Committee saw the solution as lying in an institution empowered by legislation to grant its own military degrees in courses specifically designed to educate young officers in the profession of arms. This, in fact, was the substance of the conclusions and recommendations when the 'Martin Report' was eventually submitted to the Minister for Defence (Malcolm Fraser) in late January 1970.

The 'Martin Report', in effect, signalled the demise of the RAAF Academy. Although the government was not to approve the establishment of a Defence Force Academy in principle until March 1974, and although there was a large body of opinion which thought that the Defence Academy would not materialize, or if it did, that it would be at some considerable time in the future, the uncertainty of the situation understandably had a most unsettling effect on the academic staff which, in turn, was to have ramifications for the Academy which were to last for some time.

Indeed, in 1973, the Warden (Mr Hardy) prepared a paper entitled 'Decline in Academic Standards RAAF Academy'. He observed that there had been a decline in academic motivation over recent years during which the cadets appeared to be incapable of sustaining their intellectual drive and curiosity for more than one year. Further, a conviction had developed that the Service attached little importance to the science degree other than as a prerequisite to graduation from the Academy. They saw little value, therefore, in attempting to achieve academic excellence. The objective became to qualify at the bare pass level with the minimum of effort, a phenomenon later known as - 'the 51% syndrome'. Much of the value of a university education was being lost upon the cadets, many of whom were capable of earning First Class Honours. The consequence was that the minimum effort program resulted in more failures than might otherwise have been expected.

Hardy listed a number of possible reasons for the decline. Firstly, he cited the Martin Committee Report as having had the effect of lessening the motivation of the academic staff towards the Academy. This reduced enthusiasm towards the Academy and the RAAF in general he described as having been 'quite marked':

Few of the university staff have retained their membership of the Officers' Mess and these only for personal convenience. There is an understandable tendency for them to centre their activity around the university itself against the day when the Academy will be closed down. All this has an impact on the student body.

Allied to this particular problem was the freezing of new appointments to permanent staff so that as members of the academic staff resigned or retired their places could only be filled on a temporary basis. These were usually taken up by research students which meant that the quality of the teaching at the Academy was inevitably eroded.

Secondly, he noted that in addition to the problems associated with 'the 51% syndrome', unlike other tertiary institutions no recognition was given to the extra year of study at the Academy which was taken at the post-graduate level. Thirdly, he commented on the composition of the military staff. He was of the opinion that a background of tertiary education was most desirable in the Cadet Squadron officer and that a preponderance of College or Academy graduates should fill the positions on the Cadet Squadron staff. He further believed that the posting of ex-college graduates with unsuccessful careers to the Academy seriously diminished the value of the academic course in the eyes of cadets, particularly if the graduate in question had a good academic record.

It is difficult to identify persons in the last category, but there is no doubt that only a sprinkling of graduates had generally been on the Cadet Squadron staff throughout the history of the College or the Academy to that stage. Only one, in fact, Squadron Leader N.E. Cooper (now Group Captain), Staff Engineering Officer, a highly regarded and well-reported officer, was on staff at that time. But certainly, not all officers posted to the institution were of the highest calibre whether ex-graduates or not. On the other hand, Hardy could have just as well argued that a successful career officer who had not attended the Academy might prove equally disruptive since cadets would see in him the manifestation of their belief that the degree in Science was unnecessary from a career viewpoint. For example, Squadron Leader Lovett who had completed the first year of the first Academy Course, No.14, before his transfer to the Flying Training School, had enjoyed a very successful career up until that stage and in 1973 was the Cadet Squadron Commander.

Finally, Hardy contended that the close community within the Cadet Squadron encouraged acceptance of group attitudes. This was of particular concern where, for example, a cadet who loses his personal motivation begins to influence his own close associates and eventually the whole class. One of the factors which would have been very pertinent in this respect was the time taken to effect the discharge of unsuitable cadets. Hardy cited one case in which it took eight weeks to dispose of two cadets who had lost all interest in the Course. He suggested that some amelioration might be found in restoring some flying, if only in token amounts, over the last two years (flying scheduled for Nos.21 and 22 Courses had been cancelled in 1971, and No.23 Course was not scheduled to fly); granting some tangible recognition of the quality of degree such as, for instance, seniority antedated to correspond with the level of pass; the institution of a post-graduate diploma to cover the non-degree studies of the Academy Course; a positive posting policy to ensure strong graduate representation; and improvement in the administrative processing of discharges.

These views were duly transmitted to the Department of Air through the Air Officer Commanding Support Command, who shared Hardy's Concern. The reaction within the Personnel Branch was fairly negative to most of Hardy's proposals. Group Captain J.R. Boast, Director of Personnel Officers, responded that hours for motivational flying were not available; the seniority proposal was disputed on the grounds that the graduate officer already held rank out of proportion to his flying experience and the award of seniority would "inflict a further injustice on the Flying Training School entrants who are obliged to serve two years as pilot officers merely to prevent them gaining seniority over Academy students.' Elsewhere in the Branch, some doubt was expressed as to the need for a fourth year at the Academy; there was some tacit agreement that more attention might be paid to staff selection although the point was made that, because of the relatively low number of graduates and the almost equal distribution of assessment scores, the probability of finding an available, well reported ex-Academy officer would be relatively low; and it was accepted that some examination should be made of existing discharge procedures.

Boast, a non-College graduate, advocated doing away with 'the highly regimented, boarding-school life at the Academy' which he saw as an undesirable feature in which the cadets were 'Constrained from maturing

at the rate achieved by their contemporaries not only at universities but at the Diploma Cadet Squadron.' This is an interesting commentary since there was, at the Academy, some considerable concern over the standards of conduct and efforts were being made on the part of the military staff to restore some of the personal values pertaining in the College years. Lovett, who had been the Cadet Squadron Commander during 1973 and 1974 recalls that 'earlier there had been reports of horrific social behaviour far below the standard of decorum that would be expected of Cadets, involving drink and women, even after making allowances for their lack of maturity'.

It should be remembered, of course, that the report by the Committee of Inquiry into the Royal Military College, chaired by the Honourable Mr Justice R.W. Fox (known as the Fox Report) had been presented to the Minister for the Army (Andrew Peacock) in April 1970. The report received wide publicity and had roundly condemned the practice known as 'bastardisation' as discriminatory, sometimes humiliating, always potentially harmful to the well-being of some cadets, and generally prejudicial to academic study. It further recommended liberalisation in routine, leave and discipline. The report was essential reading for military staff at the RAAF Academy with a stern warning that similar criticisms were not to be levelled at the Academy. This would no doubt account, to some extent, for the relaxation of regulation and for the reluctance of staff to apply strong corrective measures and would have contributed to the gradual establishment of academic dominance.

Lovett recalls that during his time the general behaviour of the cadets was not too bad. Patterns of behaviour seem to have developed within individual classes; his recollection that No. 26 Course was 'a bit of a handful' lends credence to Mr Hardy's earlier views on group identity. At the time, during and just after the Vietnam conflict, the profession of arms was not a fashionable vocation and entry to the military colleges was not a highly rated option for young men just leaving secondary schools. Each of the Services was having difficulty recruiting cadets, short falls seemingly being in the order of 25 per cent. Recruits for the Academy were apparently accepted with marginal academic stanines and pilot aptitude stanines of less than the minimum five generally required of aircrew applicants; on this matter Headquarters Support Command simply reported that Academy selection boards, with the concurrence of that headquarters, 'raised the pilot index number to the Flying Training School requirement in 1967' and that it had not been lowered since. The difficulty in attracting the highest quality applicants in the required numbers was generally acknowledged later by academic staff who were teaching at the Academy at that time.

In March 1974, the Commandant (Air Commodore E.W. Tonkin) wrote formally to the Air Officer Commanding Support Command on the problems affecting No.26 Course. This stemmed mainly from an earlier request from the Command to explain the high suspension rate of cadets from that course, the figures for which were: 37 enlistees; four transferees from No.25 Course; three were discharged 'within three months of enlistment'; three were discharged on 'own request'; four transferred to other courses; twelve 'failed academics'; and nineteen graduated (including three from the earlier course). These figures were not, incidentally, vastly different from either the preceding or succeeding course and were, indeed, significantly better than for No.24 Course from which only fourteen graduated from an effective intake of 45.

Tonkin suggested that the size and structure of the Academy lent itself to the formation of strong in-course attitudes which, although they could be beneficial, could produce the opposite result when a disruptive element assumes the leadership. Additionally, the Academy cadet brought a 'different attitude and outlook to the cadet of College days'. He had been 'taught to analyse and question things more and not to take them at their face value' (apparently a faculty not evident in the old College cadet). He goes on to list a number of factors which had shaped the course attitude of No.26 Course citing permissive attitudes in schools, universities and society in general; anti-military propaganda generated by the Vietnam War and fed into schools; the student challenge to authority in schools and universities; the abolition of fees at universities and the provision of living allowances which gave the cadets a fall-back position; the perception by cadets of the

import of cuts in Defence spending; the publicity given to officer resignation rates; and the uncertain future of the Academy.

Presumably, these influences would have applied similarly to a number of other courses since many of the same conditions pertained. However, it would appear that the consequences were more obviously manifest on No. 26 Course, which, Tonkin suspected was 'led by a group who had some knowledge and perhaps experience of the techniques of protest' and which, apparently, undertook a systematic challenge of the Cadet Squadron administration. This was followed by a campaign of non-cooperation with the academic staff, bordering on rudeness.

Seemingly, the military staff were unable to control these junior cadets and the Commandant, in an effort to alleviate the problem, deleted from the Standing Orders all apparently unnecessary restraints on junior cadets and severely reduced the traditional authority of senior cadets in certain areas of social behaviour. This was in line with Tonkin's belief that there should be a move towards compliance, as far as possible, with the liberal social trend by removing petty restrictions as anachronistic sources of irritation.

The aim of the malcontents was, Tonkin claims, to gain for the cadets the same freedoms as those experienced by university students. The cadets wanted all compulsion to be abandoned, their argument being that, as mature young men, with the controls removed they would automatically do the right thing. The Commandant observed, however, that even though concessions had been made, there was no noticeable improvement in the attitudes of the hard core of dissenters. He decided that he had gone as far as he was prepared to go liberalising the Standing Orders, routine and way of life, although he did advocate the formation of an all-course Committee to review relevant sections of Standing Orders, and proposed to introduce a system whereby senior cadets were made the mentors of one or more junior cadets, mainly with the objective of breaking down the barriers which existed between Courses.

In response, however, to the original request from Headquarters Support Command regarding the numbers of applications for discharge, the prime reason was still, apparently, basic incompatibility with discipline. 'The rigour', Tonkin wrote, 'of the flying course and the uncompromising insistence on obedience to orders at No.1 Flying Training School was the final frustration for the remainder of the dissentient group. . . As all of the malcontents from 26 Course have now parted company with us, and with the steps I have taken as outlined, I believe that as much as possible has been done within the Academy to close an unhappy chapter.'

The Commandant followed this correspondence with a further report to Headquarters Support Command which was to repeat most of what had been written in Hardy's statement on the decline in academic motivation. In addition, he noted a number of other reasons which added to the general discontent, including the withdrawal of flying from all but the second year cadets; the last minute cancellation of end of term tours due to lack of Service accommodation or transport; the fact that some cadets of the Royal Military College had been provided with transport for visits to Indonesia and New Zealand, whereas similar requests for Academy cadets had been refused. Each of these examples was to strengthen the impression of the cadets that the hierarchy, and indeed the Air Force at large, had little interest in the activities of the Academy.

There is no doubt that some courses have proved more troublesome than others and that some have broken from the regular pattern. This had been so since the early days of the College and No. 26 Course-was apparently such a one, although in retrospect, it is difficult to believe that a deterioration of this magnitude could have arisen so rapidly. It seems unlikely that such an alleged divergence from the norm would have been tolerated, either by the student body- or the management executive, unless the substructure for such developments was already in place.

Some of the blame must lie in the failure of the staff, and the academic staff as much as the military, to insist from the outset on the maintenance of a level of discipline appropriate to a military institution. Sight of the fact that the Academy was there to serve the needs of a fighting Service appears to have been lost somewhere in the transition from College to Academy, and it hardly seems sufficient to lay the blame for the

deterioration in standards at the feet of the schools or society in general and then to focus all of this on one course alone.

Indeed, a report at about this time on one of the courses at the Flying Training School which mainly comprised graduates of the Academy was severely critical of their performance. They were 'a difficult group to control because of their persistent lack of effort or enthusiasm. To some degree the syllabus deficiencies have some bearing on this matter; however, the main problem was the poor group attitude. Instances of uncooperativeness with staff, insubordination, lack of self discipline and group discipline, were not uncommon.' This was a report on a course that had graduated from the Academy before No. 26 Course had even joined. Further, it was a report on a group already holding permanent commissions in the RAAF and which, moreover, was engaged in the most important course its members would be likely to undertake and on which depended the shape of their future careers. More surprising is that, in view of all the evidence available at the time, neither Headquarters Support Command nor Air Office had intervened directly and strongly to remedy this decline in military standards, although its insidious nature may have accounted to some extent for the lack of more positive action.

The issue of engineering officer training also came under scrutiny during the Martin Committee's deliberations, aspects of which were investigated by a Department of Defence committee in 1971. The RAAF's main source of professionally trained engineers at that time was, of course, the Diploma Cadet Squadron whose cadets received their training at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. This course was at diplomate level whereas the Academy engineer cadets were educated in the theoretical and design traditions of a conventional university. Some were trained in the Radio or Electronic disciplines (at the University of Adelaide) but predominantly they were aeronautical engineers who entered the University of Sydney at Second Year or intermediate status, having completed a year at the Academy. (Entry was at First Year for most College cadets.)

The University of Sydney was selected as the venue for engineering training because in 1947, when the College was founded, Sydney had the sole chair in aeronautical engineering in Australia. The University granted recognition for academic work completed at the RAAF Academy by resolution of the Senate of the University 'pursuant to section 5 of chapter XX of the by-laws' which reads:

- (i) Any person who has passed an examination qualifying him for matriculation in the University of Sydney and submits satisfactory evidence that he has subsequently completed at least the First Year of the course at the Royal Australian Air Force Academy, may be admitted to status in a course leading to a degree.
- (ii) The Academic Board, on the advice of the appropriate Faculty or Board of Studies, shall determine the status of such person and the credit to be granted in respect of work performed at the Royal Australian Air Force Academy.

Some cadets who had completed their BSc Course at the Academy had also been permitted to enter the engineering Course at Third Year or Senior level.

By 1971, there had been over 40 Engineer Branch College or Academy graduates and by 1986 the number had doubled. Among them there has been one Chief of Air Force Technical Services (Air Vice-Marshal I.T. Sutherland (1)), two engineer students who have won the University of Sydney Gold Medal (Air Commodore B.J. Graf (7) and Flying Officer A. Dietz (36)) and two Rhodes Scholars (Wing Commander C.McK. Hingston (20) and Flying Officer A. Dietz (36)).

The maintenance of cadet motivation was already regarded as a major problem and was to remain so throughout the life of the Academy. Contact with the Air Force at large was limited and cadets' perception of what the Service was about was generally restricted to that gleaned from the various between-term touring activities. Flying, in any form, and contact with flying units was considered by most to afford the most productive stimulus to cadets' interest in the Air Force.

'Exercise Prune', for example, was devised for this purpose and involved the attachment of 4th Year cadets to operational units of their choice in order to give them an insight into squadron activities. Similarly, 'Exercise Fledgling' introduced in 1966, enabled cadets to be given about five hours air experience in Vampire, and later Macchi, aircraft at Central Flying School, East Sale. Not only did the cadets find this a most enjoyable and stimulating episode, but it also provided useful training for the student instructors. However, the most favoured stimulus was actual flying training and, to this end, the Air Board in April 1968 approved the allocation of 50 hours Winjeel flying for cadets, to be spread over the four years. This was designed to enable the cadet to solo in his first year with ten hours flying in each succeeding year for continuation practice. The flying was to be undertaken over seventeen weekends and would require additionally, 'two qualified flying instructors, seven tradesmen, one air traffic controller and one Winjeel aircraft.'

Flying was conducted by the staff of the Flying Training School at Point Cook. The original concept varied in form over the ensuing years to accommodate changes in resource availability and in response to the effect that the flying program was having on the cadet body since the results were not all positive. There seems to have been a general acceptance by Academy staff that most cadets joined the Air Force to fly as their primary object. The reasons why they selected the Academy as their entree instead of the Flying Training School system could vary from a single desire to acquire a tertiary qualification as a back-up in the event of failure to qualify as a pilot, to a perception that entry to the Air Force through the Academy would ensure a career path to the higher ranks. For most, the opportunity to participate in the flying program was a welcome taste of things to come and provided a morale boost, particularly to those engaged in their second year of Studies which was a period renowned for flagging morale. For others, however, the experience was less than stimulating, and for some could have the absolutely reverse effect.

Weekend flying was not popular and there was some evidence of cadets 'going sick' on Friday afternoons to avoid flying. Some cadets displayed no real enthusiasm, and duties and exercises related to the flying syllabus were seldom completed on time or satisfactorily. In keeping with the normal behavioural pattern at the Academy, reaction to flying, as in most other areas, seemed to be dominated by a course attitude. Course assessments from the Flying Training School ranged from 'keen and enthusiastic' through to 'not very interested', but in the main, cadet response was regarded favourably by the instructors. Assessment of performance during motivational flying was of particular concern to the cadets. As Senior Air Cadet P.J. McDermott (now Wing Commander) (21) wrote in 1971:

For a person who has joined the Air Force to fly and fails his flying after graduation, the prospect of ten years return of service in a branch to which he is disinclined is quite depressing. An assessment by FTS instructors before that person is committed to ten years return of service can help the student decide before it is too late whether he is really suited to the Air Force. Much doubt can be removed from the cadets' minds.

Typically of the time, he adds that it 'must be stressed, however, that the assessment is made for the student and not for the Air Force.' As in all other phases of Academy life, seemingly, even in flying training 'air force spirit' still lagged some way behind self-interest. Even enthusiasm, of a relatively enthusiastic complement, was qualified: 'At the end of 1967', McDermott writes, 'members of Number 20 Course were given the opportunity to fly during the first week of their annual leave. All of the Victorian cadets and one other were willing to do this. It is believed this willingness still prevails.' Zeal, apparently, has not only personal bounds but territorial limits as well. What is, perhaps, more difficult to understand is why, if flying over that period was regarded as desirable for some, it might not have been made compulsory for all. This was surely an area in which the military staff could exercise control and, after all, leave for cadets at the Academy was not niggardly.

Demotivation was not restricted only to those who found flying difficult or unsatisfying. Some enjoyed the experience so well that they came to regard their degree studies as merely another obstacle on the way

to the real objective and, as a result, their attitude to their studies suffered. Over 50 Academy cadets transferred to the Flying Training School system either at their own request or as a consequence of failing the academic course. It is possible that some contrived to fail their academics but this approach was frustrated somewhat in later years by requiring cadets to apply for entry to the Flying Training School in competition with other applicants. Transfers to the Flying Training School also took place during the College years. Thirty College cadets transferred and by 1986, four of these officers had reached air rank; four others are also serving at ranks commensurate with those of their previous College course colleagues.

No.26 Course, on which attention had become centred, was the thirteenth course to graduate from the Academy. Coincidentally, No.13 Course was the last course to graduate from the College. There is, therefore, some rough basis for comparative performance assessment between the last few courses of the Academy and the corresponding courses of the College. The Academy graduate, it will be recalled, graduated as a flying officer and served in that rank for three years, as did the graduates of the College after and including No.11 Course. Earlier than that, College graduates served one year as a pilot officer and two-and-a-half years as a flying officer. Later graduates should, perhaps, have had a slight edge in the promotion stakes.

Six years in rank at flight lieutenant and above is generally regarded as about normal and periods spent longer than that in any given rank will render promotion to the higher ranks more, but not impossibly, difficult. Earlier promotion, of course, has the converse effect. A span of six years would, therefore, provide a reasonable basis on which to attempt any comparisons. That is, a period which spans the graduation of Nos.8 and 13 Courses and Nos.21 and 26 Courses. Records show that, for the General Duties Branch officers of these Courses, about 57 per cent of the College graduates reached squadron leader rank within the desirable time frame as against only some 23 per cent of Academy graduates.

Empirical data of this nature are not, of course, conclusive but they do suggest that the Academy graduate of that period was not as competitive as his College counterpart at least in the early stage of his career. The problem is, as suggested earlier, that the inability to reach squadron leader rank at the right 'weight for age' can adversely effect downstream career prospects. No Academy graduate has, naturally, yet reached air rank. However, two graduates (O'Loughlin and Bowden) of No.15 Course were promoted to group captain rank in 1985 and two of the same course in 1986 (James and Thorns) as well as one of No.16 Course (Weston). Two graduates, Conroy of No.17 and Titheridge of No.18 Courses, were promoted to group captain in 1987. It is noteworthy that each of these officers reached the rank of squadron leader at or before the nine years mark after graduation from the Academy. The disappointing aspect is, perhaps, that in the promotion lists involved the Academy graduates represented only 25 per cent of the total promotees. This does not, of course, mean that sufficient graduates will not be available for promotion to air rank in similar proportions to those that have been maintained in the past but simply that the numbers available for selection would not be as high as might have been hoped. One can only assume that the marked increase in later years of those graduates not reaching squadron leader rank by the desirable time does not offer a favourable prospect for those ex-cadets.

Just as disappointing is the number of supersessions that have been occurring at the flight lieutenant to squadron leader level, not all of which ought to be explained by time in the field. Only two graduates of No. 27 Course have yet been promoted to squadron leader rank, even though the rest of their course have completed six years as flight lieutenants. Their contemporaries have been superseded by seven junior officers who were products of the Flying Training Schools. Of the course ahead, again only one member has yet attained squadron leader rank, the rest having been superseded by 21 officers, some their juniors by nearly two years. There is a considerable improvement with No.25 Course, five members of which reached squadron leader rank on or before the desired date, and two of whom were promoted in the following list. Many of the remainder of No. 27 Course may be picked up in the next list, of course, and may achieve satisfactory career progression, but it may be too late for superseded officers of No. 26 Course to make up the lost seniority.

Officer graduates in the Engineering Branch have not been included in these figures since, in the main, their promotion to wing commander rank has been ahead of their General Duties contemporaries. There would

have been a number of reasons why this should be so, but a conclusion one would not wish to draw would be that attendance at a university produced a better product than the Academy, although the concentrated effort on a professional speciality may well have paid dividends vis-a-vis the generally considered irrelevance of the Science Degree to the General Duties graduates.

CHAPTER 9

REVERSION

From the inception of the Academy, the Commandant was also the Officer Commanding Point Cook, a circumstance which did not apply in the early days of the College. Understandably, therefore, much of the routine management of the Academy was left in the hands of the Assistant Commandant. This post was filled by a number of officers who had had distinguished flying careers, with proven command and administrative experience. None, however, until Group Captain W.H. Simmonds (1) was appointed in 1975 had been a graduate of the Academy or the College and none until Group Captain W.G. Percy (10) in 1980 held university degrees. None of the commandants was tertiary qualified and Air Commodore J. A. Whitehead (3) was the first ex-College graduate to be appointed Commandant in 1977, followed by Air Commodore P.J. Reed (4) in 1979. Amongst the top echelon of the military staff of the Academy there was, therefore, very little experience of civil tertiary institutions and, until 1975, similarly little experience in managing -even a military organization of the extraordinary nature of the RAAF Academy.

Compared with the previous appointees, Group Captain Simmonds was well qualified to be the Academy's Assistant Commandant, having graduated from the first College course, completed a tour on the staff in the 1950s and having served for two years on the staff of the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs. He arrived at the Academy in January 1975 with no precise guidelines but with the clear understanding that he had been selected to effect changes which would 'smarten the place up'. His first impression of the Academy confirmed the concerns which were being expressed at the Department of Air and Headquarters Support Command. In short, he found a deterioration in military standards sheltering under a protective umbrella of academic freedom. There was no uniformity of standards of dress; organized sport had been abolished; discipline was lax; but, most critically, the military staff were continually frustrated in their efforts to remedy problems by the lack of support proffered by top management which, Simmonds says, was prone to favour the academic staff where difficult decisions were required in regard to supervision or other disciplinary measures.

Simmonds sought to rectify these deficiencies by eliciting support from the old College academic staff; by requiring cadets to participate in either cricket, hockey or rugby as team sports as well as in athletics and swimming competitions; by insisting on uniform dress; by reinstating a system of privilege; and by attempting to improve the level of motivation by arranging that all pilots on staff flew, thereby facilitating flights for cadets. The consequences were, he claims, an improvement in morale of the military staff and a more ready acceptance by the cadets of the need for and compliance with a more military style regimen which eventually resulted in a higher graduation rate.

Simmonds' formal dealings with the academic staff were undertaken through the Warden (Hardy) and although his measures were favourably regarded by some of the academic staff, notably among the old College staff members, his attempt to 'smarten the place up' were not always appreciated. He found Hardy, for whom he and all previous graduates had the very highest regard, to be his most formidable opponent when it came to attempts to tighten-up military practice at the expense of academic freedom. He observed that academic considerations, whether in regard to Academy routine as a whole or to individuals in particular, invariably assumed precedence over military opinion, and he believed that Hardy was able to exert undue influence over the Commandant at that time and that he had been able to do so for a number of years over all Commandants. Hardy, on the other hand, would argue that his prime concern was the administration of the academic program, by ensuring that academic standards were maintained and that cadets were not distracted from their academic pursuits by extraneous non-essentials.

In contention, of course, is the question of priorities. But, in effect, the Air Force had already laid these down when it sought affiliation of the Academy with the University of Melbourne. The University staff

adopted and accepted those standards with which they were familiar. It was not through any inadequacy on their part that the military was unable to create the sort of military ambience at the Academy that it sought. Any blame in this respect, they could reason, lay squarely at the feet of the military staff. Indeed, Hardy saw one of the major contributory factors to the severity of the dichotomy to be the absence of a military commander with the charisma of Hancock, who, through personal example, was able to imbue all staff -military and academic - with his own dedication to and enthusiasm for all aspects of College activity.

Even though the more restrictive stance taken by Simmonds would appear to have been somewhat at odds with the more liberal attitude of the Commandant, by 1976 some of Simmonds' objectives were being met. Several Academy teams were represented in local sporting competitions and although the success rate was not high, cadets were at least given the opportunity to participate in team activity at a competitive level. The move to involve the cadets was apparently well received by the cadet body which suggests that more efforts on the part of earlier staff to further like activities designed to foster inter-dependence and esprit de corps might well have produced rewarding dividends. There appears to have been little attention paid to this aspect of Academy life in the early 1970s. There were some good individual performances at the Inter Service College Athletics Meeting and Swimming Carnival that year, with the Academy finishing second and third respectively in the overall point score.

The really significant point of all this is that it could be demonstrated that where the cadets were given the proper stimulus and provided with sensible guidance, they were amenable to co-operative and supportive effort. It should have been recognized that young men with virtually no leave restrictions, cars and reasonable pay would, in the main, be unwilling to tie themselves to a routine even remotely like that which prevailed during the College days, even if the same social conditions had existed. With the very significant changes which had occurred within the community at large, only very strong leadership would have been able to imbue the cadet body with the degree of personal and corporate discipline required to achieve and maintain the perception held by senior officers of the day as to what constituted a reasonable standard of conduct and performance, both militarily and academically, for a Royal Australian Air Force cadet. It has to be accepted, of course, that many cadets enlisted into the Academy to fly and to get a degree as a fallback position; becoming an officer was merely incidental to the primary objectives and loomed little in their considerations.

To instil an 'air force spirit' into individuals of this persuasion would have required leaders of exceptional quality indeed. How such people came to be selected for the Academy is another question, but there seems little doubt that many of the young entrants were told that if they failed the academic side of the Academy course, transfer to the Flying Training School would be almost automatic if they sought it. In reality, this was not so and they were told, after enrolment at the Academy, that they would be discharged and required to reapply for entry to the Flying Training School system in competition with civilian applicants. This was, apparently, a source of resentment for many cadets who regarded it as a Damoclesian sword for most, and certainly for the early, years of their course. No doubt, the intent was to put pressure on the weaker cadets to persist with their academic studies instead of taking the easier option. Unfortunately, although some cadets who were suspended from the Academy did manage to gain selection for flying training through the alternative system, many other young men who could not cope with the academic content but who otherwise could have perhaps succeeded on a flying course, were lost to the Air Force.

Whether Simmonds' approach was successful in 'smartening the place up' will remain a subjective judgement. The apparently notorious No.26 Course was the senior course during Simmonds' last year as Assistant Commandant. His regime was not seen by members of that course as having had any marked effect other than, in attempting to suspend two members of that course, alienating it still further. The military staff, claims Flight Lieutenant Kerby (26), had by the end of the third year lost credibility in the eyes of his course. Cadets had been encouraged to take their problems to the military staff_to seek assistance, instead of which, he says, matters raised in confidence were used to initiate disciplinary action or were often openly discussed by officers in the cadets' mess. By the end of 1975 his course had lost confidence in the officers in charge. He

points out that the Cadet Squadron was, in the main, run by the fourth year cadets. Officer inspections of the living quarters and mess bar facilities were not frequent and matters appertaining to the administration of privilege, conduct and deportment were left to the supervision of the senior cadets. Privilege, particularly in regard to bar hours, was open to abuse and he admits that a number of his contemporaries did not always set a good example in this regard.

Squadron Leader D. Chipman (now Wing Commander), who was the Cadet Squadron Commander for part of this time, does not attribute all of the blame to the cadets either. He puts a great deal of the blame on the military staff who displayed little leadership and showed very little interest in the cadets either in their curricula or extra-curricula activities. Where interest was shown, for example, in the reformation of a rugby team, interest tended to snowball; but here again, much depended on the individual officer to stimulate interest and, if this was not forthcoming, efforts on the part of cadets to arrange activities such as an Academy baseball team gained little or no support, and the cadet initiative was likely to go unrewarded. Maintenance of discipline within the cadet squadron was to a large extent the responsibility of the senior cadets.

Self-sufficiency in all respects had been encouraged, but the relaxation of standards and the liberalisation of Tonkin's regime had weakened internal lines of communication and authority. Indeed, attempts even by the more aware senior cadets to strengthen these lines of communication had been rebuffed on pedantic grounds even though supported by the Cadet Squadron Commander. Certainly, the extent of liberalisation of regulations would have been incomprehensible to an early College graduate and the move towards egalitarianism within the cadet body would have been a difficult accommodation for the senior cadets.

Changes to procedures authorised by the Assistant Commandant, Group Captain J.S. Wilson, in August 1973 included, for instance, the deletion of references to activities after stand-down such as defaulters' parade, study period and lights out; the abolition of rostered seating in the Officers' Mess; the abolition of the system of extra duties as punishment which was to be replaced by a system of loss of leave privilege which could only be authorised by an officer on the recommendation of a Senior Air Cadet or Air Cadet Under Officer; the only cadets to be addressed by their rank were to be Senior Air Cadets and Air Cadet Under Officers.

These changes were implemented as the result of a Board of Studies meeting, which body had already liberalised leave privileges even beyond those originally sought by No.26 Course, and were not 'to be taken as an authority to lower one's personal standards, or the general standards of the Academy'. Older graduates may have wondered what other consequences might have been expected. They might like to have adopted the attitude of 'conform or else' but the pressure to enhance the graduation rate was undoubtedly high and any steps taken to improve a cadet's chance of academic success were no doubt seen as being worth the risk. Even so, there appears to have been an overreaction which erred on the side of clemency. Accent on academic achievement destabilised the routine of the Academy. Simmonds, says Chipman, tried to reverse the trend, and the attitude of No.26 Course to him was a natural reaction.

The year 1976 was noteworthy for other reasons. Firstly, the Royal Australian Air Force Academy journal was reintroduced after a lapse of ten years. The former series of journals had been used informally for recruiting purposes, being distributed not only to like institutions but also to the libraries of Australian secondary schools. Financial austerity compelled its withdrawal as a high-quality publication. The editor of the first new-look journal, Squadron Leader M.J. Rawlinson, wrote in his first editorial that:

The new look Journal is totally financed by advertising and has a circulation six times as large as its predecessor. Air Force-wide circulation has both complemented and necessitated a change in editorial policy. Whereas previous Journals had interest for only cadets and the five percent of RAAF Officers who are College/Academy Graduates, the new Journal is aimed at having appeal to all Air Force Officers. Although the pleasure of spending a large proportion of three years in a science laboratory has not been shared by all, memories of Point Cook deeply underlie most air force careers, and the Journal will endeavour to refresh them. More importantly the new look Journal will in a small way supplement the

recently inaugurated Defence Force Journal in providing a forum for the discussion of topics pertinent to the 'profession of arms.' In keeping with this aim the winning Fourth Year 'Air Power Thesis' is reprinted as an indication of cadet thinking on matters vital to the RAAF and the Defence of Australia.

The journal had the look of a glossy commercial magazine rather than the somewhat conservative publication to which graduates were used and this new style was retained until the disbandment of the Academy. Its content perhaps lacked the detail that the average graduate might expect to find but, nevertheless, the journal succeeded in recording events of major import and changes of policy. It certainly portrayed cadet attitudes more forthrightly than the earlier series had dared to do.

Two events recorded in the first new-look journal were the retirements of two of the long serving academic staff. Walter Davis Hardy retired from the position of Warden of the RAAF Academy in January 1976 after 28 years of dedicated service. Hardy had been associated with what had become the Royal Australian Air Force Academy from its very beginning. As a RAAF Education Officer he took part in planning the syllabus of the RAAF College when it was formed in 1947 and acted as its Director of Studies until the first course entered in 1948. Later in that year Squadron Leader Hardy resigned from the Air Force after ten years on active service to take up the newly created civilian position of Senior Lecturer specializing in scientific and technical education. He served at the College as Director of Studies from 1954 to 1960 and as Warden of the academy until his retirement. Hardy was appointed an Officer in the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1961 for his services to the Royal Australian Air Force College.

The other retiree was Mr W.J. Gravell. He had enlisted in the RAAF in 1942 and spent three years in charge of isolated radar stations in various parts of Australia, before being discharged. In 1949, he joined the RAAF College as a lecturer in the Humanities Department, was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 1951 and, with the advent of the Academy, became Deputy Warden. He filled the post of Warden from January 1976 until November 1976 when he was compelled to retire prematurely due to ill health. Bill Gravell, both professionally and socially, commanded affection and respect accorded to few people.

Another event mentioned in that Journal of 1976, and one in which Hardy had played a major part, was the recognition given by the Australian Council of Awards to the fourth year of studies in the grant to successful students of a Graduate Diploma in Military Aviation. This was the fulfilment of a proposal mooted and confirmed as an objective by Headquarters Support Command during May 1974.

A major issue also discussed at the time was that of staffing, prompted by the government's announcement in October 1976 that it had agreed in principle to the establishment of the Defence Force Academy as an autonomous university. Unrest in the academic staff of the Academy had been fermenting since 1967 when the interim report of the Martin Committee recommended that any such institution should be located wholly at Duntroon, and was further fuelled by newspaper reports in mid-1968 which appeared to confirm this proposal, despite assurances to the University of Melbourne by the Secretary, Department of Defence (Sir Henry Bland) to the contrary.

The situation was not clarified until October 1976, when, in a letter to the Vice Chancellor, University of Melbourne (Professor Derham), the Minister for Defence (D.J. Killen)-advised that the government's approval of the establishment of the Defence Force Academy would include a statement to the effect that it would be built on a new site at Duntroon adjacent to the Royal Military College. The announcement generated more intense activity in the staffing area which was to last until the Royal Australian Air Force Academy was eventually disestablished. The negotiations necessary between the Department of Defence and the University of Melbourne were not without rancour.

CHAPTER 10

RELEVANCE

A problem was embedded in the conditions of employment of the academic staff which comprised officers of the Australian Public Service and persons employed by the University of Melbourne, usually on behalf of the Academy. In the early days of the Academy, established posts for this latter category carried tenure. The future of the Public Service employees was, naturally, not accorded the same attention as that of the University staff, since they were subject to Public Service regulations and normal conditions on transfer would apply. The terms of employment for the University staff were not, however, so clear cut.

Generally, professors were appointed with full tenure in the strict sense of the term, whereas others of lower status were frequently employed on an annual contract basis. However, failure to renew the contract was rare and such staff were, in practice, regarded as tenured. For that reason, it would have been difficult to define precisely what obligation the University had to its staff in the matter of continued employment. The extent of this obligation on the part of the University to those staff who did not wish to transfer to Canberra was the source of considerable friction between the University of Melbourne and the Department of Defence which was to continue for several years.

On the one hand, the University believed that where members of the Academy staff did not accept employment elsewhere voluntarily, the contract with the University should continue. The question that the University wanted answered was what arrangements the Department of Defence would make to continue reimbursing the University for costs incurred on the Department's behalf? The Department, on the other hand, although prepared to respect conventional staff practices, was uncertain as to the extent which an offer of employment at the Defence Academy would discharge the University's obligations, perceived or otherwise.

Nor was the anxiety entirely limited to the University staff, since several of the Public Service staff, whose duties were mainly connected with the post-graduate training of cadets in their fourth year, were not accredited to a university. Accordingly, an accreditation committee under the aegis of the Defence Force Academy Development Council was convened to examine the credentials of Public Service teaching staff who were not already accepted by a university as being qualified to teach on a full university faculty. The committee was to determine suitability for employment in teaching positions at the Defence Force Academy. The situation only applied to officers at the RAAF Academy and the Royal Australian Naval College, since those at the Royal Military College had been accepted already by the University of New South Wales.

There is no doubt that the upheaval which would be occasioned by the disbandment of the Academy was having a very demoralising effect on the academic staff. Replacements for vacancies as they occurred were recruited on a basis of appointment for two years at a time, although the Department had stated that it would not object to permanent filling of established posts provided that it was made clear that the appointee would ultimately be required to transfer to Canberra. 'This would ensure that your University would not be saddled with any residual responsibilities towards such staff...', wrote Deputy Secretary Dwyer to Professor D.E. Caro, Deputy Vice Chancellor, in February 1977. It was generally expected that the first entry to the Defence Force Academy would be in January 1982 and the relatively short timeframe involved added another disruptive dimension to the problem of disposal, which was to linger on for some time yet.

The expected opening date of the Defence Force Academy, which meant that the RAAF Academy would cease operations in December 1981, was also of concern to the Air Force Directorate of Training. It meant that the last course to complete the Science Degree and the Graduate Diploma of Military Aviation at the Academy would be No.31 Course, scheduled to enter the Academy in January 1978. Since the Defence Force Academy course for General Duties cadets was to be a three year course, the question arose as to what was

to happen to the 1979 entrants in 1982 and, indeed, gave rise to a paper in which the need for a fourth year of training was debated.

Successful completion of the fourth year at the Academy was rewarded since 1976 by the award of the Graduate Diploma of Military Aviation and was originally introduced to provide a balance between the academic standing of the degree and the professional studies at the Academy. To be admitted to the Diploma, a cadet must have qualified for the degree of Bachelor of Science and reached an acceptable standard in preliminary studies in English, Modern History, International Relations and Political Science. The syllabi of the aerospace units in the Diploma course assumed that the student had studied thermodynamics, compressible and incompressible flow, electronics and atmospheric physics at undergraduate level. Units included were Aerodynamics, Aircraft Engineering, Electronics, Meteorology, Economics, Statistical Methods, Management, Psychology, Defence Studies, History of War and Service Communication. A satisfactory standard in the Defence Studies thesis had also to be reached. The Academy claimed that the Diploma course provided an essential bridge between the difficult high level tertiary course in physical science and an intensive flying course with much knowledge pitched at operator levels.

These courses are necessarily at opposite ends of the learning spectrum. At one end we have the contemplation of esoteric principles and at the other the rote learning of mundane procedures that must be known in detail at instant recall. An applied science course bridges the gap between pure sciences and operator level courses and has a positive motivational effect, in that cadets can finally apply some of the knowledge they have strived so hard to obtain, in an area that is directly relevant to their career.

There had been evidence that the lack of a bridging course, such as applied science, could create severe motivational problems at the flying stage when cadets felt that the level of operator knowledge required was 'an insult to their intelligence' and they responded with below capacity performance. Other reasons might, of course, have been found by other people. It is true, however, that the cadets of the old College courses would not have suffered the same problem since, although they had completed Part 1 and beyond of the Science degree course, their flying component was well integrated with their applied science studies. The Academy argued, further, that for the same reasons that the Diploma course was instituted, an Aeronautical Science course of at least one semester should follow on from the course undertaken by Air Force cadets at the Defence Force Academy.

The Chief of Air Force Personnel (Air Vice-Marshal I.S. Parker), in his submission to the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal J.R. Rowland), repudiated the arguments for retention of the fourth year of tertiary study. He noted, in particular, that because of the diversity of subjects available to study at the Defence Force Academy, graduates from that institution would not necessarily have the prerequisites for an applied science course. He suggested that intelligent, balanced and motivated people should not object to gaining skills and knowledge, mundane or not, which were needed to gain entry to their chosen profession and the fact that this had occurred was simply a reflection of a failure on the part of the Academy to inculcate the right attitude. Further, a study conducted in 1974 showed that the performance of the graduate of the Flying Training School system without degree or diploma qualifications was as good as that of the Academy graduate with them.

Parker agreed that motivation of cadets had been a recurring problem and that many cadets saw greater relevance in their diploma year than in their degree studies. Unfortunately, samples taken at the time were small, but a survey conducted by the Academy of its first six courses showed that a high percentage believed that they derived considerable benefit from the fourth year of study. Indeed, one of the graduates of the Diploma course stated that he, and almost all of the graduates he had spoken to, regarded the fourth year of training as the most fruitful year.

Parker, on the other hand, argued that the real aim should have been to make the Degree course more relevant, rather than to add an additional year. Some cadets, he added, who performed marginally in the Diploma course, advanced as their reason for poor performance a wish to 'get on with' pilot training as soon as possible after the three years of intensive study. He argued, further, that unless there was a significant change

to the existing General Duties Branch promotion criteria, any training interposed between graduation from the Defence Force Academy and flying training would reduce the time available for graduates to gain operational experience before they became eligible for squadron executive appointments, with consequential prejudice to the operational effectiveness of the Air Force. No mention was made of the detrimental effect on competitive promotion to squadron leader rank, which should have been an equally persuasive point. But as this was the situation which had pertained since 1965 it is difficult to understand why this particular aspect should have been raised as a major issue at this time.

Parker concluded that, although there would be a need for some training to be given to Defence Force Academy graduates, there was little justification for the retention of the training given in the fourth year, or even one semester, at the Academy, nor of the staff and facilities required to maintain it. On balance, he thought, graduates would benefit from obtaining their wings a year earlier.

Persuaded by these arguments, the Chief of the Air Staff agreed to the fourth year of the Academy course being discontinued from December 1981.

Headquarters Support Command was informed of this decision, with instructions that recruiting for the 1979 intake be on the basis of the completion of a three year baccalaureate degree followed by training at the Flying Training Schools. The news was duly passed to the Academy where it was not universally well received, particularly by the Public Service staff who were, of course, predominantly engaged in lecturing to the fourth year. Apart from the fact that the abolition of the Diploma of Military Aviation placed their futures in doubt, there was the additional factor that the award of the post-graduate diploma had been seen by them as an official recognition of the effort put into the development and the teaching of a comprehensive and relevant syllabus and of the value placed on the award by the Royal Australian Air Force and the graduates of the Academy. Indeed, the Warden had earlier observed that:

The RAAF College was established to provide future General Duties officers with a basis for continued development. It was therefore decided that the year of flying training should be preceded by a year of studies in military aviation; and the depth of these studies entailed a preliminary two years of studies in pure science and humanities. In 1961 the cost of affiliation with the University of Melbourne was the insertion of a third year of science before the studies in military aviation. Although the preliminary studies were elevated to degree status the *raison d'être* of the Academy was still the year of studies in military aviation (the GradDipMilAvcourse).

To this rancour was added bitterness stemming from the individual assessments given by the Defence Force Academy Accreditation Committee and which were a severe disappointment and source of resentment to some and which, by most, were regarded as being neither consistent nor fair. This attitude was reflected in a balanced and unemotive letter to the Department of Defence from the Warden (Dr D.C. Watson) who had originally been optimistic about the transition of Academy staff to the tri-service Academy. He drew comparisons with what appears to have been preferential treatment of staff at the Royal Military College, and concluded that, in making its assessments, the Accreditation Committee had attached significant weight to the fact that APS staff at the Academy had been teaching non-university subjects rather than university subjects. If this were so, he wrote, 'then a decade of deliberations over the tri-service academy has been to the great loss of the Academy staff, since they were all lecturers in 1967 when the Martin Committee was formed. The inference was that if the Defence Force had been established at about that time, those lecturers would have been teaching degree subjects.

A significant point which appears to have been missed in the original Chief of Air Force Personnel submission regarding the deletion of the fourth year of training of the Academy course, was a consideration of the consequences of the Defence Force Academy not opening in January 1982. The issue came to light

at a meeting held at Point Cook between representatives of the Department of Defence, the Public Service Board and the Public Service staff, for whom such a delay would have serious ramifications. It arose from a misconception by the staff that the fourth year would be retained if, for any reason, the opening of the Defence Force Academy were to be delayed. Alternatives were considered without any definitive proposals being made, beyond an assurance offered by the Chief of Air Force Personnel that if other options were not available that a 'strong recommendation would be made to our successors' that certain education officer posts in appropriate training establishments should be specified for their occupation for the required intervening period.

The extent of the resentment aroused at the time was manifested in some acrimonious and vituperative criticism regarding the leadership and administration of the Academy, the brunt of which was borne by the Commandant, Air Commodore J.A. Whitehead, a graduate of No. 3 Course, RAAF College, and the first of two College graduates to serve as Commandant of the Academy. Complaints were addressed to the Air Officer Commanding Support Command (Air Vice-Marshal F.W. Barnes) and to the Public Service Board. These were investigated by Barnes who found that many of the allegations were without foundation and that judgements had been clouded with emotion and bitterness. At the same time, he wrote to the Chief of Air Force Personnel that he was convinced that there was some substance to the complaints 'about alienation of the academic staff by excluding them from areas where they once participated'. He indicated that he would try to persuade Whitehead to be 'more of a Commandant than an Officer Commanding'. He also proposed to have very full and frank discussions with Group Captain A.E. Heggen (later Air Vice-Marshal) before he took over as Assistant Commandant in May 1978. Heggen (2) was to replace Collinson (1) who had replaced Simmonds (1) in 1977; thus, at that stage, there had been three consecutive College graduates as Assistant Commandants, a sequence which was to continue for the remainder of the life of the Academy.

Heggen recalls the meeting with Barnes as being one in which the need to 'weed out cadets early' was given more emphasis than efforts to try and resolve difficulties at staff level. He was left clearly with the impression that he should try and interpose himself between the academic staff and the Commandant who, apparently, had 'done something to put their backs up'. In this regard, Heggen had already received private correspondence from a staff member, offering commiserations for his misfortune at being posted to the Academy; mentioning that the place was not the same as it had been during Heggen's earlier tour, 1968-69, as Senior Service lecturer; complaining that the new military regime had sought to exclude the academics from a number of activities in which they had formerly been included; stating that morale of staff and cadets was at a low ebb; and suggesting that the place was disintegrating.

Heggen arrived at Point Cook against this background of innuendo but with no defined areas of outstanding concern against which he was to develop a corrective program. He became quickly aware of the conflicts that were seething within the academic sector, particularly among the public servant element, and the resentment which had been aroused through the Commandant's attempts to elevate the standards of the observance of military custom and protocol and his efforts to strengthen the military 'presence' on the Academy's Board of Studies. Many of these problems were alleviated with staff changes and developments towards stabilising the futures of the public service staff being progressed elsewhere, but their participation in cadet social and sporting activities had, Heggen observes, noticeably declined.

No major problems were identified at the Cadet Squadron level, although Heggen was never entirely happy with the situation. He supported the policy that the fourth year cadets should carry the main responsibility for running the cadet body, but he believed that they were given too much freedom, particularly in regard to the management of the Cadets' Mess. He put restrictions on trading hours and sought to establish a more positive control through the Squadron officers. His inability to exert this influence was his major disappointment and it was largely brought about by the fact that the flight commanders were not required to live on base and, therefore, were unable to spend the time with the cadets which would enable them to play the role which Heggen had envisaged for them. Apart from slackening of standards in drill and maintenance

of quarters, there appears to have been little in the routine of the Academy to cause any major comment or concern since Simmonds' day so that although Heggen was ^k'not entirely happy', the adverse criticism of the early 1970s appears to have died down.

By September 1978 there was general realisation that the Defence Force Academy would not become a reality before 1983, at the earliest. Central Office sought advice, at that time, from the Chief of Air Force Personnel on the matter of Public Service staffing requirements in view of the abandonment of the Graduate Diploma year of study. The Chief of Air Force Personnel was noncommittal in response, pointing out that the immediate postgraduate training requirements for General Duties graduates had yet to be determined, but would probably involve some additional officer and/or aviation related training at the Officers' Training School and/or the Flying Training School.

The deferred opening of the Defence Force Academy also held implications for the cadet body. A proposal was put forward by Headquarters Support Command suggesting that the opportunity for cadets to undertake postgraduate study might be considered as an alternative to the fourth year Diploma study while the Academy Course remained at four years duration - that is, for the currency of Nos.29, 30 and 31 Courses. Although attracted to the proposition, the Personnel Branch considered that it was opportune to look more closely at the syllabus as a whole, particularly in regard to the amount of military and aeronautical science training that cadets enrolled for the three year course at the Academy should undertake.



There had been talk for some time about the possibility of introducing a General Duties Arts stream to the Academy and broadening the double physics major Science degree by permitting major study in mathematics. Indeed, the matter had already been broached by Whitehead in an informal letter to Professor Sir David Derham, then Vice-Chancellor of the University of Melbourne. Views on these and other implications stemming from the change to a three year course at the Academy were passed to Air Force Office from Headquarters Support Command in June 1979.

The paper prepared was a compromise derived in consultation between senior staff at the Academy and training staff of the Headquarters and was submitted as a workable, rather than ideal, solution. In brief, the measures proposed were that the non-degree subjects which should be included in the academic curriculum comprise English Communication and either Aeronautics or General Studies as mutual alternatives; the Military Curriculum be revised to place more emphasis on the more practical means of officer development, with much of the existing Defence Studies syllabus being incorporated into the Military Term to serve the dual purpose of Service education and officer development; and that, because of timing schedules, a bridging course be devised to enable graduates of the three-year course to join the Flying Training School course post commencement date.

In regard to the latter, Academy graduates had been exempted from the Flying Training School syllabus studies in Physics, Mathematics, Organization and Administration, Air Force Law, Drill and Ceremonial, Ground Defence, Self Expression, Study Methods, Aerodynamics and Meteorology. The bridging course would be required to correct any mismatching in Aerodynamics and Meteorology subjects, since the content studied at the Academy might not have direct relevance to the Flying Training School syllabus and some graduates may not have chosen Aerodynamics from the available options.

Included with the Headquarters Support Command submission was a paper prepared by two of the Public Service academic staff at Point Cook, which offered an alternative to the one proposed. In essence, it argued against the retention of the Science Degree Course in its present form, suggesting that it was not suited to an Air Force vocational end. An Applied Science Degree would have been more appropriate or - better still - a Bachelor of Science (Air Force) similar to the Bachelor of Science (Mil) taught at the Royal Military College by the University of New South Wales could have been established. The Public Service staff, it continued, could have made a valuable contribution to any such new course of study in conjunction with the University of Melbourne which had had extensive experience in establishing an Applied Science degree even though that had been discontinued by that time. If the University did not wish to participate it could have

withdrawn under existing arrangements and it might, perhaps, have been possible to negotiate an alternative agreement with another university. Alternatively, it would have been possible to establish an Academy degree, with recognition from the Australian Council on Awards in Advanced Education. Any course, it was argued, would have been preferable to retaining a degree which did not suit the requirements of the Air Force and misallocated valuable educational resources.



Cadets worked on two aircraft restoration projects -the Maurice Farman Shorthorn and the Meteor Mk 8, shown here. No.30 Course is pictured hard at work on the restoration, and with the finished aircraft. The Academy was disbanded before work on the Maurice Farman could be completed.

The first course not to complete four years at the Academy was No.32 Course which marched in to Point Cook in 1979. Even after the completion of the first year, members of that course were still uncertain as to their future. Cadet M. Lowe, writing in the Academy Journal, remarked that 'nothing concrete [had] been decided about the three year syllabus', although his understanding of it was much along the lines of the proposal put forward jointly by the Academy and Headquarters Support Command. He believed that few cadets would select the General Studies option and his class was concerned that the Science Degree Course would turn out to be less flexible in content than had been hoped. The military training side he thought to be even less defined than the academic but believed that the major benefits from the fourth year had been retained. He was not keen on the prospect of being commissioned after flying training, although he noted that some cadets might 'prefer to have the option of leaving the Air Force if they fail pilot training' (conditions for voluntary separation from the Service were easier for the cadet than for the commissioned officer). How the interim period between leaving the Academy and joining the Flying Training School in March 1982 was to be used was also a source of concern. His solution was to 'stay and run the Academy Squadron, thereby gaining valuable experience' and helping No. 33 Course make the transition from a junior to the senior Course.

It is worth recording at this stage that, outside of the academic sphere, much of the original College routine remained. The Assistant Commandant (Group Captain R.W. Collinson (1), later Air Commodore) was to write in the Academy Journal of 1977-78, while comparing like activities, that:

Snow training still endures although the approach is now somewhat more professional with staff completing a snow safety course prior to leading the cadets off to Thredbo, and all cadets reach a reasonable standard of proficiency both in snow survival and on skis through careful physical preparation and the use of skilled instructors and proper equipment. In contrast, the cadets of 1948 manufactured their own skis, arrived at the foot of Mount Buller in battle-dress and greatcoats and then commenced to hike up the mountain in the dark and through heavy snow. No one knew precisely where the lodge was located and the trek took most of the night - how we survived the hike, let alone the week, on such inadequate equipment and with so little knowledge is little short of a miracle. The Goulburn River saw its first party of cadets the following year again with homemade gear in the form of timber and canvas covered canoes. These ungainly craft overturned repeatedly and caught every snag in the river which in mid-winter proved to be little warmer than the snow of the previous year. Today, fibreglass canoes are used and the trip is completed in summer, but most participants end up with a ducking and still complain of the water temperature. The evasion exercise survives, but the distance has been reduced and the area has changed, probably to give the inhabitants some respite from marauding cadets searching for food and shelter. Last of all, there is the annual bivouac, a ten-day camp designed to teach ground defence, fieldcraft and weapons handling, but also serving the dual purpose of trimming the fat from cadets after six weeks' leave and making return to the rigours of Point Cook almost enjoyable.

And, indeed, the following extract from the same Journal in regard to end of term tours, shows that these were much the same as originally devised and were received by cadets in much the same vein:

The best part of end-of-term examinations at RAAF Academy is when they are over, for then cadets go on term tours. These provide cadets with the opportunity to visit bases, see units and actually fly aircraft (which, after many solid months of study, comes as a welcome diversion).

At RAAF East Sale, the task of circumnavigating Tasmania in a HS748 Synthetic Navigation Trainer was given to first-year cadets in Operation Fledgling' (true to form, 40 out of 41 cadets crashed, ran out of fuel or just got lost). Actual flights in Macchi or CT4 aircraft were not so disastrous, but for all cadets the first taste of aerobatics exceeded expectations and sharpened ambitions. Important local heavy industry was also visited, and facilities

at Tulla-marine gave cadets the opportunity to compare the workings of the RAAF with civilian control of airspace.

Operation 'Scorch' at Second term's end saw visits by 30 Course to, firstly, RAAF Fairbairn, where No's 5 and 34 Squadrons are stationed. Canberra was toured, special interest being shown to the War Memorial and Houses of Parliament. RMC Duntroon was ignored. A C130 dash through valleys and gorges bolstered the ambitions of many aspiring 30 Course trashies, although generally cadets were glad to see RAAF Richmond's 8000 foot runway again. Once the Course had toured No's 36, 37 and 38 Squadrons, the potential boffins had a field day at 486 Squadron and 2AD. (Remember - it takes all kinds.)

Arriving at RAAF Williamtown in the middle of the joint exercise 'Arctic Ruler' gave cadets a firsthand view of a joint Operation, seeing Mirages, Fills, New Zealand A4Ks and Singaporean A4Bs in action. More jet experience was acquired by most cadets.

No 29 Course raided Thredbo for seven days in Exercise 'Snowbound.' After a vigorous survival exercise, intensive skiing sessions and a full social life (there were about a hundred high school girls at the skiing centre), the cadets limped back to Point Cook, refreshed and ready to tackle a new academic term. Exercise 'Northbound,' aside from providing genuine Queensland suntans to No 29 Course, gave chopper fanatics Iroquois time with No 9 Squadron at RAAF Amberley, as well as a close look at Fill aircraft and its support facilities. At RAAF Townsville No 10 Squadron was visited and a few aspiring wave catchers went for a 10-hour flight in a Neptune. The rest went for a fishing cruise on a RAAF crashboat, stopping at Magnetic Island for some Mini Moke drag races. No 35 Squadron detachment was inspected, then the Course left for Darwin after inspection of RAAF facilities (including a new SURAD complex). The course was squeezed onto a RAN attack class patrol boat in order to appreciate the RAN contribution to continental defence. The short, comfortable hop from Darwin back to Laverton was made in a nice quiet C130A.

At the year's end, 29 Course completed a short parachute training course at RAAF Williamtown, getting their feet wet by performing a sea drop. No fatalities were reported.

As members of 28 Course had almost completed a BSc, it was decided to let them use their knowledge with a visit to Weapons Research Establishment at RAAF Edinburgh on Operation 'Guy Fawkes.' The tour went well, despite pitiful attempts to ask intelligent questions. ARDU was visited, as well as 92 Maritime Wing. The ubiquitous 'other half' was also investigated, with a visit to No 1 Recruit Training Unit, followed by a very detailed analysis of the strategic (hic!) importance of the Barossa Valley.

Whilst chewing their nails and waiting for results, 28 Course was treated to a canoe trip down the Goulburn. It was a pleasant trip through picturesque scenery and picturesque pubs for four days and let the whole course mentally unwind (especially at the Molesworth Pub).

Ostensibly a tour of naval establishments by members of 27 Course, the highlights of Exercise 'Eastbound' included a thorough familiarization with Kings Cross night life and an alert surveillance exercise at Lady Jane Beach. Visits to submarines, destroyers and tenders along with support facilities and various schools highlighted interservice co-operation, whilst a tour of the Naval Air Station at HMAS Albatross provided an insight into naval air power. The Atomic Energy Commission's establishment at Lucas Heights was also visited.

Exercise 'Prune' was the first individual attachment of each member of 27 Course to a squadron of his choice. This year, eight cadets went to Mirages and Fills, six went to choppers, two were attached to maritime and three chose transport (!).

Term tours are an integral part of Academy training, although all cadets seem to share a serious criticism - there aren't enough of them.

Likewise, sport was again prominent in Academy life. By 1979, for example, team sports included soccer, hockey, rugby, water-polo, basketball and volleyball. There was participation in the inter-college swimming

competition, won that year for the third successive time, and in the inter-college athletics meeting. Academy cadets were prominent in Inter-Service and Combined Services teams.



“Snowbound” was another inter-term activity much enjoyed by cadets. As with canoeing, however, little improvement in expertise appears to have developed.

Entry numbers to the Academy in the second half of the 1970s were high and the suspension rates relatively low, which might justifiably have led to the conclusion that the policy of installing College graduates to the top officer posts and the institution of a more military-like regime was beginning to pay dividends. Certainly, the cadet body appeared to have responded to the initiatives taken under Simmonds’ earlier tutelage.

CHAPTER 11

CONDEMNATION

Matters alluded to by Cadet Lowe at the end of 1979 had also been exercising the minds of planners throughout that year. With the entry of No. 32 Course, the Academy had begun a three year transition phase during which two similar but separate training and education streams were to co-exist. The phase would culminate, in the normal course of events, in the simultaneous graduation from the Academy of Nos.31 and 32 Courses. What this eventuality involved was of the utmost concern to the Academy's administrators over such detail as responsibilities within the Cadet Squadron, graduation ceremonies and allocation to flying courses post-graduation.

These matters had not been resolved by September 1979. However, Headquarters Support Command had been informed that there was to be no change in degree studies for Nos.32 and 33 Courses which were to continue to pursue the specialised or double major in physics. Those students who wished to exercise an option of an arts subject were to be encouraged to take one from the group of six common to Arts and Science and of those computer science, statistics and mathematics had the greatest future vocational relevance. Subject to confirmation, No.34 Course would be given the opportunity to undertake major study in other than physics and No.35 Course would be allowed to transfer from Science I to Arts II.

The military curriculum was to be recreational rather than academically demanding. Positive officer development was to occur at a much earlier stage of the course with emphasis placed on practical field exercises. Reductions were to be made in the administrative segments of the course which were, apparently, of 'questionable value with low understanding and retention' and which could, presumably, be covered during the Flying Training School phase.

Concentration was to be on attitudes, values and ideals.

There were considerable reductions in hours allocated to non-degree studies. Aerodynamics was reduced from 122 hours to 48 hours or to 48 hours of general study; electronics from 104 hours to 48 hours or aircraft engineering from 140 hours to 48 hours. Some concentrated bridging to retain existing Academy to Flying Training School phasing was thought necessary in aerodynamics and meteorology, but was deemed to be unfeasible for No.32 Course. This course would be required to join the Flying Training School in March 1982, whereas succeeding courses which should have the benefit of a bridging course, would be able to start the flying course in October of the third year.

The appointment conditions for No.32 Course had been laid down by the Director General of Manpower (Air Commodore H.K. Parker, later Air Vice-Marshal) in September 1978. These were that General Duties air cadets would be appointed to a commission at flying officer rank on completion of their pilot's or navigator's course, but with seniority with effect December 1982; that Engineer Branch air cadets would be appointed to a commission at flying officer rank in December 1982; pilot trainees suspended from No.32 Course and back-coursed for navigator training would be appointed as flying officers at the same time as their No.32 Course peers; and that gradation between members would be determined at Air Force Office using Academy, Flying Training School and School of Air Navigation results.

Unfortunately, these conditions of appointment had not been passed to Headquarters Support Command, whose staff remained ignorant of their existence until information was sought by them from Air Force Office in February 1980. They were also told in response that these conditions resulted from an attempt to maintain the precedent of promotion to flying officer rank after four years Air Force service. Headquarters Support Command comments were sought. In later correspondence, the Command was also informed that cadets would be posted from the Academy to the Flying Training School; that No.32 Course would graduate at the end of the respective degree courses in Science and Engineering; and No.32 Course General Duties cadets

would be appointed as flying officers coincident with the appointment of the Engineer Branch cadets in mid-December 1982.

Staff at Headquarters Support Command were not happy with these instructions. They saw as discriminatory the decision to graduate degree qualified cadets from the Academy without change of status. They compared their fate with that of engineer graduates from the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology who, after a period of three years diploma study, were appointed as pilot officers, and with equipment graduates from the Darling Downs Institute of Technology, who also after three years of study, but towards a Bachelor of Business Degree, were appointed as flying officers. They argued that the Academy cadets were aware of these discrepancies in appointment conditions for tertiary qualified cadets and were justifiably concerned about 'an apparent lack of recognition of their particular academic qualification.' They saw this as a serious morale issue and strongly recommended that No.32 and subsequent pre-Defence Force Academy graduates be appointed as pilot officers, on probation for twelve months.

The point was also argued in a letter of 27 June 1980 that certain administrative difficulties were being used to justify the expressed policy while others were ignored. For example, the possibility of cadets not graduating until after their flying training was rejected because of the problem of returning cadets to Point Cook in time for a December graduation. Yet, it was rightly pointed out, such a system was used satisfactorily at the RAAF College from 1958 onwards. Moreover, Headquarters Command added, the problems created in the Cadets' Mess at Point Cook by an apparent change of status from senior air cadet and cadet under officer to ordinary cadet appeared 'to have been ignored or at best not thought through.'

During a visit to Point Cook in August 19 80 by representatives of the Personnel Division, staff of the Academy and Headquarters Support Command were told that the decision was based on a policy which required graduates to be employable before being appointed to a commission. The Command argued that the Academy graduate satisfied this criterion better in some ways than graduates of either the Royal Melbourne or Darling Downs Institutes of Technology and, therefore, that the same constraint should immediately be placed on graduates of those institutions. In October 19 80, the Director General of Manpower (Air Commodore J.A. Whitehead (3), previously Commandant, Academy) replied that this matter was under investigation, but that to change the policy at that stage would have been unacceptable and that the appointment conditions for No.32 Course and subsequent courses were to remain as stated.

In November 1980, the Officer Commanding Point Cook (Air Commodore P.J. Reed (4)), was asked for comment on two unresolved matters relating to appointments for No.32 and subsequent courses, namely, whether cadets should be attached or posted to the Flying Training Schools, and what should be the associated graduation parade requirements. In regard to the former, Reed enumerated a number of advantages and disadvantages but saw the decisive advantage in attaching over posting the cadets for aircrew training as being that their graduation from the Academy, after four years, would be a 'truly significant event. They would not only have had their degrees conferred but in most cases they would have recently gained their aircrew qualification, and be at the point of being commissioned. In short, they would have completed their preparation for their subsequent career.'

On the second matter, Reed argued strongly that cadets should continue to graduate in their fourth year in the traditional manner. The essential points were, he claimed, that the ceremony must be one of fitting pageantry and must take place at Point Cook. In regard to No.32 Course he was of the opinion that some unique arrangement should be made to enable that course to graduate on completion of its flying training. His views received sympathetic support from both Headquarters Support Command and Air Force Office. Further advantages were seen by the Directorate of Training in that the requirement for graduation would specify both aircrew qualifications and a Science degree as joint course terminal objectives, thus moulding military training and education into a single course; the position could be established that Defence Force Academy graduates should be appointed at the employability point; and it would provide a model which could be used in the development of a proposal to establish a centralised officer training facility at the existing Academy which

would, inter alia, be responsible for the single-service military training of Air Force graduates of the Defence Force Academy.

These proposals were all agreed by the Chief of Air Force Personnel and this advice then passed to Headquarters Support Command and to the Academy. Although it had taken nearly 40 years, the course originally envisaged by the progenitors of the RAAF College, namely, an integrated course comprising degree and flying elements had finally been achieved.

The Public Service staff were not, however, prepared to allow the three year course to proceed without further rearguard action. In a letter to the Minister for Defence (D.J. Killen) the General Secretary of the Professional Officers' Association wrote, following representations from some Academy staff, that although there may be grounds for reducing the length of the course, one that consisted of a pure science degree and a few ancillary subjects was quite unsuited to the education of young men, initially destined to be pilots and later senior officers. The broadening of the course, as had been achieved through the Graduate Diploma in Military Aviation, was essential and the changes to be introduced represented a backward step educationally. The proportion of time allocated to the ancillary subjects, nine hours per week, made their teaching farcical. He added that the University insisted that no homework be set for ancillary subjects and he questioned whether the continued inclusion of them "just for appearance sake" was worthwhile.

The Ministerial response of 2 October 1979 admitted that the course which had been devised was not perfect but noted the overriding factor as being the need to advance the time taken for the cadets to reach the flying training stage. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that even at that stage there appears to have been some doubt regarding the future of the tri-Service institution since the 'Air Force is aware too, of the limitations imposed by a pure science degree and has plans for the general broadening of subjects to be available to cadets if the Australian Defence Force Academy does not proceed.' As a point of interest, despite the decision to discontinue the fourth year, the procedure to reaccredit the Graduate Diploma in Military Aviation had proceeded and the Australian Territories Accreditation Committee had recommended that the course be reaccredited to 31 December 1984.

Earlier in this study it was observed that some courses seem to attract notoriety in one guise or another. No.32 Course, the first of the new format courses, was one such. Members of that course were involved in probably the most unsavoury episode in the life-span of the College or Academy, as a result of which one cadet was discharged and a number of others were placed on formal warnings. The episode in question involved several cadets who, deemed to be consequent upon the aggressive activities of one, became participants in homosexual activity at the Academy. An investigation by Service Police was undertaken as a result of formal complaints made by a cadet in January 1982.

It is not intended to detail these events, but it is relevant to state that instances of homosexuality were known to cadets of No.32 Course late in 1979 and that there had been many other occasions of which they had been aware throughout the period leading to the formal complaint in 1982. A Cadet Squadron Commander during that period (Wing Commander T.B. Jacobs) was to state during the investigation that of the five courses he had seen, No.32 Course was the worst. He did not mean as individuals, but as a group they were 'insular, resentful of authority, unable to recognize attempts to help them, unwilling to assimilate to the RAAF, overconfident of their abilities.' He attributed some of these failings to the fact that as the first of the three-year courses - so called - they were uncertain of their training prospects and both felt and acted as though segregated from the courses above. Failure of the course to report the instances of homosexuality over such a long period was, he considered, typical of the peer pressure which dominated the whole course.

The flight commander responsible for No.32 Course at the time (Flight Lieutenant T.W. Connolly) held the same opinion of the course as did his superior officer, Jacobs. He reported that the course was a closed group in which individualism was frowned upon. 'The group pressure', he had said, 'was negative when it came to academic achievements and military standards. On the other hand, it was very positive when it came to sport and drinking. Flight Lieutenant A.J. Gill, a member of that course, supports these theses

stating that there was no attempt to accommodate individuals and that peer group pressure led to a number of early resignations. The course had quickly learned that by strong cohesive action they were able to withstand attempts by sections to establish dominance and that this was also to serve them well in their dealings with both the military and academic staffs.

Much of this commentary from the officer staff stemmed from claims by the cadets that they had attempted to alert their officers both directly and through the cadet chain of command. The officers, on the other hand, retorted that the cadets were so good at deriding each other that one occasion, more or less, would not have been regarded any differently and that, in any case, no action could be taken because the cadets involved could not or would not offer any concrete evidence. Certainly, the cadets of No.32 Course were consistent in their evidence and maintained the view that they could achieve little by going to higher authority, coloured perhaps by the fact that they could hardly do so without possibly indicting a number of their fellows, and were intent on dealing with the matter themselves .

In a paper written by one of the course members at the time, the points were made that the course preferred to keep problems within itself and that 'previous efforts with other errant members had resulted in a behavioural change or resignation'. The decision to withhold information had, in fact, been a course decision as was the eventual decision to make an official complaint. Intermediate decisions had been taken regarding the cadet deemed to be the prime offender in the way of rather severe room ragging, which included, in the particular case, damage to both private and public property, neither of which were normal. Room ragging generally did not include damage to valuables, but was generally restricted to overturning beds, contents of drawers and books being strewn over the floor, and the room being generally 'messed up'.

Serious though the occurrences of homosexual behaviour may have been, of equal consequence were the peripheral aspects of the episode. The Officer Commanding Point Cook (Air Commodore A.R. Reed) was to report that a common factor arising from the investigation and of very serious concern was alcohol abuse by cadets. That some of the events had taken place in the Cadets' Mess, seemingly without the knowledge of other cadets present, was almost beyond comprehension. There had been admission in evidence of heavy drinking, in some cases to an unconscious state in the Cadets' Mess and at 'fire escape' and 'balcony' parties in the cadets' quarters. Cadets' Mess regulations had been varied in October 1981 as evidence of heavy drinking sessions came to light and Reed, who was appointed Commandant in January 1982, imposed further restrictions. Inspection of the cadets' quarters before his arrival had revealed large quantities of liquor in rooms, leading to appropriate in-house action being taken against the offenders.

Gill, who was the cadet-in-charge of the bar for a period, believes that claims regarding liquor in rooms was overstated. He recalls that on the occasion most probably referred to here, liquor had been purchased by cadets in anticipation of Christmas leave and was not bought for consumption at the Academy. All of this alcohol found in the cadets' rooms was poured down the sink - unjustifiably, he thinks. He admits that some cadets, indeed, frequently drank themselves into a stupor and has no difficulty in believing that, under the circumstances, the passive recipients of homosexual advances would have had no knowledge or recall of the episodes. Heavy drinking of this nature was not, apparently, regarded as sufficient cause for dismissal on personal quality grounds, either by the cadets or the staff.

Reed further observed that, over a number of years, the military involvement in the Academy had waned in favour of a more laissez-faire university atmosphere. The drift away from military discipline, and self discipline, had gone too far. Reed intended that the staff and students 'regroup to a firm charter of military and social behaviour and direction'. Tight control of cadets' activities was to be imposed. Indeed, some remedial action was patently called for since the military staff of the day could not absolve themselves totally from an evident lack of control and supervision, despite the difficulties apparently created by course attitudes and despite the fact that deterioration in standards, of this sort, can be insidious and not readily detectable by resident staff who, because of their tenure, can only make judgements against conditions as they prevailed at the time they were appointed. In any event, it was quite apparent that the practice of self-regulation applied

at the Academy in the management of the cadet body had been an outright failure and that alternatives were indicated.

The Commandant also had some very firm ideas as to the type of officer who should fill military appointments at the Academy, although he was quite positive on the point that the current staff should not bear the blame for all of the existing deficiencies, which had developed over a long period. Each member of the staff needed to be exceptionally well qualified for the job, he wrote to Headquarters Support Command, if the correct balance of military input was to apply. In general, staff selected must engender the respect of cadets. They must be prepared to involve themselves fully with cadets on a day to day basis; to accept without complaint considerable out of hours work, particularly at weekend sporting fixtures; to participate with the cadets in their leisure activities; to fly with the cadets during motivational flying; and, generally, to provide an example on which a cadet could mould himself.

More than desirably, the officer staff member should be a well qualified Academy graduate with the type of operational background that a cadet would admire. There should have been at least one fighter/strike pilot with an outgoing personality as a staff member at all times. One, but not more than two, bachelor staff members would be desirable at any one time. Socially, the married staff member's wife should be able to provide the type of guidance a young man away from home should receive. The staff member must be prepared to entertain cadets regularly at home without financial assistance and with the only reward being knowledge that his efforts are for the good of the individual, the Academy and the RAAF. In essence, the staff member should be prepared to live and breathe the Academy all the time. Such officers are in short supply.

Group Captain W.G. Percy (10), who had been the Assistant Commandant during 1980, saw a deterioration in morale among the students which was occasioned by a lack of resolution regarding the structure of the three year course. The cadets, he believed, settled down a lot once this particular problem had been sorted out. At the same time, he was of the opinion that the cadets were never quite sure as to where they fitted into the scheme of things and were unable to come to grips with being neither officers nor airmen. They tended to react to the status that they were accorded whereby, for example, if they were treated like children they reacted, or rather over-reacted that way.

In Percy's view, there were a number of heavy drinkers amongst the students, just as there always had been, but the problem was not seen to be one calling for drastic measures. Nonetheless, regular beer was replaced by - light' beer on tap - against the wishes of the cadet body - although normal bottled beer and spirits were still permitted. Of No.32 Course, he saw them as troublesome with, interestingly, no course cohesion, comprising a number of little cliques and predominantly self interested. The major problems that he perceived were, firstly, the inability to control the activities of the cadets during the academic year because of the fragmented nature of the studies they were allowed to pursue; and, secondly, his inability to break the academic hold that the staff had over the cadet activities.

Percy was succeeded by Group Captain J.A. Radford, who bore the brunt of the after-effects of the homosexual enquiry, even though many of the problems had developed, or had been developing, well before he assumed the appointment. Radford, as with others before him, had not been happy with what he found at the Academy but considered that, realistically, his powers to change matters were rather limited. He tried to introduce changes to the routine of the Academy which would identify more with a military rather than an academic institution. He noted that a daily routine was observed but that it was 'not policed' and as part of the tightening up process, he re-introduced kit inspections, rostered a Duty Officer, and insisted that the Warrant Officer Disciplinary inspect living quarters.

Again, efforts to instil a higher level of discipline were thwarted to some extent by the need to avoid confrontation with the academic staff. Punishment, for example, could not be administered where the accusation could be levelled that it would interfere with the cadets' studies, which meant that punishment was generally restricted to curtailment of leave privileges. Indeed, so strong was the academic influence that Radford was told that if any further inroads were made into the cadets' time, consideration would need

to be given to declaring the course a “part-time course’. Even the ‘Commandant’s Paper’, introduced by the Commandant, Air Commodore A.R. Reed (later Air Vice-Marshal) to replace the Air Power Thesis of the Diploma course, had to be completed in a cadet’s ‘free time’.

As with Percy before him, Radford found that the day-to-day working of the Academy made control extremely difficult, a problem which was to be exacerbated by the fact that the senior course was the Third Year in 1982. By comparison with earlier years, when the senior course was the Fourth Year, the senior course was not only younger, but also heavily involved in its final year of its university studies and, partly in consequence, was frequently absent from the Academy. It was not able, therefore, to devote as much time to its supervisory role as had its predecessor.

As a result of the investigation at the Academy, the Air Officer Commanding Support Command, Air Vice-Marshal B.H. Collings, directed his Chief of Staff, Air Commodore R.W. Collinson (1), to examine and report on the rules and procedures in force at the Academy and on the philosophy with respect to the *modus vivendi* in meeting the graduation requirement. Collinson, it should be noted, was the Assistant Commandant of the Academy between Simmonds and Heggen, from January 1977 until December 1977; Heggen did not take up the appointment until June 1978, the post being held in the intervening period by Squadron Leader B.J. Roberts (15).

The report was very critical of many aspects of Academy life and was interesting not only from that angle but also because, in some ways, it appeared to reflect a hankering for the community and Service mores of the old College days; moreover, many of the sources of his criticism would have either been evident or incipient at the time he was the Assistant Commandant. Parts of the report are reproduced here as evidence of what, perhaps, the average senior officer of the day expected of the RAAF’s premier training institution and because they give an insight to Academy life at the time.

Cadets are regarded as university students and a policy of non-interference is enforced during the three academic terms leaving only the shorter military and graduation terms for proper inculcation and supervision of the cadets.

Some general comment should be made on drinking habits. It is incontestable that we should be carefully monitoring the manner in which cadets are introduced to alcoholic beverages. The RAAF provides the means for this type of indulgence and we accept a moral responsibility on behalf of the parents of each cadet to ensure that he learns to drink or not, and if he does, to do so wisely and not make an idiot of himself in public. Sadly, this has not been the case. The practice over the past few years has been to drink heavy beer usually as a chaser to a nip of Scotch or some other spirit. There appears to have been no control over bottle sales from the bar and drinking often continued after the Cadets’ Mess bar had closed. Similarly, the barbecue area of the Mess enjoyed high popularity, not so much for its nutritional value, but more for the proliferation of kegs laid on for each festive occasion. Instructions are now in force to curtail these practices at least in RAAF areas. Lack of supervision of cadet drinking habits is believed to be a fundamental cause of the present problem at RAAF Academy.

There appears to have been little or no attempt to guide the development of cadets in a social sense. They are given basic hygiene and drug lectures but no instruction on sexual matters. Bearing in mind their transition from a family scene with every excuse to forego this instruction, to a regimented environment seemingly unconducive to such basic and sensitive issues it would seem fundamental for the Service to take the initiative and ensure that this aspect of adolescent development be properly covered. Similarly, social activities with local girls’ schools, ie. tennis tournaments, debates and dances, have lapsed and formal invitations to the quarters of Academic staff are few. As a result of this inattention, too many cadets are awkward socially, lack presence or a proper appreciation of etiquette and reveal an ignorance of, or reluctance to purchase, appropriate civilian apparel.

Much has been made of self regulation at the Academy by the Cadet body and this is worthy of comment. Appointment to any cadet rank does not entitle a cadet to exercise command, however in the absence of an officer, the senior cadet present is responsible for the maintenance of order and discipline. Cadet Under Officers and Senior Cadets are responsible for administering the Cadet Squadron in regard to dress, weekly 'panics', room inspections, sporting arrangements and maintenance of a proper study environment in their quarters. Such a system provides an essential teaching medium for cadets based on a RAAF unit organization of flights and sections and is paralleled by the military staff appointments of a squadron and flight commanders to monitor activities and intervene where necessary. Powers of punishment by senior cadets are limited (one extra drill) and must be confirmed by an officer before being implemented. 'Hazing' of junior cadets is non-existent and 'initiation' into the Academy is a relatively mild event performed at the bivouac each year.

The three flight system has been based on the first, second and third year entries with fourth year cadets acting as flight and section commanders. This practice has many disadvantages, eg. flights of different strengths and experience levels, and fosters a course spirit to the detriment of a genuine esprit de corps within the Academy. With the reduction in course length to three years, flights have now been rearranged to include members from each entry in each flight. A proposal was put forward many years ago to name flights after distinguished Australian airmen, eg. Williams Flight rather than A Flight, but was not adopted. In the light of current problems such a move is worthy of review.

The transition, from a tertiary level program tailored to an Air Force education requirement to a university degree allowing very little flexibility to meet the needs of the RAAF, has not been in our best interests. The range of electives which a cadet may choose is limited and many are quite unsuited to his future employment. For example, philosophical units such as 'Darwinism' may be taken. Viewed against the restriction of including units such as computer science or electronics in the degree course gives cause for concern over our arrangement with Melbourne University. One unit, Mechanics of Flight, was accepted this year but all others from the now extinct DIPMILAV course must be either taught outside the degree curriculum or dropped.

The dominant position of the academic program in the Academy course has fostered the belief among cadets that academic success, ie. BSc qualification, will lead to graduation and certainly it is very difficult to suspend cadets on the more difficult qualitative assessments of officer qualities, and inordinate lengths are taken to ensure graduation of final year cadets. Each year cadets are allowed to graduate without the DIPMILAV qualification which simply means that they have failed the applied science phase of their training. With the three year Course now established, those failing to gain the 100 points for their BSc - a not unexpected phenomenon - will have to delay commencement of flying training until completion of further qualifying exams in February of the following year. Hitherto, this action had been absorbed, and thus hidden, in the Academy fourth year of training. When a cadet fails these special examinations, such as has just occurred, the decision must be taken as to whether further qualifying time should be allowed. In drawing the line, the impact on future cadet courses must be considered for if they know that extensions of time to qualify become the norm, attention to studies must decline.

In summary, the general picture at the Academy is not healthy. The Academy is not providing the inspired leadership expected, the military flavour is lacking and academic prowess predominates as the sine qua non, sporting arrangements are disappointing, training and supervision in a social sense is practically nonexistent and there appears to be an absence of a proper spirit and devotion to Air Force ideals. In short, we are graduating intelligent, academically-qualified young men who despite three or four years of training are rather short on maturity and in some cases lacking the qualities expected of an officer. That they will become effective officers is not in doubt, but this will be a rather painful process and one which should not be necessary given the time already spent on them.

Collinson had also been critical of some of the military staff, not necessarily from the point of view of competence but more from qualification and experience. He listed a number of actions which had been proposed or implemented by the Commandant, all of which aimed to improve social attitudes, military behaviour and staff participation. Bar hours were to be severely restricted with alcoholic sales limited to light beer only; there was to be greater participation by officers with cadets at all meals; daily room inspections were to be made and the duty officer was to visit the quarters during the evening study period.

Collinson went on to suggest additional measures:

It is clear that the many changes wrought over the years have left the cadets without some sense of purpose. Their general behaviour and attitude is that of a student out to attain what he can from whatever is offered. Whatever spirit exists manifests itself at the course level and within some courses there are cliques bonded together for security and exhibitionism. The changing of the flight system will in some measure lessen this horizontal loyalty but what is needed is a revival of an esprit de corps within the cadet body. The only reference to the responsibilities of a cadet is at 3/19 of Unit Standing Orders which state: "The primary duty of each cadet is to approach the Academy Course in a spirit of dedication and co-operation, with the aim of" high achievement over the widest spectrum of opportunities, to accept and obey the disciplinary codes of the Academy in an intelligent and officer-like manner, and to assume a personal responsibility to foster the corporate life and the professional image of the Academy and of the Royal Australian Air Force. Senior cadets by the exercise of personal example, are to foster a sense of honour, concepts of duty and loyalty, and a ready acceptance of responsibility. This is a basis for behaviour but does not go far enough and should be expanded to frame a code of conduct which each cadet can follow and measure his actions against. He must be conscious of standards, the concept of loyalty and the fact that the Service relies on effort dedicated to the whole rather than the individual. He should be imbued with the thought that only the best can be a cadet and he must shape up or ship out. The view is held that, had there been such a code impressed on each cadet, the grave events now under scrutiny would either not have occurred or would at least have been effectively dealt with before reaching the present scale.

The question of dress off-base was examined and the casual and untidy style of clothing worn by cadets when attending lectures at Melbourne University will no longer be tolerated. Cadets will wear uniform to all lectures and this will be policy for all RAAF trainees henceforth.

Currently, 'Reveille' and other significant periods are announced by whistle. The practice in former days was to play these events as proper bugle-call via record or tape over the College/Academy PA system. These should be re-introduced to augment the military aspect of RAAF Academy.

There should be a greater emphasis on inter-flight sport to allow as many members as possible to participate in major sporting events. Events such as rugby, hockey and the like should be preceded by more training for flight teams and athletic events should have wider participation, eg. all cadets should at least do the track events. The cross-country run around the airfield should be a weekly event by all cadets and a competitive flavour could be added by awarding flight points for specified events.

The position of the Commandant in relation to suspensions should be strengthened. Present policy allows him to suspend a cadet for failing to achieve training objectives (presumably academic and officer qualities) but this is further qualified by requiring him to seek Air Force Office approval prior to suspending anyone lacking in personal qualities. As the objective of the Academy is to train officers, he is in the best position to gauge those failing to meet officer criteria and take appropriate action. Failure to support his judgement at higher levels of authority can only undermine his authority and control over the Academy.

Discipline needs to be tightened up in a number of areas. Coupled with reintroduction of more frequent room inspections, articles of clothing should be folded and stored to an agreed pattern, footwear should be clean and polished where applicable and rooms should be scrupulously clean except at weekends where some relaxation in standards may be permitted. 'Room ragging' has been the practice, in one form or another, throughout the history of this unit and is a tolerated pastime provided it is restricted to 'panic' nights and weekends. However, where damage to property occurs, cadets are expected to report such occurrences promptly and they should anticipate having to pay the price of such pranks both in a financial sense and through loss of privileges. Further, it must be impressed upon all cadets that any acts bordering on the obscene and conducted against the privacy or personal property of another cadet will not be tolerated and will result in swift and severe retribution by the proper authorities. On this matter of punishment, cadets need to be reminded that they cannot take the law into their own hands and only the military staff can mount an investigation into allegations of misconduct.

In addition to increased attendance by military staff at the Cadets' Mess to dine with the cadets and visits to their quarters during the evening, regular visits are required by such staff at Reveille parades. This was a necessary measure in previous years and the attitudes displayed by the present cadet population suggest that such a step would be efficacious.

All cadets should be encouraged to fly in the local aero or gliding clubs. Considering their more than adequate rates of pay, such activity would help keep them 'tuned in' to flying and hopefully put a stop to the present spate of loss of motivation at the commencement of normal flying training. This activity will need to be complemented with many other available endeavours requiring high co-ordination and 100% recall in a dynamic environment - something quite foreign to the processes employed by cadets in their tertiary training.

The practice of travelling to remote areas such as Lakes Entrance or the Snowy Mountains over the week-ends should be carefully controlled by imposing driving radii and only those excursions considered to be worthwhile and within the bounds of safety and competence of the applicant should be allowed. Prior to such excursions, cadets should be carefully briefed on the conduct expected of them including application of a sensible attitude to drinking and any other acts likely to portray the RAAF and the Academy in a poor light.

The report, contends Radford, was written following a half-day visit to the Academy and largely on the basis of an 'assistant Commandant to ex-assistant Commandant' discussion. Most of the recommendations proposed by the Commandant for implementation had already been adopted, he claims, and although all other recommendations had been examined it was not practical to institute them all. An attempt was made to prepare a code of conduct for cadets and cadets were required to wear uniform when attending lectures at the University of Melbourne; otherwise it was generally considered that as much control as was reasonable or desirable was already exerted over such aspects as participation in sport, maintenance of discipline and weekend activities.

The measures proposed were designed to restore the highest standard of conduct appropriate to a military academy and which, as evidenced by recent events, had been allowed to decline over a number of years. The Air Officer Commanding endorsed the conclusions of the report and commented that the situation which had been allowed to develop was not the fault of any one administration but, rather, had been the result of an accommodation of gradual pressures for change without having paid sufficient regard to the cumulative effect of such change. Later, in a letter to Air Force Office dealing with cadet training at both the Academy and the Engineer Cadet Squadron, he was to confirm his views, but added that there was a need for greater military influence at the Academy and, moreover, because the Academy graduate was considered to have had sufficient officer training during his course, that such training should be accorded priority over academic proficiency.

This is, of course, one of the major issues which bedevilled the Academy's military staff throughout its history. Collinson's report gave an overview of the Academy routine and 'analysis of its ability to meet perceived RAAF requirements,' although this latter quote may be something of an over-elaboration. One of the things which his report did not cover in any depth was 'the philosophy with respect to the *modus vivendi*.' This is interpreted to mean that he was required to examine some means whereby the conflicting interests between the objectives of the academic staff and the military staff could be resolved or more closely aligned. Although he touched on the ingredients of the problem - the lack of empathy between the respective staffs, the unsuitability of available elective subjects, the belief amongst cadets that academic success will automatically lead to graduation, the extension of qualifying time to allow supplementary examination - but, seemingly, he, as others before him, was unable to offer constructive advice as to how to come to terms with the dichotomy between the academic and military ethos.

The content of the degree course, including the suitability of electives, was considered to be beyond the control of the Commandant and was the prerogative of the University faculty. Similarly, the allied recommendation regarding enhanced powers for the Commandant to remove from training those cadets failing to demonstrate officer qualities ran into the problem of quantification. In other words, it was much easier to demonstrate positive academic proficiency than negative personal qualities. Further, there was no mention of what both Percy and Radford regarded as a major source of difficulty: namely, the question of how to control the cadet body involved, as it was, in such a diverse range of academic activities over an irregular time span.

Interest shown by senior officers of the Department of Air or Air Force Office in the- activities of the College or the Academy from 1948 onwards comes up as a series of peaks, occasioned by some unsatisfactory report of output or performance, and rather long troughs in which the attention given to events at either institution might, at best, have -been regarded as neutral. The homosexual episode was the undoubted cause of a peak of renewed interest following a period of not necessarily benign neglect but rather a general assumption that nothing was reportedly wrong, although there is unattributable evidence to suggest that the views and recommendations of the Commandant and military staff in regard to suspension had not always been supported at higher levels.

This is not to suggest either, of course, that all that happened at the Academy was, in fact, unwholesome. Most of the Academy's students were untouched by the unsavoury series of events leading to the enquiry early in 1982 and there were other more positive achievements worthy of note. For example, No. 31 Course, the last of the Graduate Diploma courses, graduated 36 officers from an intake of 42, a feat achieved by no other course. The actual statistics were: 42 enlisted, two added from other courses; eight left, leaving 36 comprising 33 General Duties and three Engineer Branch officers. Sporting teams achieved reasonable success in local competition during 1981 and there were a number of inter-Service representatives in skiing, rugby, hockey and swimming. Cadets participated in Australian Rules football, soccer, rugby, skiing, tennis, cricket, volleyball, hockey, basketball, swimming, athletics, waterpolo and squash, most of which were represented in various Victorian leagues.

Also of interest are two views expressed in the Academy Journal of 1981, concerning academic content, one from the senior course and one from the junior. Firstly, from No.31 Course, referring to their final year, 'the academics were the most taxing of the four years' and 'no BSc bludge was this.' Secondly, from No.34 Course, who 'found themselves in some really torrid work in Bridge Course. Those members who were the hardest workers of all (remaining conscious during lectures), found themselves churning out two or more letters per day, which pleased the folks on the home front no end. Many novels were either read or written during this highly educational period.'

These two extracts are noted because Group Captain G.J. Beck (13), who was a product of the College to Academy transition era and who held the degree of Bachelor of Science, was extremely critical of the syllabus content and academic performance of the cadets. When he took up the appointment in August 1983, he

was distressed to find that after nearly a quarter of a century, virtually no progress had been made in the development of course content and that cadets still regarded the degree course as irrelevant which, in his opinion, accounted to a large extent for the disillusionment and cynicism exhibited by many of the cadets. In evidence, he mentioned his aversion to subjects such as philosophy of science, welding and casting, being included in the pure physics course, but observed that he could not sustain an argument against them and was, therefore, unable to influence subject matter. He was aware that the cadets regarded the 'Bridge Course' as being largely a waste of time but was unable to have the time allotted to this function reallocated to military training, although the course was amended, apparently, in the final year of the Academy to provide an introduction to computer science as a precursor to one of the major options to be available at the Defence Force Academy.

The reduced time available for military activity was a continuing problem for Beck. It was, for example, virtually impossible to coordinate the various classes so that the cadet squadron could drill together. The free time programmed as part of the academic syllabus was unavailable for military purposes and this despite the fact that it was possible for some cadets to gain the 100 points required for their degree half-way through their third year and that, for most, study was crammed into a week or so before examinations. Beck attempted to restore some stimulus for higher academic achievement by introducing a new graduation certificate which graded performance.

The circumstances which complicated the enforcement of discipline persisted. The fourth year cadets, while at the Flying Training School, had little to do with control of the Cadet Squadron and regulation should have been in the hands of the third year cadets. As explained earlier, absences from the Academy environment nullified their usefulness as supervisors, so internal discipline was largely in the hands of the second year cadets. This, says Beck, proved most unsatisfactory and in an effort to improve control he insisted that flight commanders become more involved; he brought the fourth year cadets from Flying Training School quarters back to Academy quarters; and he had adopted a daily routine timetable which covered reveille, lights-out, meals, compulsory study quiet time, and periods during which extra drills (reintroduced) would be carried out. Lectures at the University which had been optional were now deemed compulsory and failure to attend attracted disciplinary action. Although he insisted on uniform dress for cadets attending University, he believes this to have been a mistake since it tended to isolate them from the civilian students.

CHAPTER 12

TRANSITION

The Collinson report was the last of the peaks of Departmental interest in the affairs of the Academy, Air Office activity then becoming concentrated on the advent of the Defence Force Academy and the implications that the joint nature of that institution were likely to have for single service training. Indeed, there was little to attract Departmental intervention as the Academy settled once again into its routine which was to prevail until disbandment. The run down was entrusted to Air Commodore R.J. Walsh who took over the appointment from Reed in January 1984; Walsh had been at the College as a member of No.8 Course but was discharged in July 1956 when he re-enlisted as an aircrew trainee.

Apart from a low point in March 1982 which followed a ministerially endorsed decision to discharge five cadets (later rescinded), the morale of the cadets was to remain, reportedly, high. An exception was, apparently, July 1984 according to the Commandant who wrote in his report for that month that morale and discipline were not as high as they should have been. It was evident that many cadets were not performing to the level at which they were capable and some senior cadets had failed to set an adequate example to the junior courses. Many cadets had been placed on Formal Warning for suspension by the Board of Studies for poor officer qualities. Such a lapse must, however, have been transient only since the reports of the previous and following months had reported morale being 'high'.

In some ways, it is perhaps a tribute to the staff that morale was kept reasonably high throughout this period of transition. It was known that No. 35 Course would be the last course to graduate from the Academy and that Nos.37 and 38 Courses would proceed to the Defence Force Academy in 1986. The future of No.36 Course was, however, a little less certain. Its members would normally have graduated at the end of 1986 having completed their flying courses. By then, though, the Academy would have been disbanded. Their immediate disposal was, therefore, of some concern to Air Office.

In the event, a decision was taken to promote them to the rank of pilot officer in January 19 86, a course which would not adversely affect either them or their predecessors' seniority, and require them to undergo a course of six months in Air Force Studies at the new RAAF College to be established in January 1986. This would accord with the practice to be adopted in regard to future graduates from the Defence Force Academy. The cadets, unfortunately, did not learn of this decision until quite late in 1985 and it was a source of disappointment since their flying training was now to be delayed six months beyond their expected start date.

No doubt, there was cause for apprehension for each of the last three Academy courses. Although members of Nos.37 and 38 Courses were given orientation visits to the complex, the Defence Force Academy was still something of an unknown quantity with several details of its administration, course content and routine not being determined until quite late in the planning stage. But, in the meantime, the routine of the Academy was following its established path. Cadets continued to engage in a wide range of sporting activities; the Academy play was an annual feature as it had been in the old College years; the annual car rally was a popular event; cadets were given limited flying experience; some were able to participate in gliding, rock-climbing or white water canoeing during adventure training exercises; and, as well, between term visits and bivouacs equivalent for the most part to those initiated in the old College days were carried out. Further, cadets joined in such community related activities as Werribee's Weerana Festival, a clean-up of Aviation Road, in Keep Australia Beautiful Week, the escorting of young ladies to a number of Debutante Balls, and assisted in the planting of some 6500 trees near Laverton in association with Rotary.

During 1983 cadets, under the auspices of No.34 Course, designed, built and flew an entry in the Moomba Birdman Rally. Regrettably, the craft, although launched from a height of six metres, was only able to cover six metres laterally in what the cadet report describes as a semi-controlled stall. One further project embarked

upon in 1983 was the restoration of a Maurice Farman 5-11 Shorthorn of WWI vintage. By 1985, all eight wing sections, the tailplane, elevators, fuselage members and ailerons had been constructed to a reasonable stage; new struts were being machined and an original propeller located. Unfortunately, the closure of the Academy rendered further work impossible and the project was handed back to the RAAF Museum in the hope that other volunteers would continue the work. (A similar project, the restoration of a Gloster Meteor aircraft, had been undertaken by members of No.30 Course. This aircraft is held for permanent ground display at the RAAF Museum.)

Exchange visits between selected cadets from the Academy and the USAF Academy had become a fairly regular feature of the yearly program over the later years. A less frequent exchange had also been arranged with the Indonesian Defence Academy. Selection was restricted by space availability on Service aircraft and selectees were usually limited to half-a-dozen or less; selection was a reward for achievement and was highly regarded by the cadet body. Those fortunate enough to visit the USAF Academy returned impressed not only with the size of the establishment and the quality of the facilities provided, but just as much with the range of degrees available. The USAF cadets were able to major in more than 40 subject areas as diverse as Astronautics and Ancient History.

But although the routine of the Academy seems to have settled into a steady pattern, the academic side of the picture was still troublesome. For example, towards the end of 1982 and following a conference between military and civilian staff, considerable concern was expressed over the serious under-achievement by Academy cadets. Consequently, an ad hoc working party was formed to investigate the situation and reported its findings on 13 December 1982. The Academy Board of Studies examined those findings and acknowledged that although statistical evidence could not be found to prove the clear existence of a '51% syndrome', the strong impressions of the experienced staff, together with the admission of the cadets themselves that a general lack of motivation to achieve did exist, were sufficient cause for concern and called for remedial action. The Board of Studies' recommendations in this regard were not overly forceful, placing most of the onus on the staff to effect any improvement - 'continually examine the use of incentives, rewards and the scale of privileges', 'active and positive staff involvement in enhancing course interest and the long-term relevance of all studies being undertaken' and, 'more frequent and regular staff conferences for both civilian and military staff.

There had been several other specific recommendations from the findings of the working party and in January 1984, Beck was to note that there had been 'some disquiet among staff that the report of the working party had 'received little attention by the Board of Studies'. He wrote that the complexity of the problem had prevented implementation of many of the recommendations, but offered comment on some of them. He noted that three changes had already been introduced during 1983, designed to enhance cadets' perception of the need for academic motivation. Firstly, a distinguished graduate programme now recognized military and academic achievement and new graduation certificates had been printed; secondly, the supplementary prize-giving ceremony included awards for each academic subject for each year; and, thirdly, all courses were briefed, individually and collectively, on staff expectations. The working party had recommended the grant or withdrawal of privilege as the result of academic achievement or failure respectively, and had proposed a system of gradings which would lead to automatic suspension after a specified number of unsatisfactory grades. The latter was not acceptable to the Board but formal warnings were administered more liberally than in previous years. Beck considered provision already existed for flexibility in the administration of privilege and selection of cadets for prime visits was made on the basis of overall performance.

What is significant in this discourse is the fact that discussions of this type were still being undertaken 23 years after the Academy began operating and with three years to run, the staff seemed to be no nearer to reaching acceptable solutions. The relevance of course content, for example, had always been regarded as a major source of discontent and demotivator, yet when cadets were given the option between

Electromagnetism (for instance) or a unit from Science, Languages, History and Philosophy of Science, Psychology or Mathematics, one of the latter 'less relevant' subjects was generally chosen in preference.

Further, the Warden (D.R. Watson) was to write that in his report on the third term examinations in 1983 he had drawn attention to the poor performance of cadets in Atmospheric Physics and Aerodynamics. The Commandant (A.R. Reed) was still having difficulty trying to arrive at a compatible military training and academic programme. His observation in March 1983, that the changes that had to be made at short notice to accommodate individual options to be undertaken at the University, the disruption to First Term military and non-degree subjects, and the obvious imbalance in the programme over the three terms, did not augur well for a successful and properly balanced final year of study. The Dean of University Studies at the time (Professor J.A. Thomas) was to write that:

[a colleague had] offered the opinion that a third year student who only spent 40 hours/week on his degree work should expect to fail; this excited no criticism from any other member of the faculty, and I am sure was generally felt to be true. We would expect a civilian undergraduate in third year to spend 50-60 hours per week on his degree work - this is very nearly impossible for a cadet with an average of 7 hours/week scheduled for various activities (drill, sport electives, defence studies, etc) in addition to the more informal duties a cadet may have. Cadets typically have about 26 hours/week of scheduled degree contact hours and even with a hypothetical 3 hours study/night for 6 nights/week will be struggling to achieve an adequate coverage.

In the light of such professional advice it is hardly surprising that the military executive, over the years, had yielded ground in the competition for the cadets' time. Indeed, a proposal to reintroduce a military thesis into the third year military studies of the cadets was sufficient to cause Thomas to record his 'alarm'. On this occasion the Commandant won his point, but in view of the earlier comments regarding the effort expended by the cadets and their attitude generally towards their academic studies, it is difficult to comprehend how academia was able to win such easy victories. Professor Thomas, now Professor of Physics at the Defence Force Academy, readily admits that the cadets did not, in the main, exhibit the same diligence shown by civilian university students, accepts that most cadets worked sufficiently hard only to pass their examinations at the minimum level, agrees that cadets crammed for exams rather than maintained a steady rate of study and that it was possible for a few to complete the course in the middle of the final year. He acknowledges that cadets would choose the easy path when selecting electives, but suggests that the choice of subjects did not rest entirely in the hands of the academic staff and that the Air Force could have directed the cadets in other directions if they had wished.

Although staff would advise cadets regarding their choice of subjects, there was no compulsion to follow that advice as long as their choice complied with Faculty requirements. Nor was there any obligation on the part of the academic staff to influence the choice. To do so may, in fact, have been interpreted as an unwarranted intrusion into the cadets' freedom of choice as, indeed, would have been the case with civilian students. Unfortunately, the fact that the cadets were well paid while they were being educated for their chosen profession and that they had an obligation to their employer beyond that of their civilian counterparts appears to have escaped the attention of the military and the academic staff as a point at which leverage might have been applied.

The suspension of four cadets in the last month of their final year because they no longer had any motivation towards a career as RAAF officers, again raised the vexed issue of loss of motivation. The fact that suspension arose so late in the course was of particular concern to Air Force Office in view of the financial and other resources expended on them. Three of the suspensions, as it happened, followed failure of the pilots course and they selected discharge rather than- elect navigator or engineer training; the other was an engineer cadet. Frequently, cadets who failed pilot training lost interest in the RAAF and they expressed no

wish to transfer to the navigator category or to another branch of the Service; such cadets were discharged as having lost motivation.

At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that the loss of motivation of these cadets was not always allied to their failure as pilot trainees. Lack of interest in the Air Force had often developed before the cadet began flying training, and in some cases discharge on other grounds could well have been justified. Suspension reports sometimes acknowledged official awareness of a deterioration in a cadet's attitude, generally reflected in a reluctance to conform to accepted standards of discipline and authority together with a statement of disillusionment with RAAF life-style, but there appears to have been a reluctance to terminate cadetships on those grounds alone or, at least, until the cadet had been given very considerable counselling and opportunity to overcome his deficiencies. The Academy itself, of course, did not have the power to suspend on the grounds of 'officer qualities' assessments and, reports Walsh in a letter as late as February 1985, 'attempts to do so in recent years have proved fruitless'. He draws a comparison with the situation at RMC Duntroon noting that of '96 dismissals [there] in 1984 only two were for poor officer qualities assessments'.

It would have been naive to assume that all applicants for the Academy were strongly motivated either to the Air Force or to flying. Very few would have had any real appreciation of what service in the RAAF as a permanently commissioned officer actually entailed. The stimulation and maintenance of motivation would have been no easy task for the Academy staff and it should have been no surprise to find that, over the period of the course, some cadets became disenchanted with Service life, because of what they had experienced either within or outside of the confines of the Academy, or that some cadets did not find the satisfaction that they had hoped for in military aviation. What is more surprising is the fact that after continuous changes to the curriculum, to the Academy structure and to the routine, and after the experience of a quarter of a century, the issue of motivation could still be regarded as a profitable topic for debate.

In fact, if the graduation rate, including flying training, is taken as a rough measure of motivation while at each training institution, considering that selections were initially made on a similar basis and from persons of similar educational backgrounds, there is little to choose between Academy and old College graduates or, indeed, over the total time span. The graduation against entrant rate for the old College courses was about 55 per cent as against about 57 per cent for the Academy.


It is worth noting that the training of foreign students was re-introduced over this final period. One Royal Malaysian Air Force officer was to graduate from No. 31 Course, while a Royal Thai Air Force student was included on each of Nos.33, 35, 36, 37 and 38 Courses. They underwent the academic element of the course but completed their flying training with their parent forces, unlike their early College predecessors of the Royal New Zealand and Pakistan Air Forces.

The last course to be inducted into the Academy was No.38 Course, with a complement of 35 students. A member of this course, Cadet Officer S.J. Emery, the son of Group Captain W.J. Emery (11), and now a student at the Defence Force Academy, says that his course as a whole still regard themselves as RAAF Academy cadets. Even having spent only one year at Point Cook, he believes that most of his colleagues have difficulty accommodating to the ADFA routine in which he finds discipline lax, Air Force influence and contact minimal, and an even higher academic dominance than at the RAAF Academy. Their activities tend to be concerted, so much so that they have become known as the 'Air Force faction' and they miss seeing the 'Aplastic parrot' as part of their daily environment.



Admitting that Emery's background might lead to a slanted response to interview, there does seem to be little doubt that in their short time at Point Cook, the staff was able to imbue them with some 'air force spirit' and that the cadets were also able to mould themselves into a cohesive group. As a junior cadet at the RAAF Academy he was made to know his place and believes that his senior courses did a good job in administering cadet routine and discipline. The academic staff, he felt, took an adequate interest in their studies and that

there was 'not too much that they could get away with,' although he acknowledges that they had 'heaps of time' to complete their academic assignments.

The final graduation parade of the Academy was held on 11 December 1985 in the presence of Sir Ninian Stephen, Governor-General of Australia, and Lady Stephen. Thirty-four young officers were to graduate at this parade including a record number of 26 pilots. To coincide with the parade, a function was held to which all past graduates of the old College and the Academy were invited. Of the approximately 600 graduates nearly 300 attended, this being the only occasion on which such a reunion had been contemplated.



In these scenes of graduation parades since 1951, uniforms and side arms have changed over the period but little else.



The Queen's Colour for the RAAF Academy was awarded by Queen Elizabeth II on 5 July 1973. The colour was presented on 7 March 1974 by the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, on the Queen's behalf.

The Colour is sky blue silk with fringe, cord and tassel of gold and crimson silk. It has a decorative border of wattle and the RAAF Academy badge in the centre. The original Unit Badge for RAAF College was approved by King George VI in July 1949 and a close copy of this badge, involving the change in unit title from College to Academy, was approved in March 1961.

The Queen's Colour was laid up in the Officers Mess at Point Cook in a short ceremony following the 1985 graduation parade. This traditional ceremony signifies the disbandment of the unit.

Although this was the last formal parade arranged under the auspices of the Academy, a special ceremonial parade, in the presence of the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal J.W. Newham, was held on 10 July 1986 to mark the completion by No.36 Course of the first Air Force Studies Course. Otherwise, this course would have been the only course to have missed the appropriate military recognition of a major qualification. The graduation of Nos.37 and 38 Courses would, of course, be marked by the relevant ceremonial parade at the ADFA. Coincidentally, and fittingly, the graduate to win the Sword of Honour, awarded for leadership attributes at the RAAF Academy and the new RAAF College, was awarded to Pilot Officer S.J. Robertson, nephew of Pilot Officer D.N. Robertson, Sword of Honour winner from No.1 Course, and later killed in action in Korea.

The Queen's Colour for the RAAF Academy, which was awarded by Her Majesty the Queen on 5 July 1973, was laid up in the Officers' Mess, Point Cook, in a short ceremony following the graduation parade on 11 December 1985. Traditionally this symbolises the disbandment of the unit. In fact, however, the unit was disbanded, in accordance with Air Force Directive 10/85. 'The RAAF Academy will no longer be required to train General Duties and Engineer cadets and will be disbanded.' Disbandment was effected on 20 January 1986.

POSTSCRIPT

The problems of amalgamating the spirit of individual enquiry and intellectual integrity with military discipline and unqualified regard for authority were in evidence throughout the life of the Academy. The conflicts between the objective of education which seeks to stimulate discussion and independent thoughts, on the one hand, and training on the other, which looks to vocational relevance and group orientation, were never satisfactorily resolved from an Air Force point of view.

For the most part, the university staff did not see themselves with a role to play in the development of the cadets as officers of the Royal Australian Air Force. Their measure of success was to be found in the teaching record and the quality of the research that the Academy could attract. During its 25 year association with the University of Melbourne, the Academy graduated some 500 students in Physics who were awarded the Degree of Bachelor of Science. Additionally, under an agreement in 1962 whereby the Academy was allowed to instruct civilian or military students in the higher science degrees and the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, about 30 students completed the Degree of Master of Science and about 50 the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The reasoning behind this agreement was that it would provide for the establishment of a more balanced Science Department and attract higher calibre staff; it would enhance the academic prestige of the Academy and improve the quality of its publications; and, it would be of value to the Royal Australian Air Force in that it would provide a facility for serving members.

The fact that the Air Force had not availed itself of the facilities for post graduate education was a source of contention with the Academy staff (and is likely to remain so at ADFA). The academic staff believed that promising Academy graduates should have been encouraged to undertake post-graduate degrees. The Air Force, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the graduates were already too long 'under training' and more delay would only be a further impediment to their career progression. In any case, they would have had enough scientific education to meet the Air Force need and education for education's sake was not a pursuit to encouraged.

The provision of adequate research facilities was regarded by the McLachlan Committee as being essential if appropriately qualified staff were to be attracted to the Academy. As a consequence, a building suitable for research activity was included in the building program and the Air Board agreed to an annual research grant of about £15,000 (\$30,000) to the University of Melbourne, subject to certain administrative arrangements. By the time of the Academy's demise, this sum had been more than quadrupled. In addition, the University of Melbourne provided its normal research grant per student and agreed to make available some space at the University for research.

By 1971, the Academy had built up an international reputation for research. Professor Hopper, then Dean of University Studies, was able to write that major research support had been received from the United States Atomic Energy Commission for research in the Upper Atmosphere and this had amounted to well over \$300,000 in services, equipment and funds during the previous five years. Further, the Australian Research Grants Committee had provided over \$100,000 during the same period to support the research programs of Academy staff.

Grants had also been received from the Bureau of Meteorology, Department of Civil Aviation, Radio Research Board, PMG Research Laboratories, Nuffield Foundation and the Australian-American Education Foundation. Melbourne University research scholarships were valued at over \$60,000 for that year (1971) and the University Grants to the Department of Physics (RAAF Academy) were also over \$40,000. Collaborators in gamma-ray astronomy in the USA allocated some of their funds which in the previous year had amounted to over \$250,000, for the provision of expensive balloons. The Academy also collaborated on an equal footing with the Physics Department Group at University College, London, and the Ionospheric Group at the University of New England.

As it happened, it was about this time that the Martin Committee was recommending the formation of a tri-service institution to replace the three separate Service bodies. Understandably, Hopper was most concerned that the work in which his staff was involved and which had considerably enhanced Australia's reputation in the scientific field overseas should also be recognized in Australia and allowed to continue without detriment should the tri-service establishment eventuate. Illustrative of the cause of his concern was the fact that although the number of research students remained constant at about 30 from 1966 to 1971, according to a report in the University of Melbourne Staff News of February 1986, it was to fall to seven by 1976.

Work continued however, mainly in the areas of astrophysics and atmospheric physics, supported by grants received from the University of Melbourne, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization and the Australian Research Grants Committee in addition to the Department of Defence (Air Force Office). Some projects were carried out in collaboration with colleagues at Case Western Reserve University, the University of California, Mt Stromlo and Siding Spring Observatory, Imperial College, London, Nagoya University and The Institute for Space and Astronautical Science.

Considerable interest had also been shown in lower level investigations into the physics of turbulence, wind structures and electric fields, particularly by means of remote sensing acoustic doppler radar systems. These systems, designed and built at the Academy, were being used both in Australia and overseas for observation and control of atmospheric pollution. Research also continued in the other disciplines of Mathematics, Aeronautical Science, and Humanities and Military studies. Overall, some 500 publications resulted from the research effort conducted under the auspices of the Academy.

Looking back at the Academy, and from the outside, it is difficult to visualise it as an entity, as was the case with the old College. At the College, the military staff, the academic staff and the cadet body formed a cohesive group working to a common and solitary goal - to produce, in the main, officers for the General Duties Branch potentially able to become air commanders. It was a simple model within which each element clearly understood the rules of play and precisely where and how it fitted into the operative pattern. Standards, across the board, were defined, acknowledged and honoured; non-conformity was unacceptable. Whereas, quite evidently, the Academy was a house divided.

For its part, the Air Force never seemed to understand what it had taken on when it sought affiliation with the University of Melbourne. At the least, there appears to have been little or no appreciation of the impact that emphasis on academic attainment would have on militarism of the institution as a whole. The Air Force lacked administrators knowledgeable in the ways of either academies or universities and it is not surprising, therefore, to find the better qualified and more experienced University staff exerting the greater influence. Indeed, there is enough evidence to suggest that not all senior officers were convinced of the need for a degree-producing academy and that most regarded the science degree as irrelevant and would have preferred vocationally oriented education, either in arts, humanities or applied science. Generally, however, considering that the Academy existed solely to provide the Air Force's future leaders, very senior management, or indeed the Air Force at large, seemed to pay scant regard either to its output or in the way in which that output was achieved.

By comparison, the University side of the house well and truly had its act together. Under the strong leadership of Hopper, supported by a very able staff, early academic authority was established and academic objectives met. Throughout the Academy's existence, and even in the old College years, the University of Melbourne had been a generous supporter. The Vice-Chancellor, Sir George Paton, in particular, had taken a keen interest in the Academy project and was proud of its achievements in the teaching and research fields. Under his good offices, the University had assisted in the recruitment of staff, had supplied technical and administrative staff, had paid grants to research students, had provided a small building at the university for Academy use, had allowed cadets to attend lectures at the University free of charge and had permitted the use of computer facilities at no cost to the Academy.

Moreover, the University had been reasonably flexible in accommodating Air Force wishes regarding course content. In its earlier years the Academy was able to attract first class people, some of whom unfortunately left as a consequence of the uncertainties engendered by the Martin Committee Interim Report, and there is no doubt that, from a purely academic point of view, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Academy had developed into a teaching and research institution of considerable standing. Unfortunately, these considerable achievements were not interpreted by the Air Force in quite the same light; on the teaching side, in particular, the Air Force's concern was with the quality of the product as an officer, not simply as a student.

On the other hand, the academic staff would argue that in that regard they had done the job for which they were paid and done it well; once again their side of the house was in order and it was the military which, ergo, must be at fault if its own standards were not being met. Dilemmas of this nature are only likely to be resolved, presumably, where each side of the house has a common aim and this, perhaps, is only attainable where each has a common employer responsible for the laying down of both academic and military standards. In the case of the Academy, the Air Force had been able to define what it really wanted from the Academy rather than trying to live with the platitudes of its own recruitment brochures.

In the long run, however, what is really of interest is not so much whether the College or the Academy met their respective aims, or whether the problems of the military and academic dichotomy could have been resolved, but rather whether the eventual outcome was worth the effort. By the end of 1986, about 50 per cent of the air rank General Duties officers were College graduates, but less than 40 per cent of the group captain ranks were College or Academy products. The numbers are not great and the proportion is not as high as would have been hoped for when the College was first mooted. At that time, of course, it was anticipated that most officers holding permanent commissions would be College graduates and, under the Service conditions of the day, that most would serve to retirement. And, indeed, most of the graduates of the first ten or so courses did achieve rank commensurate with their length of service, but this would not necessarily have applied if all had served to retirement or thereabouts.

In reality, however, the fact is that not too many of even those first courses were sufficiently 'imbued with the air force spirit' to see out the full career span. Most members of Nos.1 and 2 Courses would have reached or have been near retirement ages for rank by 1986, but it is significant that of the first eighteen courses, comprising either College or Academy graduates, only about 25 per cent are still serving. Resignation rates for graduates of No.19 Course and onwards are not meaningful at this stage since those graduates would only have just reached the 'twenty year for pension' mark and may not yet have been tempted to seek outside employment.

What is disappointing is to find that ex-cadets fill something less than 35 per cent of the General Duties appointments at the rank of wing commander and above and that the situation does not appear to be improving since ex-cadets only managed to fill about 10 per cent of the January 1987 promotion list for General Duties Branch officers of squadron leader to group captain ranks. This, in itself, would not provide an overwhelming argument against the value of the College or the Academy to the Air Force, since all future air rank officers could conceivably be drawn from that 35 per cent. On the face of it, however, that would appear highly unlikely, and the prospect of a higher proportion of non-Academy graduates occupying the very senior ranks seems to be increasing if for no other reason than the comparative numbers available for selection.

On the other hand, the future proportion of Academy graduates to Flying Training School graduates at the higher ranks might also change as a consequence of resignation or early retirement for one reason or another, and this might again alter the balance of the equation in favour of the Academy graduate. Such happenstances are unpredictable, but again the likelihood seems remote. However, longevity does appear to play a part in the promotion process to very senior rank. Those Flying Training School graduates of the 1950s, for example, who were granted short service commissions and who stayed on in the Service have, for


the most part, kept pace with their contemporary College graduates. None of the foregoing is to suggest, of course, that those graduates of either the College or the Academy who did not reach or, indeed, did or do not aspire, to very high rank have not made a valuable contribution to the Air Force. It merely rephrases the question put earlier as to whether the same contribution might not have been made by them without the preliminary indoctrination through the College or the Academy.

If, as seems more than a possibility, as many non-graduates continue to hold as many senior appointments as College or Academy graduates, there would appear to be reasonable grounds for querying the wisdom of establishing and maintaining either institution. Indeed, Scherger's apparent inclination to abolish or downgrade the College may well have been the right one. Its conversion to the Academy does not, as yet, appear to have provided any major advantages although it is probably too early to be positive in this regard. Indications are, however, that the later Academy courses in particular may have trouble competing with their Flying Training School counterparts at the first point of selective promotion.

The tragedy of this situation, from an Air Force point of view, lies in the fact that the fruits of the education given to the Academy graduate might not be able to be properly utilised until late in his career. In the meantime, the deficiencies in his vocational training and the lack of competitiveness at the flight lieutenant level, partly because of the time spent 'under training' and partly because of the accelerated promotion to the base flight lieutenant grade, look as though they could lead to a loss of seniority at the squadron leader rank. This, in turn, raises some doubts as to whether they will get to use the intellectual tools with which they were equipped during their time at the Academy and on the attainment of which the Air Force was prepared to expend so many resources. The next consequence is likely to be disenchantment for the majority and a severe loss to the Service.

This should point to the question of whether there might not have been a better way of doing it. Indeed, was there any reason to establish a dual entry system to the General Duties Branch at all, considering its composition as it is today? In 1945, there would have been little doubt as to the advantages of an officer training institution of the type eventually created in 1947. This was to cater for the Air Force's corps of permanent officers, remembering that most other aircrew were to be either officers or airmen on short tenure. The progenitors of the College could hardly be blamed for not foreseeing the expansion of the Service, the commissioning of all aircrew, or (the most significant change of all) changes to the retirement scheme which enabled officers to opt for resignation after 20 years of service without sacrificing all pension rights. Much of this was also true in 1957 at the time of the deliberations of the McLachlan Committee.

The weakness in the logic at the time, however, appears to lie in the acceptance of the 'missile air force' thesis which was mistakenly allied to the non-sequiter of tertiary education, particularly where tertiary education was deemed to be pure science. Neither of the above premises would have borne substantial scrutiny and the most urgent argument in favour of the Academy was really that relating to competitive recruitment. It was at this point that thinking appeared to go astray. The Air Force never fundamentally established which was to come first; the officer, together with an implied ability to fly, or the education. The latter won, despite the fact that as early in the life of the Academy as 1964 when it was prepared to canvass the option of dropping the course and the Air Force providing its own tuition outside the sponsorship of the University On with a mixed population more than ten times that of the RAAF Academy, controls were less restrictive, supervision less close and routing more difficult to administer than it had been even at Point Cook. The likelihood of being able to inculcate the 'air force spirit' into these young men and imbue them with the 'high standards of honour, personal conduct, moral courage, loyalty, self-reliance, devotion to duty, and many other qualities desirable in future leaders', required of the old College Charter, looks to be one step further removed even from what were the chances at the RAAF Academy.



CT4 OVER RAAF ACADEMY

THE NEW DIRECTION

by Group Captain P.W. Growder, Commandant, RAAF College

The Air Officer Commanding Support Command was directed to reform the RAAF College at Point Cook on 1 January 1986. Planning for this event had been proceeding since May 1984, when the Chief of the Air Staff Advisory Committee recommended formation of the College by moving the basic staff course and external studies elements of the RAAF Staff College from RAAF Base Fairbairn, and amalgamating these with the Officers' Training School at Point Cook.

Initial development of this plan was handled within the office of the Director of Training at Air Force Office in Canberra, but the project was transferred to Headquarters Support Command in August 1984. In November a project officer and team began formulating policy for the College and the courses to be included, a task completed in June 1985 while renovation of the vacated Academy buildings at Point Cook was undertaken. The old physics and chemistry laboratories, lecture theatres, humanities building and university support facilities were extensively remodelled, and the Academy library retained.

In September 1985 the Chief of the Air Staff formally approved the formation of the new College to undertake the military training and education for RAAF officers and officer cadets. The College was to incorporate the Officers' Training School, the RAAF Staff College and the Engineer Cadet Squadron, and include an element known as the School of Air Force Studies. The College was to provide single service training for RAAF cadets and for graduates of the Australian Defence Force Academy, who would undergo the six-month Air Force Studies Course before beginning flying training or moving into their employment in the RAAF.

While it had been approved that the advanced staff course element of the RAAF Staff College was to be incorporated, along with the basic staff course and external studies, the decision was taken not to immediately co-locate this element with the others at Point Cook. The permanent location of the advanced staff course was purposely to be decided later; in July 1988 it was resolved to retain this at Fairbairn.

The process of forming the new College in January 1986 was planned to be accomplished in three phases:

The incorporation of RAAF Staff College elements and the Officers' Training School into the RAAF College organisation, the transfer of engineering cadets from Engineer Cadet Squadron, and the conduct of the first Air Force Studies Course for the RAAF Academy cadets who completed their degree course in 1985. The transfer of the Engineer Officer Basic Course from RAAF Base Wagga to the College by July 1986. The transfer of specialist officer courses, and the basic staff course and external studies elements of RAAF Staff College, in January 1987. The organisational structure which came into force in January 1986 saw the Officer Commanding at Point Cook (an air commodore) also become Commandant of the RAAF College. This officer-controlled both the Basic Training College at Point Cook and the Staff College in Canberra, which each had their own commandants (at group captain rank). The Commandant of the Basic Training College controlled an Officers' Training School, School of Air Force Studies, External Studies School and Basic Staff School.

Within months it was realised that there were problems with this organisation: the administrative staff at the School of Air Force Studies was too small to carry out all the duties required; there was a lack of resources within the same school to carry out single service training as well as the Air Force Studies Course; and limitations in domestic and training accommodation would delay the scheduled transfer of the Engineer Officer Basic Course from Wagga until September.

Changes brought into effect in January 1987 removed the advanced staff course as an element of the RAAF College, which eliminated the requirement to have the Basic Training College as a subordinate

element within the organisational structure. The Officers' Training School and School of Air Force Studies were additionally downgraded from the status of separate units. These arrangements reflect the 'mature' organisation of the present College, with one further significant modification.

After a major revision of the Air Force Studies Course early in 1990 reduced the training time required from 24 weeks to just five weeks, the Chief of the Air Staff cancelled this course entirely. In March 1991, the College operates as a wing formation commanded by a group captain, and comprises: three schools - External Studies, Basic Staff, and Officers' Training - each under a director of wing commander rank; a headquarters having a Training and Development Flight under a director (also a wing commander); and an Engineer Training Squadron.

Due to the various organisational alterations during the first few years, combined with fundamental course changes and frequent long absences of executive staff, the College operated not as a unit but as four schools following their own procedures, customs and precedents. When Group Captain M.J. Rawlinson became commandant in April 1989, he made a concerted effort to bring all elements of the College together. He introduced the College aphorism "Training for Excellence", made the Warrant Officer Disciplinary of the Officer Training School the College WOD, and formally reconfigured the College concourse area as the College parade ground. In October 1989 the Officers' Mess Annexe, which is under the functional control of the College commandant, reverted from a Mess Committee run by staff to one run by students, with an officer cadet PMC.

As presently operating, the College provides all non-specialist officer education and training up to but not including the Command and Staff Course. This includes single service training for RAAF officer cadets of the Defence Force Academy. The College also provides specialist training for the Engineer Branch and the Administrative Category, and (through the Engineer Training Squadron) administers RAAF aeronautical engineering officer cadets studying at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.

The Officers' Training School is the largest element of the College. It conducts a range of courses including basic and finance courses for Administrative Officers, initial and specialist courses for officers of the Active Reserve, and a WOD course; it also assists with the Commanding Officer Law Course. The School concentrates, however, on junior officer needs through running Junior Officer Initial Training, Junior Officer Training Instructor, and Junior Officer Executive courses. Of these, the 13-week Initial course is the School's 'bread-and-butter'.

A new syllabus for this course introduced in 1989 high-lighted a shift towards a philosophy of adult learning, with a strong bias towards adventurous training intended to extend trainee's personal horizons. Aiming to produce well-organised, confident and self-reliant graduate officers able to participate effectively as individuals and team members, the training encompasses challenges such as abseiling and rock climbing at Mount Arapiles in Western Victoria; canoeing in the Grampians area and in the Werribee River; and orienteering and other running activities in the You Yang Ranges. Practical aspects of the course include several field deployments to develop leadership, basic navigation and field operating skills.

The Basic Staff School conducts six 'middle management' courses for approximately 144 students per year. The Basic Staff Course was developed by the School in 1981 as part of the officer education and training scheme and replaced promotion examinations to squadron leader rank. The External Studies School runs two courses by correspondence: Writing Skills (32 weeks) and External Studies (44 weeks). The latter course - open only to those who have completed the Writing Skills Course - is a prerequisite for promotion to wing commander rank and also for entry to the Command and Staff Course, and as such, it is well-known to officers all over Australia and even overseas. It requires students to demonstrate an understanding of management theory, higher Defence organisation, Australia's strategic policies, national power theory, and concepts of operations. In July 1990 the External Studies School established a liaison with Deakin University to explore the granting of accreditation for its two courses towards a formal civilian qualification.

The RAAF College has changed dramatically in role and method of operation since the days of the Academy and the original College. It remains, however, not only an integral part of the education and training process within the Air Force, but in many respects it may now be a more pervasive influence than its predecessors - as evidenced by a total of more than 1000 graduates from its various courses in 1990 alone. In the fact that all RAAF officers must now pass through the College at least once during their careers, the impact of the College and the quality of its training is - and will continue to be - felt throughout the Air Force.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF SENIOR STAFF

COMMANDANTS

RAAF College

1947-49	Air Commodore V.E. Hancock, CBE,DFC
1949-52	Group Captain M.O. Watson, OBE
1952-53	Air Commodore A.M. Murdoch, CBE
1953-55	Air Commodore E.G. Knox-Knight, CBE
1955-57	Group Captain R.N. Dalkin, DFC
1957-61	Group Captain D.W. Colquhoun, DFC,AFC

RAAF Academy

1961-66	Air Commodore K.R.J. Parsons, CBE,DSO,DFC,AFC
1966-68	Air Commodore C.F. Read, CBE,DFC,AFC
1968-69	Air Commodore J.F. Lush, CBE
19 6 9-70	Group Captain J.M. Sutherland
1970-72	Air Commodore D.W. Colquhoun, DFC,AFC
197 2-77	Air Commodore E.W. Tonkin, OBE
19 7 7-79	Air Commodore J.A. Whitehead, DSO
1979-81	Air Commodore P.J. Reed, DFC
1982-83	Air Commodore A.R. Reed
1984-86	Air Commodore R.J. Walsh, AFC

ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

RAAF College-

1948	Wing Commander A.B. McFarlane, DFC
1948-51	Wing Commander D.W. Kingwell, DSO
1951-54	Wing Commander J.P. Costello
1954-55	Wing Commander R.N. Dalkin, DFC
1956-58	Wing Commander J.M. Sutherland
1958-61	Wing Commander R.S. Royston

RAAF Academy

1961-64	Group Captain M.G. Cowan, DSO,MVO
1964-67	Group Captain G.H.N. Shiels, DFC,AFC
196 7-73	Group Captain J.M. Sutherland
1973-75	Group Captain J.S. Wilson, AFC
1975-7 7	Group Captain W.H. Simmonds
1977	Group Captain R.W. Collinson
1978-79	Group Captain A.E. Heggen
19 79-80	Group Captain W.G. Percy
19 81-83	Group Captain J.A. Radford
1983-85	Group Captain G.J.J. Beck

RAAF College & Academy 1947–86

Wardens

1947-54	A.J. Black
1954-75	W.D. Hardy, OBE
1976	W.G. Gravell
1976-85	D.R. Watson

(Until 1961 the Warden was known as the Director of Studies)

Deans of University Studies of the RAAF Academy

1961-81	Professor V.D. Hopper, OBE
1981-85	Professor J.A. Thomas

Professors of the RAAF Academy

1961-78	Professor V.D. Hopper, OBE	Physics
1962-66	Professor B.C. Rennie,	Mathematics
1966-85	Professor M.N. Brearley	Mathematics
1981-85	Professor J.A. Thomas	Physics

(The University of Melbourne conferred the title of Professor Emeritus on Professor Hopper when he retired from the Chair of Physics in 1978. Since then he has been associated with the Department of Physics as Honorary Professor.)

APPENDIX 2: CHARTER FOR THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE COLLEGE

1. The aim of the Royal Australian Air Force College is to provide young men with the theoretical and practical training to fit them in their careers as permanent officers of the RAAF. The essence of such training is the development in cadets of the qualities of leadership. To this end the curriculum will be designed to develop character, physical and mental fitness, an understanding of men, and to impart a thorough knowledge of the elements upon which air power is based.
2. In particular, this aim will be attained by the following methods:
 - a. The staff of the College, by their example and by the application of a well-balanced syllabus, will imbue the air cadets with high ideals and a high standard of honour and personal conduct; with moral courage, loyalty to the Service, ready acceptance of responsibility, devotion to duty and self-reliance.
 - b. Physical and mental fitness will be maintained and developed by providing scope for the display of initiative, energy and endurance; by fostering a strong sense of sportsmanship and a healthy moral outlook; by developing clear, rapid and analytical thought; and by encouraging cadets to participate in and to organize sport and leisure time activities.
 - c. Cadets will be encouraged to take a personal interest in the welfare of members over whom they may exercise authority, and to study the elements of successful personnel management in preparation for their greater responsibilities as commissioned officers.
 - d. The professional scope of the syllabus will be designed to provide the cadet with a liberal education in the arts and sciences, and with a knowledge of basic Service subjects as a foundation for subsequent specialization for the branch of the RAAF into which he may graduate. The professional aspect may be broadly subdivided into academic and Service instruction:
 - i. The academic field will include instruction in the basic principles and application of the mathematical and physical sciences; in social, political and economic history; in English expression and English literature with particular reference to clarity and facility of expression, both written and oral, and to an appreciation of literature; and in the fundamentals of law.
 - ii. Instruction in Service subjects will include training in the basic duties of an airman; general duties and responsibilities of an officer; flying training to the required standard; a knowledge of the capacity and limitations of air weapons and of weapons of the other Services; the theory of flight; the principles of construction of air equipment; the principles of organization, training, maintenance and employment of Air Forces in peace and in war; the relation between the air effort and the economic capacity of the national resources; and co-operation with other Services.
- a. The syllabus and methods of instruction at the College will be constantly reviewed to ensure that the training continues to impart those qualifications essential to graduates in consequence of changes wrought by scientific and other developments.

APPENDIX 3: THE ACADEMY AIM

1. The Service believes that the senior RAAF executive of the future should have these characteristics:
 - a. He must be capable of inspiring loyalty in those he commands through his general professional competence and understanding of men.
 - b. He must be capable of understanding the political and economic context in which military decisions are made.
 - c. He must be able to advise his Government on the strategic implication of its policies.
 - d. He must have knowledge and experience of the weapon systems available to the Air Force.
 - e. He must be sufficiently literate in science and technology to appreciate the advice of technical specialists.
 - f. He must have the management skills to direct elements of a large and complex organization.
 - g. He must think clearly and present cases logically and convincingly.
 - h. He should be a widely educated man, able to appreciate the contemporary culture.
2. The total curriculum and environmental influences at the Academy are designed to foster these qualities.
3. Arising from the above, a formal statement of the aim of the Academy has been adopted in the following words:

‘The aim of the Royal Australian Air Force Academy is to provide instruction, experience and incentive to each cadet so that he will graduate with the knowledge and the qualities of leadership required of a junior officer in the Royal Australian Air Force, and with a basis for continued development throughout a lifetime of service to his country leading to readiness for responsibilities as a future air commander. To this end, the curriculum will be designed to impart a thorough knowledge of the elements upon which air power is based, and to develop character, physical and mental fitness, and an understanding of men.’

APPENDIX 4: STATUTE OF AFFILIATION WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

Academy cadets qualify for a Bachelor of Science Degree of the University of Melbourne at the completion of their third year. This is made possible by the University of Melbourne statute of affiliation reproduced below, which allows instruction at the Academy for the various degrees in the Faculty of Science and for Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Melbourne.

STATUTE 9.8 - THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Whereas the Air Board has created an educational establishment known as the Royal Australian Air Force Academy (hereinafter referred to as 'the Academy') at Point Cook, Victoria.

And whereas by Section 18 of the University Act, 1958, power is conferred on the Council of the University of Melbourne to make and alter statutes for the affiliation to or connection with the University of any college or educational establishment to which the governing body of such college or establishment consents:

Provided always that no such statutes shall affect the religious observances or regulations endorsed in such colleges or educational establishments.

And whereas the Air Board as the governing body of the Academy desires that the Academy be affiliated to the University of Melbourne on the terms hereinafter appearing.

1. The Academy shall be an educational establishment affiliated to the University for the purpose of instruction of candidates for the various degrees of the faculty of Science and the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University (hereinafter called 'the said degrees').
2. Subject to the provisions of this statute all courses of instruction in the Academy which are in accordance with the statutes, regulations and details of subjects of the University relating to the courses for the said degrees shall be recognized by the University and students who have matriculated and subsequently thereto have received such instruction shall be eligible for admission to the appropriate examinations for that degree conducted by the University upon conditions prescribed by the faculty of Science of the University, or for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy upon the provisions of regulation 3.59.
3. All teaching appointments in any way affecting studies related to the courses for the said degrees proposed by the governing body of the Academy shall be submitted to the Council for its concurrence before the appointments are made.
4. Subject to the provisions of regulation 3.6 0 and to such standing resolutions of the Academic Board as may apply in relation to persons holding full-time University appointments, the Academy shall be recognized as a part of the University for the purpose of accepting any full-time member of the teaching staff of the Academy as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
5. The affiliation of the Academy to the University shall be terminable at any time by mutual consent or after twelve clear months' notice in writing at the will of either body.
6. This statute shall not take effect until the consent thereto of the governing body of the Academy is signified by the signature of the secretary of the Air Board to the engrossment of this statute.

APPENDIX 5: WINNERS OF MAJOR AWARDS

THE QUEEN'S MEDAL

The Queen's Medal is awarded with the approval of Her Majesty to the Dux of the Academy, the graduate who has gained the highest aggregate marks in personal qualities, military and academic assessments over the four year period of the course. The name of the Queen's Medal winner is recorded on the A.J. Black Perpetual Trophy.

THE SWORD OF HONOUR

The Sword of Honour is awarded to the graduate, who by his personal example and powers of leadership, has exercised the greatest influence upon his fellows whilst at the RAAF Academy. The perpetual Trophy for this award is presented by the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

THE FLYING TROPHY

The Flying Trophy is awarded to the graduate who is assessed as the most proficient and best all-round pilot of his course. The perpetual trophy for this award is sponsored by British Aerospace Australia.

Course No.	Queen's Medal	Sword of Honour	Flying Trophy
1	D.N. Robertson *	D.N. Robertson	H.A. Hughes
2	R.E. Frost	R.E. Frost	B.A. Thomas
3	B.T. Sweeney	P.K. Brown	P.A. Young
4	N.F. Ashworth	M.T. Burke	P.G. Larard
5	P.J. Scully	P.J. Scully	K.J. Tuckwell
6	E.A. Radford	E.A. Radford	E.A. Radford
7	R.D. Crump	R.D. Crump	A.F. Taylor
8	R.W. Bradford	R.W. Bradford	R.W. Bradford
9	I.D. McFarlane	J.T. Owens	R.C. Moore
10	W.G. Percy	W.G. Percy	K.G. Smith
11	B.G. Grayson	B.G. Grayson	B.G. Grayson
12	1.6. Gibson	L.T. Winn	G.A. Warrener

* King's Medal

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Cours No.	Queen's Medal	Sword of Honour	Flying Trophy
13	M.E. McDonald	M.E. McDonald	J.W. Garland
14	D.G. Moore	N.J. Conn	J.P. Hayden
15	B.D. O'Loughlin	D.T. Bowden	
16	M.J. Robertson	M.J. Robertson	
17	R.J. Brewster	R.J. Brewster	
18	A.W. Titheridge	G.D. Thomas	
19	C.E. Richards	B.J. Espeland	
20	C.McK. Hingston	D.J. Dunlop	
21	K.J. Downey	B.E. Briggs	
22	P.W.C. Kaye	P.W.C. Kaye	
23	G.T. Sampson	G.T. Sampson	
24	B.P. Crowhurst	J.R. Cole	
25	J.P. Gordon	G.A. Gibbins	
26	D.M. Crowe	H.R. Champness	
27	M.R. Lax	M.B. Selkirk	
28	C.R. Wylie	C.R. Wylie	
29	CD. Miller	C.J.C. Smith	
30	F.J. Haes	D.C. Steele	
31	P.L. Barfield	G.W. Steed	
32	G.K. Todd	B.J. Wheatley	D.A. Limmer
33	G.D. Hall	G.D. Hall	M.E. Hupfeld
34	A.J. Roberts	D.R. Fraser	A.J. Roberts
35	D. Wong	D. Wong	D. Wong
36	S.J. Patterson	S.J. Robertson	

APPENDIX 6: GRADUATES OF THE RAAF COLLEGE/ ACADEMY-

* denotes deceased

No. 1 Course - 1951

D.N. Robertson *	W.H. Simmonds	I.S. Charlton
H.A. Hughes	R.W. Collinson	D.A. Delaney
G.A. Boord *	T.C. Owen	I.T. Sutherland
J.L. Surman *	B.N. Tennant	
H.B. Howard *	D. Ingall	

No.2 Course - 1952

R.E. Frost	B.M. Thomas	A.J. Munday
B. Coleman	L.R. Anderson	B.S. McEwen
B.J. McCabe *	D.E. Hampton	G.E. Hewitt
M.W. Buchanan	B.J. Reynolds *	N.L. Chisholm *
T.J. Withington *	A.E. Heggen	J.R. Cox *
J.H. Cooney	M.J. Robin	D.J. Davies

No.3 Course - 1953

B.T. Sweeney	CD. Sithies	D.A. Carter
P.A. Young *	P.K. Brown	P.J. Malley *
A. Turner	M.R. Dunbar *	R.E. Gillard
J.A. Whitehead	R.S. Ramsey	E.J. Whitehead
J.A. Turton	E.J. Heywood *	

No.4 Course - 1954

N.F. Ashworth	J.A. Radford	M.A. Shamin
M.T. Burke *	J.R. Batchelor *	F.J. Downing
R.G. Green	B.A. Johnson	A.L. Furniss
P.J. Reed	M.K. Lyons	R. Rixon
P.G. Larard	H.H.V. Paine *	S.W. Wilson
J.A. Paule	B.J. Avis	R.F. De Vere

No.5 Course - 1955

P.J. Scully	J.J. Gordon	S. Joshua
R.J.R. Plummer	W.G.M. Richardson	J.P.H. Trinder
K.J. Tuckwell	N.T. Raffin	G.C. Monkley
N.J. McGuire	O.G. Worth	W.E. Sansum
S.S.N. Watson	M.A. Daudpota	

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K.A. Mirza C. Whitely

No.6 Course - 1956

E.A. Radford	P.W. Mahood *	I.F. Andrew
R.G. Funnell	C.C. McAllister	J.S. Hamilton
I.B. Gratton	M. Robinson	R.S. Fisher *
I.R. Gordon	B. Squires	D. Patston
P.A.D. Hilson *	M.J.C. MacKenzie	R.J.W. Bailey
R.E. Offord *	P.A. Bolin	T.A. Morton

No.7 Course - 1957

R.D. Crump	G.A. Jenkins	C.M.V. Roff
M.A. Loves	A.F. Taylor	R.V. Lewis
D.L. Dunstan	J.S. Back	R. P. Ewing
C.J. Noble	G.C. Smith	B.J. Graf
G.I. Holmes *	T.M. Gilroy	
B.S. Lodge	A.J. Simmonds	

No.8 Course - 1958

R.W. Bradford	H.F. Freeman	B.A. Wellington
H.J.F. Roser	D.J. Stubbs	J.W. Mitchell
S.C. Fisher *	A. Eddieston	A.R. Green
D.A. Robertson	D. Middleton	N.J. Montgomery

No.9 Course - 1959

I.D. McFarlane	B.J. Frost	B.B. Thompson
J.T. Owens	S. Clark	S.J. Cattell
R.C. Moore	I.D. Bridge	J.G. Gazley
G.C.D. Richardson	R.J. Phillips	G.N. Goodard
J.M. Leaversuch	J.N. Spencer	

No.10 Course-- 1960

W.G. Pearcy	M.R. Lewino	I.D. McInnes
R.K. Page	B.J. McKenny	J.D. Jordan
T.W. O'Brien	J.H. Dunn	R. Hewitt-Cook
K.G. Smith	R.W. Howe	H.D. Moore
R.T. McLeod	P.J. Dienelt *	S. Mitchell

No.11 Course - 1961

B.G. Grayson	P.N. Perrow	M.A. McMahon
W.J. Emery	I.H. Whisker	A.H. Hopkins
I.M. Westmore	J.A. Pedrina	G.A. Peterkin
D.W. Owens	P.D. Jones	R.G. Grandin

R.R. Tayles

A.A. Streeter

No.12 Course - 1962

L.T. Winn

G.A. Warrenner

B. Bryce

A. Young

I.J. Tolj

S.K. Koski

I.G. Gibson *

E.L. Fowler

P.G. Newton

D.W. Marland

G.K. Holm

No.13 Course - 1963

M.E. McDonald

K.R. Blakers

G. Corner

J.W. Garland

G.N. Clery

K.J. Bos

G.J.J. Beck

D.B. Sutherland

M.K. Pledge

B.J. Sweeney

A.R. Miller

A.J. Emmerson

D.G. Bliss

N.E. Cooper *

R.A. Budd

No.14 Course - 1964

D.G. Moore

J.P. Hayden

I. H. Ashbrook

M.J. Dunn

B.G. Young

P.A. Reddel

D.W.M. Rule

I.T. Williams

N.J. Conn

G. Segan

D.J. Fickling

K.J. Dowrick

J.B. Wurf

No.15 Course - 1965

B.D. O'Loghlin

A.T. Pearson

D.B. Hodge

D.T. Bowden

T.M.B. O'Brien

H.A. Dreimanis

C.G. Hudnott

R.D. Phillips

N.A. Smith

B.J. Roberts

B.G. Cowdell

D.R. MacCarthy

S.T. James

G.A. Thorns

No.16 Course - 1966

M.J. Robertson *

M.J. Rawlinson

M.B. Vink

M. Nixon

K.F. Johnson

R.J. Salmond

R.T. Sivyver

J.C. O'Dempsey

K.J. Dickins

M.J. Cavenagh

R.G. Enders *

B.G. Weston

R.J. Connor

No.17 Course - 1967

R.J. Brewster

W.S. Friend

M.P. Herbert *

C.L. Mills

P.A. Ware

E.G. Buchanan

I.R. McLean *

"R.J. Conroy

D.C. Hobday

K.R. Scott

R.S.T. Lean

J.L. Millhouse

No.18 Course - 1968

A.W. Titheridge

J.A. Stacey

R.J. Hookey

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H.J. Badower *	D. Graham	R.N. Tippett
M.A. Thomas	W.A. Evans	
G.D. Thomas *	K.E. Webb	

No.19 Course - 1969

C.E. Richards	B.A. Robinson	J.O. Spurgeon
D.C. Chipman	D.G. Burley	J.C. Vansetten
B.J. Espeland	J.R. O'Keefe	M.H. Reymond
M.J. Hudson	K.D. Dale *	
P.J. Mather	K.F. Clarke	

No.20 Course - 1970

D.J. Dunlop	D.J. Schubert	C.McK. Hingston
S.R. White	P.F. Peterson	A.Riley
I.S. Frame	J.W. Steinback	R.J. Campbell

No.21 Course - 1971

K.J. Downey	R.K. McLennan	J.D. Smith
D. Halloran	I.L. Getley	M.A. Foster
P.J. McDermott	J.G. Thyer	G.M. Silcock
G.S. Rowe	H.F.B. Howell	P.L. Sadler
B.E. Briggs	G.A. Trowbridge	N.B. Chapman
D.W. Brock	D.J. Fitzgerald	
R.J. Haylock	E.G. Voumard	

No.22 Course - 1972

P.W.C. Kaye	D.A. Lock	N.F. Davidson
S.P. Longbottor	D.M. MacKerras	C.B.J. Hussey
B.C. Williams	G.A. Hyde	P.G. Webb
C.G. Spence	A.H. Huish	P. Clark
T.W. Connolly	R.J. Fox	J.H. Trezise
K.J. Drover	R.D. Hazell	N.E. Kerr

No.23 Course - 1973

G.T. Sampson	L.G. Clayton	M.A. Lewis
M.F. Boland	W.H. Spears	R.N.K. Taylor *
H.N. Burlinson	L.R. Watt	N.A. Jones
M.R. Hurman	G.J. Fitzgerald	K.R. Gosling
R.W. Cook	C.C.P. Blake	M.L. Lewis
B.L. Stott	L.R. Ward	J.F. Shepherd

No.24 Course - 1974

B.P. Crowhurst	M.R. Warfield	E.R.R. Lang
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J.R. Cole	G.D. Shepherd	C.R. Nesbitt-Hawes
P.J. Chance	H.L. Allen	T.E. Grace
D.F. Burns	D.W. Paterson	N.D. McKenzie
L.C. Roberts	V.M. Gallagher	

No.25 Course - 1975

V.P. Gordon	G.A. Gibbins	S.P.J. Carter *
S.A. Wright	G.E. Tasker	K.I. Henderson
D.G. Green	W.L. Madsen	R.J. Preston
G.J. Sheppard	P.J. Procter	D.B. O'Hearn
R.J. Cooke	A.C. Hodge	G.J. Spoor
K.P. Scott	O. Halupka	G.F. Hadfield
P. Bennett	D.A. McLeod	

No.26 Course - 1976

H.R. Champness	G. Gearby	L.R. Harch
D.M. Crowe	R.J. Kerby	T.J. Ahearne
T.J. Sidey	J.F. Barden	J.A. Preimonas
G.M. Rengers	R.I.E. Van Hoff	W.L. Aldham
A.R. Blake	T.J. Brown	R.F. Luke
L. Knox	R. Parker	
R.J. Henderson *	K.W. Jurd	

No.27 Course - 1977

M.R. Lax	U.S. Ely	G.B. Secombe
A.S. Fraser	P.R. Skepper	W.J. Lang
M.B. Selkirk	G.J. Wilson *	S.J. Fielder
M.W. Buddery	T.A. Thrupp	P.M.E. Carter
B.G. Van Eyle	G.W. Davie	J.S. Farguharson
M.R. Morrison	K.S. Foley	J.A. Longrigg
G.J. Henwood	J.H. Roddick	T.W. Poynton

No.28 Course - 1978

C.R. Whyllie *	P.A. McAuley	W.J. Crompton
D.W. Hume	R.P.T. Champion	J.T. O'Halloran
G.P. Presneill	DeCrespigny	D.R. Newman
K.B. Gutterson	P.J. Batten	C.P. Hampson
B.G.M. Lugg	G.J.P. Barnes	G.J. Carter
C.J. Joynson	S.C. Bailey	P.J. Ferguson
P.G. Murray	J.W. Lynch	I.D. Harrison
J.C. McKenzie	J.F. Stewart	T.J. Jay
M.G. Rossiter	A. Caldwell	P.J. Burgess

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No.29 Course - 1979

CD. Miller	G.S. Lee	M.A. Evans
P.I. Morrell	G.J.C. Smith	M.D. Townsend
P.W. Rienks	R.P. Walpole	D.E. Tindall
M.D.G. Hilton	B.G. Van Donkelarr	I.J. Mackinnon
K.M. Bayley	R.W.W. Nelson	G.D. McDougall
D.J. McGrath	G.B.G. Krause	G.A. Cross
W.A. Nelson	G.W. Robins	
J.M. Brown	P.S. Worth	

No.30 Course - 1980

F.J. Haes	J.T. McGruer	G.A. Dawson
M.A. Gardner	K. Osley	A.D. Ball
R.A. Bone	C.B. Burton	P.S. Ward
M.A. Cotterell *	A.M. Franc	N.G. Lindorff
G. Northam	S. Battams	M.R. Maddocks
C.R. Couch	A.M. Livingston	S.D. Reed
A.G. Dally	D.C. Steele	L.J. Douglas
C.A. Navin	G.W. Law	A.P. Ulmer
M.D. Simpson	M.A. Skidmore	

No.31 Course - 1981

B.M. Rosdi (RMAF)	S.L. Goodier	A.P. Jonas
P.L. Barfield	CM. Brown	W.F. Henman
D.P. Smith	B.K. Tonkin	E.J. Walsh
D. Pappas	D. Newman	A.N. Bennett
G.W. Steed	D.R.C. Davis	P.A. Hislop
I.A. Farnsworth	D.J. Keightley	D.A.J. Scott
P.J. Sterling	M. Tippelt	S.L. Toms
G.P. Anderson	C.L. Macaulay	R.G. Oliver
J.M. Adams	R.N. Lawson	B.J. Dunstan
M.R. Williams	R.L. Hodge	T.C. Griffiths
I.W. Davidson *	M.B. Francisci	P.D. Hayes
R.J. Thomas	M.J. Clark	R.A. Harrington

No.32 Course - 1982

G.K. Todd	A.J. Gill	S.C. Drury
M.J. Barnsley	B.S. Dickeson	B.J. Wheatley
S.W. Perret	N.P. Groves	M.A. Toia
S.M. Erskine	I.R. Watt	C.S. Crocombe
R.E. Ulmer	S.T. Henderson	G.D. Pedemont

P. Szypula
D.A. Limmer
P.N. Wood

G.A. Holtz
R.G. Magee
C.C. Morris

S.W. Filmer
D.T. Mahoney
M.D. Rowe

No.33 Course - 1983

G.D. Hall
P.R. Lo Passo
T.M. Borella
P.G. Muffet
M.E. Hupfeld
S.C. Smith
S.A. Last
J.N. Eaglen

M.L. Spencer
C.J. Carruthers
D.J. Randall
N. Walker
D.A. Lynch
R.M. King
D.B. Sutherland
D.R. Chaplin

P.E. Shephard
M.J. Hicks
G.A. Hewson
N.E. South
A.D. Buchanan
M.G. Chang
P.C. Yates

No.34 Course - 1984

A.J. Roberts
R.G. Gration
G.P. Borwon
A.D. Banks
D.R. Fraser
S.C. Pinney
G.A. Haswell
A.J. Towie
R.J. Ward
A.B. Gillespie

D.J. Jeppesen
D.M. Honner
G.H. Coy
R.J. Banfield
E.B. Rutley
I.K. Gerken
P.C. Kanaley
A.J. Loch
B. Anderson
P.N. Creagh

T.R. Shaw
D.S. Long
D.C. Baldwinson
C.A. Isaac
A.D. Fisher
P.C. French
M.G. Williams
S.J. Findlay
C.B. Walker
A. Sangrit

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No.35 Course - 1985

S.C. Ackerman	N.C. Hart	C.C. Smith
A.L. Applin	G.W. Haylock	A.J. Thorpe
G.I. Auld	R.D. Healey	R.J. Tizzard
A.P. Beukers	R.S. Howell	B.W. Werndly
G.M. Bramich	S.M. Kennedy	C.A. White
D.W. Doering	R.F. Landini	L.T. Wilson
M.I. Duncan	R.L. Lennon	D. Wong
J.W. Foley	J.M. McGarry	S.T. Woods
E. Gaschk	P.J. Poulos	R.P. Wright
M.A. Green	M.D. Prowse	M.J. Wuillemin
M.G. Greentree	S.P. Rackley	
M.A. Grimmer	T.D. Rundle	

No.36 Course - 1985- -86

M. Arman	C. Gallagher	S.J. Robertson
M.A. Beaver	B.J. Harries	C.G. Roberts
N. Brain	G. Heme	S.M. Roughsedge
B. Breeze	B. Lack	P.T. Schofield
R.K. Brownie	A. Mackinlay	M.J. Smith
G. Bryant	A.I. McArthur	D.A. Steel
R. Bunton	G.B. McDowell	P.C. Tait
I.D. Chennell	J.D. McKenzie	P.P. Trigge
A. Dietz	R.G. Newcombe	S. Votier
T.I. Dunn	G.R. Nicol	B.J. Wells
A.M. Farrier	S.J. Patterson	J.A. Williams

COURSES AT ACADEMY THE TIME OF CLOSURE

No.37 Course

B. Adcock	T.W. Martin	A.L. Smithers
A.R. Baird	M.P. Mayfield	D.A. Steel
M.W. Brazel	L.M. Nagy	R.A. Stroud
S. Chantrapunth (RTAF)	P.M. Nowland	J.D. Tauschke
G.A. Crawford	L. O'Donohue	S.P. Thomas
J.R. Dawson	CD. Phasey	S.A. Toonen
G.J. Fichera	N. Puzey	G.M. Van Der Lende
	O. Refei	

M.J. Halloran
E.A. Hill
M.R. Kitcher
J. Lemarquand
T.J. Lewis
S.A. Maneschi

A.C. Richardson
D.A. Riddel
C.A. Sambell
D.J. Sampson
G.D. Simpson
D.R. Smith

P.B. Wardle
A.J. Whalley
I.R. Whyte
T.J. Woodrow

No.38 Course

M. Atkinson
S.P. Bellenger
G.R. Browne
P. Chinaramrungruang
(RTAF)
A.R. Elliott
S.J. Emery
M.D. Garside
R.S. Gaskell
A.N. Glover

V. Jiervasi
1.6. James
N.L. Lewis
N.L. Lewis
P.E. Lewis
S.R. Smith
D.A. Strong
A.N. Vidler
S.A. Waldron-
Lamotte

B.P. Williams
D.J. Worthington
S.W. Young
R.J. Lovatt
C.S. MacDonald
A.S. McConnell
J.D. McNess
R. Meschino
G.B. Neilsen
A. Short

FILE REFERENCES

Number	Title	Location
182/1/435	RAAF College - Monthly Reports	AA
C1226/4/P3U)	Board of Studies - Record of Meetings	AA
C46/4/AIR	Flying Training - Air Training Schedules	AA
40/4/537	Flying Training - Air Cadets at RAAF College	AA
566/2/70	RAAF Academy - Formation, Organization & Movement	AA
14-8-413	Training of RAAF Cadets - Ex Duntroon (Jan 31 Entry)	AA
14-8-475	Selection of Cadets for RAF and RAAF (1928-37)	AA
14-7-25	No.1 Course - Officers Naval and Military Secondment to RAAF	AA
20-6-18 (1) (2) (40-4-438 (1))	RAAF College - General Proposal to Establish	AA
566-2-70 (2)	F.O.M. RAAF Academy	AA
Old Air 620-6-11 (1) (2)	RAAF College - Conditions of Service and Entry	AA
620-6-25 (1)	RAAF College - Air Cadet Course Syllabus	AA
40-4-420	RAAF College - Ancillary Training Organized Visits during Vacations	AA
40-4-506	RAAF Cadet College - Conditions of Service and Entry (Over 19 Years of Age)	AA
40-4-489	RAAF College - Training of Royal Pakistan Air Force Cadets - Administration General	AA
40-4-528	RAAF College - Training of RNZAF Cadets - Individual Progress Reports and Results	AA
C1226/3/P3	Confidential Reports - Dominion Air Cadets	AA
40/4/513 (1) (2)	Exchange with the RAF - Graduates of the RAAF College	AA
C43/23/AIR	Suspension of Cadets - Failure to Fly	AA
40/14/445	RAAF College - Staffing 1947-53	AA
C1226/2/P3C1)	Air Cadets	AA
C43/47/AIR(I)	Final Year Thesis	AA
40/4/540	Works Officer Training by RAAF College	AA
C43/24/AIRQ)	Suspension of Cadets - Academic, Personal or Medical Reasons	AA
C1226/7/P3	Air Cadets - Reports on Graduation	AA
C1228/3/P3	Prizes and Trophies - RAAF College Cadets	AA
208-30-450	RAAF College Cadets - Recognition of Academic Standards by Australian Universities 1948-54	AA
40-4-449	RAAF College - Air Cadet Courses -Disposal of Wastage from - Policy	AA
C43/33/AIR	University Progress Reports -Technical Air Cadets	AA
40/4/446	Entry of Cadets to RAAF College -Procedure	AA
40/4/547	Cadets Posted from RAAF College for Training - Responsibility of CO RAAF College over CO Trng Units	AA

208/30/451	RAAF College Cadets - Reports on Educational Training of No.1 Course, 1948	AA
40/4/450	Air Cadets - Disposal After Failing to Reach Academic Standards	AA
AF515/2/8 (l) (2)	Training - Service RAAF - Academy Courses Administration	AA
OAF620/6/24 (1) (2) (3)	Review of RAAF College Appointment and Report of Committee	DR (AA)
40/6/1	Air Force Wing at Duntroon	AA
AF515/1/141	RAAF College of Officer Training Policy - DT-AF Aspects	DT-AF
AF515/2/1(2) (3) (4) (5)	Training RAAF General - RAAF Academy Policy	DT-AF
AF515/2/17 See AF85-1502	RAAF Academy - Nominal Rolls, Transfers and Suspensions	DR DT-AF
AF83-8953	RAAF College of Officer Education and Training - Developments	DT-AF
AF517-29-146 See AF85-18637CL1)	Officer Training for Tertiary Degree Cadets	DT-AF
620/6/37	RAAF Academy - Syllabus of Training	DR
ACAD1226/82/ P3(l)	Special Reports - Cadets	PC
HQPK1226/2/ P3(6)	Adverse Reports - Cadets	PC
13/150/3(2) (3)	RAAF Academy	MU
13/146/3	RAAF Academy	MU
43/4/24 AIR	Interview Boards RAAF Academy	HQSC
43/2/5 AIR	Air Experience Flying Academy Cadets	HQSC
43/3/3 AIR	RAAF Academy Training Cadet Operations	HQSC
43/3/4 AIR	RAAF Academy Training Operations RAAF Academy Visits - Policy	HQSC
43/4/6 AIR	RAAF Academy Training Administration	HQSC
43/3/19 AIR	RAAF Academy Training - Statement of Academic Records - Ex Cadets	PC
4 3/AIR	RAAF Academy Training - Policy	PC
43/12/6 AIR	Exercise Fledgling	PC

Legend to Locations

AA	Australian Archives
DR	Defence Registry
DT-AF	Directorate of Training (Air Force Office)
PC	Headquarters Point Cook
MU	Melbourne University Archives
HQSC	Headquarters Support Command

